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Security Council

Fifty-sixth year

Provisional

4325th meeting

Tuesday, 5 June 2001, 11 a.m.

New York

President:	Mr. Chowdhury	(Bangladesh)
Members:	China	Mr. Wang Yingfan
	Colombia	Mr. Valdivieso
	France	Mr. Teixeira da Silva
	Ireland	Mr. Cooney
	Jamaica	Mr. Ward
	Mali	Mr. Toure
	Mauritius	Mr. Neewoor
	Norway	Mr. Kolby
	Russian Federation	Mr. Lavrov
	Singapore	Mr. Mantaha
	Tunisia	Mr. Mejdoub
	Ukraine	Mr. Kuchinsky
	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Mr. Eldon
	United States of America	Mr. Hume

Agenda

The situation in Afghanistan

Letter dated 21 May 2001 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2001/511).

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

The meeting was called to order at 11.20 a.m.

Expression of sympathy in connection with the deaths of His Majesty King Birendra, Her Majesty Queen Aishwarya and His Majesty King Dipendra of Nepal, and other members of their family

The President: At the outset of this meeting, I should like, on behalf of the Council, to express grief and sorrow at the passing away of His Majesty King Birendra and Her Majesty Queen Aishwarya of Nepal, and of other members of the royal family. His Majesty King Birendra contributed greatly to the social and economic development of Nepal, promoted peace in the region and was deeply loved by his people. I should like also to express our heartfelt sorrow at the passing away of King Dipendra.

On behalf of the Council, I should like to extend our profound condolences to the bereaved family and to the Government and the people of Nepal.

I invite the members of the Council to rise and observe a minute of silence in tribute to the memory of His Majesty King Birendra, Her Majesty Queen Aishwarya and His Majesty King Dipendra of Nepal.

The members of the Council observed a minute of silence.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in Afghanistan

Letter dated 21 May 2001 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2001/511)

The President: I should like to inform the Council that I have received letters from the representatives of Afghanistan, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Pakistan and Uzbekistan, in which they request to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the Council's agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite those representatives to participate in the discussion, without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Farhâdi (Afghanistan) took a seat at the Council table; Mr. Hosseinian (Islamic Republic of Iran), Mr. Ahmad (Pakistan) and Mr. Vohidov (Uzbekistan) took the seats reserved for them at the side of the Council Chamber.

The President: In accordance with the understanding reached in the Council's prior consultations and in the absence of objection, I shall take it that the Council agrees to extend an invitation under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure to Mr. Haile Menkerios, Chairman of the Committee of Experts on Afghanistan appointed pursuant to Security Council resolution 1333 (2000), and to his fellow members of that Committee.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

I invite Mr. Menkerios and his fellow members of the Committee to take the designated seats at the Council table.

Also in accordance with the understanding reached in the Council's prior consultations and in the absence of objection, I shall take it that the Council agrees to extend an invitation under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure to Ambassador Alfonso Valdivieso of Colombia, Chairman of the relevant sanctions Committee.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

I invite Mr. Valdivieso to take the designated seat at the Council table to enable him to present the report.

The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. The Council is meeting in accordance with the understanding reached in its prior consultations.

Members of the Council have before them a letter dated 21 May 2001 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, transmitting a letter dated 18 May 2001 from the Chairman of the Committee of Experts on Afghanistan appointed pursuant to Security Council resolution 1333 (2000) addressed to the Secretary-General, enclosing the report of the Committee regarding monitoring of the arms embargo against the Taliban and the closure of terrorist training camps in the Taliban-held areas of Afghanistan, document S/2001/511.

The first speaker is Ambassador Valdivieso, who will speak in his capacity as Chairman of the sanctions Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999) concerning Afghanistan. He will present the report contained in document S/2001/511.

Mr. Valdivieso (Colombia), Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999) (*spoke in Spanish*): In my capacity as Chairman of the sanctions Committee on Afghanistan, I warmly welcome the members of the Committee of Experts on Afghanistan appointed pursuant to Security Council resolution 1333 (2000), who prepared the report submitted to the Council several days ago. That report was prepared in accordance with paragraph 15 (a) of resolution 1333 (2000) and appears in document S/2001/511.

The sanctions Committee met yesterday with the members of the Committee of Experts for a preliminary presentation. I should like to highlight some of the elements aimed essentially at emphasizing the primary purpose of proposing a sanctions monitoring mechanism, as provided for by this Council in resolution 1333 (2000) of 19 December 2000. At the same time, I should like to stress at this public meeting that, as established in the text of the report, the participation and commitment of Afghanistan's neighbouring countries are essential to the efficacy of the sanctions.

At the outset, I wish to say that the Committee of Experts had the very concrete mission of presenting its recommendations on the best ways of monitoring effectively, first, the arms embargo and, secondly, the closure of terrorist training camps. In its report, the Committee of Experts has made recommendations as to the best way to monitor compliance with the sanctions, but I must say that members of the Council will find express reference to other, related matters, such as sources of funding — drug trafficking in particular — trafficking in goods and illegal flights. The experts feel that these are directly connected with the traffic in arms and, undoubtedly, with the existence of the terrorist training camps. The Committee of Experts was not called upon to undertake an investigation or to establish responsibilities or facts. I reiterate that its mandate was very concrete and specific.

The Committee met several times here at Headquarters in New York and in the various countries that it visited. It analysed the information made available by those countries and in official and unofficial documents referred to in the report. It also assessed various alternatives in drafting some of the recommendations now before the Council.

The sanctions Committee and the Committee of Experts have met three times: once at the beginning of the work of the Committee of Experts; once upon its return from its field trip, before the final draft of the report was prepared; and at the meeting yesterday, to which I have already referred.

From an operational point of view, the recommendation of the Committee of Experts for the establishment of a monitoring mechanism is innovative and interesting. I wish to point this out because it has also been discussed in the sanctions Committee, without, of course, any country's taking a definitive position. The mechanism, I repeat, is a novel one that has two parts.

First, it would involve the establishment of small Support Teams designed to strengthen existing mechanisms, as set out in the report, in each of the neighbouring countries of Afghanistan. The Support Teams would be entrusted with verifying allegations of sanctions-busting. The other element would be the establishment of an Office staffed with specialists in arms-embargo issues, counter-terrorist activities, the investigation of other international crimes — such as drug trafficking — and legislative and legal support. This Office would be headed by a Director and staffed with those specialists, who would advise the Committee of Experts and support the work of the Teams responsible for activities in the field.

The Committee of Experts has also highlighted the need to monitor movement of acetic anhydride, the indispensable chemical precursor in refining heroin. The Committee recommends closer scrutiny of the granting of export permits for that chemical precursor. It has also recommended that aircraft turbine fuel and lubricants needed for use in armoured troop-transport vehicles be specified in the embargo.

It is clear from the report that the six neighbouring countries are committed to implementing the provisions of resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1333 (2000). In every country we visited, it was stressed that stability in Afghanistan is necessary and that there can be no military solution to the conflict. These considerations are set out in the report, which also states that no monitoring mechanism will be effective

without the cooperation and commitment of the six neighbouring countries. Moreover, it will be extremely desirable to establish coordinating mechanisms among the six countries. Compliance with sanctions must be enforced in order for them to be effective and in order to preserve the credibility of the United Nations. The report also says that sanctions must be seen as a way of encouraging the Taliban, primarily, to participate in negotiations to find a political solution to the conflict.

The Council will therefore have to take a decision on the proposal made by the Committee of Experts. I would like to stress that the Council should do so as expeditiously as possible, for almost six months have already passed since sanctions were adopted through resolution 1333 (2000). As everyone knows, those sanctions are in force for a period of 12 months, and we are still at this stage. There are various reasons for that delay, but unfortunately I feel that there was an excessive delay in appointing the Committee. With regard to the Committee's work, I would like to make it quite clear that once the Experts were finally appointed they met as quickly as possible, carried out their work and provided their report within the deadline.

It is now up to us to work in a more speedy manner. That is why this public meeting is important, as it will enable us to hear the views of the countries that are key elements of the proposed mechanism, as the report clearly states. It is hoped that this will help give impetus to all the actions required to take a decision regarding the monitoring mechanism called for in the report and envisaged in resolution 1333 (2000).

The President: I thank Ambassador Valdivieso for his presentation of the report.

Before giving the floor to the members of the Council, let me mention that, in addition to the Chairman of the Committee, Mr. Menkerios, we also have at the table Mr. Reynaldo Arcilla, Mr. Michael Chandler, Mr. Mahmoud Kassem and Mr. Atilio Molteni, who are here as members of the Committee of Experts to join in the Council's deliberations today.

Mr. Kuchinsky (Ukraine): My delegation would also like to thank the Committee of Experts for preparing this excellent report pursuant to the Security Council's resolution. We note with appreciation that the members of the Committee, who worked very intensively, have fulfilled the Committee's mandate and provided us with a realistic and thought-provoking document.

We feel certain that the specific recommendations on the implementation of resolution 1333 (2000) that are contained in the report will be of practical value to the Security Council in achieving the full potential of its decisions aimed at restoring peace and stability in Afghanistan. We fully endorse the recommendation that an international monitoring mechanism should be established where the sanctions are in place in order to ensure the credibility of the Security Council. Past and current experience — specifically in some African States — proves the importance of a well-designed structure and terms of reference for such a monitoring body to be effective and result-oriented.

We also believe that it is important to take into account the views of the neighbouring countries. Their cooperation is absolutely essential. Clearly, no monitoring body will be successful unless there is full commitment from the Member States involved in the implementation of sanctions. My delegation welcomes the fact that six neighbouring countries have confirmed their full compliance with resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1333 (2000).

We believe that the question of strengthening control on the borders of neighbouring States is central to the monitoring process. From the standpoint of future challenges in the area, they would benefit from a greater level of coordination, which would be broadly welcomed. In our view, consideration of this issue in the "six plus two" group would be a logical step.

We think that the issue of an arms embargo is of the utmost importance in the context of the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan. As the report says,

> "The flow of arms into ... and from Afghanistan is a major long-term cause of insecurity and instability in the central Asian region." (*S/2001/511, annex, enclosure, para. 33*)

We also believe that establishing an effective mechanism to prevent illicit arms trafficking into and from Afghanistan will be the most challenging task before the Council. It is obvious that cooperation on the regional and international levels will be crucial in finding the solution to this problem. In that context, we hope that decisions and recommendations of the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, which will be

held at New York this July, will be of practical use in our deliberations on the situation in Afghanistan.

The report also includes many other recommendations — regarding drug trafficking, the closure of terrorist training camps, the establishment of field teams, et cetera — that fall squarely within the competence of the Security Council and that need to be addressed promptly. The Chairman of the sanctions committee, Ambassador Valdivieso, has elaborated on this subject. I will simply state that we fully share the views of the Committee in that regard.

Finally, I want to stress that we believe that the establishment of a monitoring body in Afghanistan will be an evolutionary process that will require continued attention on the part of the Council. Here, I would also like to reiterate once again my delegation's full support for the idea expressed by the Secretary-General in his previous report, and which is also reflected in the present report, that an integrated or comprehensive strategy is needed to provide for a solution to the Afghanistan problem.

Mr. Wang Yingfan (China) (*spoke in Chinese*): The Chinese delegation appreciates the work done by the Committee of Experts headed by Mr. Menkerios. China attaches great importance to the Committee's report. We will carefully study the report and its specific proposals. We are very grateful to Ambassador Valdivieso for the presentation he just made. We believe that the sanctions committee that he heads will conduct further discussions on the specific elements of the report after today's discussions in the Security Council. I will therefore confine myself only to some brief comments.

It is the obligation and duty of all Member States comprehensively to implement Security Council resolutions 1333 (2000) and 1267 (1999), on sanctions against the Taliban. We have noted that the report of the Committee of Experts proposes new measures, such as the establishment of a new sanctions-monitoring mechanism. The establishment of such a mechanism is intended effectively to enhance monitoring. The Security Council should therefore take actual results fully into account after that mechanism is established.

The border between Afghanistan and neighbouring States is more than 5,000 kilometres long. We would like to know the size and scale required of a monitoring mechanism in order for it to be effective. We also wish to know whether the United Nations will be provided with guarantees of sufficient resources. China does not wish to see a situation develop by which excessive haste in implementing relevant measures leads to the failure to achieve their objective. If that happens, it will be a monitoring mechanism in name only, and that will damage the credibility of the United Nations.

We also wish to point out that the establishment of a new sanctions monitoring mechanism will require the close cooperation of States neighbouring Afghanistan. Before arriving at a decision, the Security Council should carefully consider and respect the opinions of those neighbouring countries.

The Committee of Experts has put a great deal of work into this report, and its efforts should be acknowledged. The report makes certain allegations, however, without specifying its sources. Mere allegations should not be used to prove a point, still less serve as the basis for action. Greater efforts should be made in this regard.

I should like to take this opportunity to provide some information about the border region between China and Afghanistan with which all Council members may not be familiar. The border between China and Afghanistan is located in a cold, mountainous region. Its total length is 92 kilometres, and its average elevation above sea level is more than 5,000 metres. The geography is varied and the climate harsh. There is hardly any human presence in the region, and access to it is extremely difficult. China and Afghanistan have not established any travel routes between the two countries in the border region. Given these features of the border region between China and Afghanistan, what does the Committee envisage doing — indeed, what can it do — there? That issue requires further clarification.

Mr. Mejdoub (Tunisia) (*spoke in French*): I should like first of all to thank Ambassador Alfonso Valdivieso, our colleague and the Chairman of the Security Council sanctions Committee on Afghanistan, and, through him, Ambassador Haile Menkerios, the Chairman of the Committee of Experts, as well as all of his colleagues, for the report that has just been introduced. It is a comprehensive and exhaustive document. The detailed supplementary information that it contains, compiled from different sources, shows the firm commitment of the experts to provide us with a complete picture of the situation on the ground so that

we can draw appropriate conclusions and take the necessary decisions.

I should like to make several comments and share some thoughts about the conclusions and recommendations contained in the report.

First of all, My delegation welcomes the commitment of the countries in the region to abide by the provisions of resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1333 (2000) and to seek a political resolution of the conflict in Afghanistan. Secondly, we share the opinion of the experts that sanctions, the search for a political solution and humanitarian and economic initiatives must be seen as a package of elements in an integrated strategy aimed at the achievement of a representative Government in Afghanistan. Assistance may be necessary for those among Afghanistan's neighbours that need concrete support in order to strengthen and develop their monitoring mechanisms.

Thirdly, it is important to stress the fact that the countries visited by the Committee of Experts showed their commitment to cooperating and to accepting the assistance of the international community. They made it very clear that they would implement the provisions of Security Council resolutions using their own border control services.

That leads me to my fourth point, regarding the recommendations of the Committee on the establishment of a United Nations Office for Sanctions Monitoring and Coordination-Afghanistan. The Office — which, according to the Committee's recommendations, would have headquarters in Vienna — would benefit from the support of Sanctions Enforcement Support Teams working alongside the border control services in the States neighbouring Afghanistan. That is an interesting recommendation, but there are practical difficulties involved. We believe that setting up such a mechanism will depend to a considerable extent on the cooperation of Afghanistan's neighbours, who will have to demonstrate their support for the Office.

In this regard, we believe that it will therefore be necessary to discuss with the countries concerned all the modalities involved and to gather their opinions on establishing the mechanism so as to ensure its success at the practical level. We truly need their cooperation and support.

Fifthly, with regard to the conclusions of the Committee on the implementation of the arms embargo, as well as annex I of the report, which contains a list of arms control measures to be considered by the Office for Sanctions Monitoring and Coordination, my delegation would like to recall that certain issues relating to small arms raised by the members of the Committee are still being considered by States Members of the General Assembly. It would therefore be useful to pay close attention to the United Nations conference on the illicit trade in small arms due to take place in July. In the view of my delegation, we would be well advised to await the conclusions of that conference.

Sixthly, with regard to the recommendations on the imposition of a possible embargo on the chemical substance used in the manufacture of narcotics, we believe that it is important to impose strict controls so as to prevent the production and sale of illicit drugs coming from Afghanistan.

Finally, we believe that sufficient time must be taken to carefully examine the report and assess the impact of the recommendations made by the Committee of Experts so that the most appropriate decision can be taken regarding the establishment of a mechanism to ensure that Security Council sanctions are implemented.

Mr. Lavrov (Russian Federation) (*spoke in Russian*): I join in the words of gratitude expressed to the Chairman of the sanctions Committee and to the Chairman of the Committee of Experts, which prepared the report in accordance with resolution 1333 (2000) and made recommendations about the monitoring of the arms embargo and the closure of terrorist training camps in the territory of Afghanistan controlled by the Taliban. We have studied the report and support its main conclusions regarding the need to set up a monitoring mechanism to control the implementation of resolution 1333 (2000).

It is clear now that since the resolution's adoption half a year ago the Taliban have in no way tried to comply with the Security Council's demands. They have not taken the least step to extradite Usama bin Laden, nor to close those camps where international terrorists are being trained in Taliban-controlled territory.

In the broader context, the Taliban, relying on external military assistance, are continuing to try to

resolve the Afghan conflict by force. In addition, recently we have witnessed new Taliban activities that go against all norms of human morality and ethics. There continue to be gross violations of the rights of women and girls. The Buddhist statues were destroyed. Discriminatory measures, similar to those used in ghettos in the past, have been imposed against adherents of non-Islamic faiths who are living in Afghanistan. As I said, no progress has been achieved as regards the Taliban's support for international terrorism.

Given this situation, it is particularly important to consistently implement resolutions 1333 (2000) and 1267 (1999). In our opinion, an important step along this road should be Council support for the experts' recommendations regarding the creation of a monitoring mechanism.

Of course we understand that no sanctions monitoring will be effective unless the States neighbouring Afghanistan cooperate in the matter, first and foremost the States bordering Afghanistan. We welcome the proclaimed willingness of the six States to comply with resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1333 (2000). We believe that cooperation with them should continue as we work further with the experts' recommendations. I support the appeal made by the Permanent Representative of China regarding the importance of cooperating with neighbouring countries.

We believe that initially the work of the monitoring mechanism should focus most fundamentally on the key requirements: ensuring compliance with the arms embargo and closing the terrorist training camps. I understand that these are difficult tasks; however, we cannot afford to do nothing. That would be worse. It seems to me that the experts' proposed plan will allow real progress to be made. Perhaps all of the Security Council's demands will not be completely implemented as a result, but the plan will, I repeat, promote real progress towards that goal. I am referring in particular to the proposals to set up the Office for Sanctions Monitoring and Coordination and the Sanctions Enforcement Support Teams in the region. We are prepared to use this plan as a foundation. Of course we will still have to define the plan's specific parameters, including the functions of each of the proposed elements, particularly with regard to the teams to be set up in bordering countries. Of course there should be the closest possible consultation with the interested States on this matter.

With regard to the location of the monitoring mechanism, we think it would be preferable for it to be in New York. This is important for effective interaction with the sanctions Committee, and also so as to have a link with the Security Council. If the monitoring mechanism is set up in a location other than New York, this link would be weakened, which we think would be a mistake. It is important to take a close look at the possible options for financing the mechanism so that its activities are properly funded.

The report contains many other practical proposals, including on expanding the list of embargoed goods and on unifying national legislation as regards arms trading, customs policies and so forth. We are prepared to review these proposals, many of which will require careful study. But right now, I repeat, we believe the Council should concentrate on preparing and adopting a draft resolution that would allow the monitoring mechanism to quickly begin work. The recommendations requiring further study can be considered at subsequent stages.

We support the view that sanctions against the Taliban should be implemented in close connection with other United Nations decisions that seek to ensure peace and stability for Afghanistan. Most serious attention should be given to retaining the targeted nature of the sanctions: making sure that they continue to be directed against the leadership of the Taliban, rather than against the Afghan people.

On the basis of these principles we will be cooperating with other Council members in the further work on this report.

Mr. Hume (United States of America): I would like to take this opportunity first of all to commend Ambassador Valdivieso for the critical leadership he has provided to the Council's sanctions Committee. We rely on him for his leadership and expertise. I would also like to thank Ambassador Menkerios and congratulate him and his Committee of Experts on the extraordinary work that they have been able to do in a very short period of time. They have given us a significant and substantive report that merits our full consideration.

The challenges and threats presented by Afghanistan are immense and multifaceted. The Council has addressed these issues many times and will have to continue to do so. Today we are here to focus on the report of the Committee of Experts on how to

monitor the arms embargo and the closure of terrorist training camps that was demanded in Security Council resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1333 (2000).

This Council has stated repeatedly that the Taliban must cease its support for terrorism. We have taken an unambiguous stand in our resolutions. We are prepared to back up words with action — primarily through implementing an effective arms embargo against the Taliban.

Now this Committee of Experts has informed us that for our resolutions to have an impact we need to establish a mechanism to monitor compliance. The United States agrees with this recommendation and would support a resolution to establish such a mechanism. We support the conclusion of the Committee of Experts that the proposed monitoring mechanism should augment the ability and efforts of Afghanistan's neighbouring States to enforce the Council's resolutions, especially to cut off the flow of weapons and to close down the terrorist training camps. I would like here to note the cooperation that each of Afghanistan's neighbours provided to the work of the Committee of Experts.

The mechanism will be useful in providing information and assisting countries bordering Taliban-controlled areas of Afghanistan so that they can improve the national enforcement of each nation's international obligations under resolution 1333 (2000). The mechanism should also provide accurate information to the sanctions Committee so that suspected violators can be named and shamed. We believe this action should also serve as a deterrent.

The mechanism, as we see it, should be put together carefully. It cannot replace the work that has to be done by the thousands of border police, customs agents and other national officials responsible for compliance with the arms embargo. Nor should it seek to duplicate the efforts of other agencies such as the United Nations International Drug Control Programme (UNDCP), Interpol and the Wassenaar Arrangement.

We see this mechanism as a critical means to assist Ambassador Valdivieso with his work as Chairman of the sanctions Committee. Therefore, we agree with the comment just made that the monitoring mechanism should be established in New York, where it can have close links with the work of the Council, and that it should have the capacity to have some staff in the field.

Although financing for the mechanism needs to be discussed, the United States favours the immediate establishment of a trust fund through which the mechanism, whatever its exact final form, would be financed. The United States Government is in the process of identifying resources that will allow it to make a substantial contribution to a trust fund, so that an effective monitoring mechanism can be established as soon as possible.

Finally, the United States congratulates Ambassador Menkerios for his leadership and his Expert Committee's invaluable contribution. We also thank Ambassador Valdivieso for his continuing and critical leadership.

The United States looks forward to working with all present to establish an effective monitoring mechanism and to adopt a draft resolution later this month to put this into effect.

Mr. Toure (Mali) (*spoke in French*): I should like warmly to thank you, Mr. President, for having convened this open meeting of the Security Council to discuss the report of the Committee of Experts on Afghanistan appointed pursuant to paragraph 15 (a) of Security Council resolution 1333 (2000), regarding monitoring of the arms embargo against the Taliban and the closure of terrorist training camps in the Taliban-held areas of Afghanistan.

I should like also to thank the Committee of Experts on Afghanistan, chaired by Ambassador Haile Menkerios, for the outstanding work it has done in such a short space of time and in rather difficult conditions. This is a perfect opportunity for my delegation to state how pleased we are at the conclusions reached by the Committee. We would also like to thank Ambassador Valdivieso, Chairman of the sanctions Committee on Afghanistan, for having given us a detailed introduction to the report.

The principle underlying my delegation's view of sanctions regimes is that the goal of sanctions should not be to punish, but to modify behaviour. In order to attain this goal of behaviour change, it is more than ever necessary rigorously to apply sanctions imposed against States. This can be done only through an effective mechanism to monitor compliance with the requirements set out in the relevant resolutions. That is why we support the recommendations of the Committee of Experts contained in the report before us — recommendations that will make it possible to

improve the effectiveness of sanctions imposed, which will lead to a change of behaviour.

We note the fact that Afghanistan's neighbours realize that there can be no military solution to the conflict that has bloodied Afghanistan for two decades. Those who are fuelling this conflict must put an end to their behaviour and understand that there is a link between stability in Afghanistan and their own security.

As indicated in paragraph 88 of the report, my delegation supports the creation of a United Nations Office for monitoring the sanctions imposed by the Security Council against the Taliban authorities in Kabul. Efficiency and cost-effectiveness should be taken into account when deciding on the location of the office. In any case, the location that is chosen should be able to provide the necessary administrative and logistical support to the Office. In this way the groundwork can be laid for exemplary cooperation between the United Nations and Afghanistan's neighbours, in order to ensure total respect for the international embargo on weapons destined for the Taliban and to monitor activities in the terrorist training camps.

To that end, we support the idea of sending small teams of specialists, which would work closely with the various border control services and anti-terrorist teams in each of the six countries that are neighbours of Afghanistan. Given the fact that the considerable funds resulting from the opium and heroin trade are being used to buy weapons and other war matériel and to fund the training of terrorists, my delegation firmly supports the recommendations of the Committee contained in paragraph 61 of the report regarding the interdiction of smuggled drugs from Afghanistan. The international community should do everything in its power to deprive the Taliban of the important funding that it gets from the illicit drug trade.

Finally, I should like once again to congratulate Ambassador Haile Menkerios and his team on the excellent work done. We reiterate the fact that my delegation is ready to take an active part in seeking a consensus whereby this important document can be followed up.

Mr. Eldon (United Kingdom): I shall be brief, for two reasons: first, because there has already been a chance for an initial discussion of the report of the sanctions Committee, and, secondly, because one of the important functions of this meeting is to allow Council members to hear the views of neighbouring States before the Council itself moves to take action on the recommendations of the monitoring report.

What I have to say today will not be exhaustive, but will, I hope, give Council members and others in this room a good feel for the way in which the United Kingdom is approaching the discussion on the report.

But first, I think that congratulations are due both to Ambassador Valdivieso and to Ambassador Menkerios for the excellent work they have done. It is good to see Ambassador Menkerios around the Council table again, albeit in a slightly different incarnation from last time. It is very good to have him here.

We regard the Committee of Experts' report as a very thorough, very inventive and very useful document. We agree with most of the recommendations, and in particular we agree with the key recommendation that we should work towards establishing a monitoring mechanism along the lines the Panel recommended.

We also agree that there is benefit in having field teams on the ground to support the efforts of the neighbouring States. We welcome the commitment of the neighbouring countries, as set out in the report, to implement sanctions and cooperate with the monitoring mechanism. I hope and believe that we will hear more of that today.

The first step will have to be an evaluation of what skills are required in each country — in other words, how best the United Nations can help. It is also important that the teams on the ground should have a monitoring role in addition to an advisory role. This is not just because this two-pronged approach accurately reflects the main thrust of the problem; it is also because it is one of the best ways, as we see it, to achieve a truly cooperative effort, which, as a number of speakers have already said, will be the key to ensuring the success of this enterprise.

We have looked at the idea of having a central headquarters in the light of the wider debate that is going on on sanctions monitoring. As the Council is aware, there are a number of proposals on the table for establishing a centralized global monitoring mechanism for sanctions. The establishment of a monitoring mechanism for Afghanistan should not preclude the development of such semi-permanent

global mechanisms encompassing all the monitoring regimes.

We do, however, see benefit, in the Afghanistan case, in setting up a light, flexible headquarters to coordinate the work of the six teams and carry out some of the centralized tasks, as described by the Committee of Experts.

We believe that the team should be established within, or closely related to, the existing sanctions team of the Department of Political Affairs. That, again, points to establishing it in New York. We hope we can move as quickly as possible to establish the monitoring mechanism. As the debate proceeds and as the work continues on the details of establishing semi-permanent global sanctions monitoring structures, we will want to look at how the Afghanistan monitoring mechanism and the other monitoring mechanisms can be brought into such structures.

On funding, we are looking carefully at how this can best be done. There are a number of bottom lines, I think: to ensure that, whatever is done, the monitoring mechanism is adequately and securely funded; to ensure that it can be funded quickly; and to ensure that we do not incur unnecessary expenditure. I have noted in this context what Ambassador Hume has had to say about the establishment of a trust fund.

I will leave it there. I hope my statement contains the essence of the United Kingdom approach. We look forward to hearing the views of others in this Chamber, both members and non-members of the Council, and we look forward to working in the Council to ensure that the report is properly followed up.

Mr. Cooney (Ireland): I shall try to be brief. I would like to begin by thanking Ambassador Menkerios and the rest of the Committee of Experts for their report (S/2001/511), which was compiled in difficult circumstances and which contains many useful recommendations. I would like also to take this opportunity to recognize the energy and leadership of Ambassador Valdivieso in his chairmanship of the Afghanistan sanctions Committee.

As the wider issues of Afghanistan will be discussed later this month, I shall restrict my comments here to the report of the Committee of Experts. Ireland supports the recommendation of the Committee of Experts that an office for sanctions monitoring and coordination be established in a central location with sanctions enforcement support teams working with border control services in the countries neighbouring Afghanistan. The practical aspects of that structure, including the modalities for cooperation with neighbouring States, should now be discussed in the sanctions Committee, which has the relevant expertise, with a view to presenting recommendations to the Council as soon as possible.

In order for such a mechanism to be effective, it must, we believe, have sustainable and continuous funding. When costings become available, Ireland will consider offering assistance in the light of available resources.

Many of the other recommendations of the Committee of Experts are also worthy of consideration and should be further examined by the sanctions Committee. We appreciate the emphasis placed on the significance of drug trafficking, and we fully agree that this must be addressed as part of the overall problem. We also agree with the two-pronged approach to the closure of terrorist camps, as outlined in paragraph 52 of the report.

We note with interest the recommendation in paragraph 32 regarding aircraft turbine fuel and fluids for armoured personnel carriers. But on that point, I would be grateful for clarification that this proposal relates to military flights and that any restrictions could be implemented without inadvertently affecting humanitarian flights.

Mr. Teixeira da Silva (France) (*spoke in French*): I join previous speakers in welcoming Ambassador Menkerios and the other members of the Committee of Experts and in congratulating them on the quality of their report, which was submitted most promptly. I also echo their praise for the leadership of Ambassador Valdivieso as Chairman of the sanctions Committee on Afghanistan. I have four comments to make on the report and on its anticipated outcomes.

The prime merit of the report is that it emphasizes the central role of neighbouring countries in the true implementation of the arms embargo and the closure of terrorist training camps. We note the confirmed commitment of Afghanistan's neighbours to implement the embargo and to cooperate with the United Nations to that end. The Committee of Experts itself participated in an effort to increase awareness of this issue. We must take the neighbouring States at their

word, and must help them overcome the obstacles noted by the Committee of Experts.

Secondly, we support the overall structure of the proposed monitoring mechanism. We feel that the structure should be as light, flexible and adaptable as possible. The first task would be to bring the national forces of neighbouring countries up to standard. The proposed general monitoring and disarmament measures are of interest and should be considered in greater depth. Similarly, it has been proposed that new arms-control legislation be enacted and existing legislation strengthened; that would be useful to encourage work now under way in a number of international bodies. That is true also of proposed measures that are set out in the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, recently adopted by the General Assembly. Most of the proposed measures will be addressed at the forthcoming United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in all its Aspects. Clearly, there is a great deal of work to be done here that lies beyond the mandate of the Security Council but that still complements the Council's work.

Thirdly, we fully support the recommendation that the monitoring mechanism could serve as the nucleus for a more general mechanism to monitor sanctions and the illicit trade in raw materials in armed conflict. We would observe with interest that the Committee of Experts has noted that arms embargoes have inherent problems, irrespective of the sanctions regime. Resolving these problems demands the implementation of comprehensive measures at the international level. It would obviously be useful to be able to take advantage of the synergy among the various sanctions mechanisms and panels of experts that are put in place over time. In that spirit, and to make reference to what Ambassador Eldon said, we feel that the monitoring mechanism for Afghanistan would best be established in New York, precisely to foster synergy with sanctions committees and with other existing mechanisms.

Finally, let me say a word about financing. Here, predictability is important to enable the monitoring mechanism to function well and independently. That is why we would prefer funding from the regular budget of the United Nations; that would also have practical advantages with respect to the day-to-day operation of the mechanism: we must ensure that there is no interruption in the funding, because that would be extremely damaging to the functioning of the mechanism. To expand on my earlier remark, the establishment of a general monitoring mechanism for sanctions and illicit trade would not only facilitate synergy in its work, but would also offer significant budgetary savings.

In general terms, we share the views of the Committee of Experts on the need to conceive and make use of sanctions as part of a comprehensive strategy for a political settlement of the Afghan conflict. We hope that in coming weeks we will be able to discuss that more general topic.

Mr. Ward (Jamaica): My delegation thanks the Chairman of the sanctions Committee, Ambassador Valdivieso, for introducing the report of the Committee of Experts and extends its appreciation to the Committee for its important work.

We have carefully reviewed the report and have concluded that the ideas and recommendations provide a basis for effective implementation of the measures mandated in resolution 1333 (2000). It is our view that, having adopted resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1333 (2000), we must seek to enforce the measures we have approved. Responsible parties must take appropriate action to prevent illegal flights and the entry of arms and ammunition into the territory and ensure the closing of terrorist training camps in Afghanistan.

The report addresses the steps that need to be taken to give effect to these measures and we welcome the opportunity to discuss effective measures to address this problem. We feel that the report provides guidelines for action at the national, regional and international levels that require the commitment of the concerned States if these provisions are to be implemented.

At the regional level, neighbouring States must coordinate their efforts and indicate the level of assistance needed to effectively monitor their borders. It is important that transit and supply States comply with Security Council resolutions. It is commendable that neighbouring States have expressed their commitment to this process and it is left to us to encourage them to put these words into action.

At the international level, it is important that these levels be supported, in the short term, by the provision of technical and financial assistance to those countries. In the long term, the gains made and decisions taken in other United Nations bodies must be taken into account. In this regard, we note the observation of the Committee, contained in paragraph 34 of the report, that

> "any measures proposed for Afghanistan must be seen in the wider context of arms control measures targeted elsewhere".

It is clear that we need to move quickly to strengthen monitoring mechanisms in order to support border arrangements. We look forward to further discussions on the modalities and financing of these mechanisms. We are also particularly interested in the Committee's recommendations regarding the inspection of shipments under the Afghan Transit Trade Agreement. It is important that we examine carefully how this recommendation can assist us in the implementation process.

In closing, my delegation wishes to reiterate that the Security Council must continue to seek a comprehensive solution to the problem in Afghanistan. The Committee of Experts, in its report, notes the position of all concerned States in the region. We concur with its conclusion that there can be no military solution to the conflict in Afghanistan and that only a political solution by the people of Afghanistan can bring an end to its suffering. The international community must continue its efforts to bring this about. The effective monitoring of sanctions should be undertaken as a means to this end. While we focus on this issue, we should also remain conscious of the dire humanitarian situation that prevails and make a concerted effort to ensure that our decisions do not add to this crisis.

Mr. Neewoor (Mauritius): I thank you, Sir, for organizing this public meeting on Afghanistan, where the situation on all fronts seems only to be getting worse on a daily basis — the latest scenario being the edict that the Taliban has issued against minority communities.

We deeply appreciate the important briefing provided to the Council this morning by Ambassador Valdivieso and we felicitate Mr. Menkerios and members of the Committee of Experts for their comprehensive and important report.

Today's discussion has to focus on the report, and in that connection my delegation has noted the many highly commendable suggestions that have been made by the Committee. Among the important suggestions, we note the following: publication of information concerning violations of end-user certificate provisions, including the names of companies, countries and individuals involved, as well as cases of unauthorized re-transfer of weapons to third parties, as referred to in paragraph 39 of the report; the need for assistance in providing data on aircraft movements in and out of Afghanistan, which would help to monitor illegal flights, as referred to in paragraph 40; the need for neighbouring Pakistan to regulate the curricula at the *madrassas*, as referred to in paragraph 43; the return or repatriation of foreign terrorists under international supervision, as referred to in paragraph 48; and the idea of creating a dual-control sanctions monitoring mechanism, as referred to in paragraph 77.

My delegation strongly supports those recommendations, which are in line with the mandate of the Committee to deal with the growing problems in Afghanistan. We believe that they are important guidelines for the management of sanctions in general. We agree with the observation made in the report that the close cooperation of neighbouring countries is imperative in resolving the Afghanistan problem. We appeal to the neighbouring countries to cooperate fully with the international community in this regard, and we hope that they will.

The proposal for a sanctions monitoring mechanism is very commendable, but we have to assure ourselves that such a body will not become a mere reporting panel for further action by others. Instead, it must have a solid structure, with all financial and human resources to effectively deal with sanctions-busting cases. We believe that the monitoring body should be financed out of assessed contributions and supported by voluntary funds from donors. The body should work in close cooperation with the sanctions Committee and report its findings to the Committee for action as appropriate.

Finally, we hope that, in the course of this month, the Security Council will hold an open debate that will allow the Members of the United Nations to express their views on a more comprehensive basis on all aspects of the Afghanistan question.

Mr. Kolby (Norway): First of all, I would like to thank Ambassador Valdivieso for his introduction and for his energetic leadership of the Committee.

Secondly, I would like to thank Ambassador Menkerios and the Committee of Experts for providing us with a thorough and thought-provoking report.

I would also like to congratulate you, Mr. President, for holding this open meeting, which enables the Council to hear the views of representatives of countries whose efforts are crucial to the success of our efforts to implement the sanctions against the Taliban in the region.

My statement will be limited to the report before us because later this month we are going to have a discussion of the overall question of Afghanistan.

My Government regards the report and its recommendations as an excellent basis for establishing a monitoring mechanism with regard to the effective implementation of resolutions 1333 (2000) and 1267 (1999). Norway supports the realistic approach taken in the report. A mechanism should be based on neighbouring States' national border control efforts and be supported by small international Support Teams of experts that would also monitor and investigate violations. In the report it is suggested that such Support Teams should be based at existing United Nations offices in the region. In that connection, my delegation would like to ask the Committee whether the Committee of Experts has considered any potentially negative consequences of co-locating the Sanctions Enforcement Support Teams together with United Nations offices and agencies operating inside Afghanistan, including those involved with the provision of humanitarian assistance.

We have noted the arguments presented for locating the headquarters office in Vienna. We find that there are also sound arguments for locating the office in New York, including the need for close and continuous contact with the Security Council, the sanctions Committee and the Secretariat.

It is also necessary to see a sanctions monitoring mechanism for Afghanistan in connection with the discussions on the establishment of a permanent mechanism for monitoring United Nations sanctions regimes, including arms embargoes. The report has raised important issues in that regard that need to be studied further.

As for the question of financing, Norway's position is that the mechanism needs secure and stable funding and that it should thus be financed by assessed contributions. We have also noted arguments in favour of initial voluntary funding in order to ensure speedy implementation of the recommendation. We are also ready to consider that.

Norway is ready to consider the other recommendations, including that aircraft turbine fuel and special fuels for military use be specified in the arms embargo, but with the provision that this does not negatively affect the humanitarian assistance efforts in Afghanistan.

The President: Before giving the floor to the next speaker, let me review with the Council the situation regarding the time and the number of speakers we have. We still have three other Council members to hear — Singapore, Colombia and Bangladesh. To help the situation, I can forgo my national statement. But we will still need at least 10 minutes for Singapore and Colombia, five each. We also have four speakers under rule 37. My initial contacts with them told me that the four of them will need about 35 minutes. Thereafter we will hear from Ambassador Menkerios, whom I believe should be given at least 10 minutes to respond to many of the questions raised. That makes a total of 55 minutes. It is my intention to close this meeting at 1.15 p.m. If we need to go beyond that, we will have to come back at 3 p.m.

Mr. Mantaha (Singapore): Our thanks go to Ambassador Valdivieso for his presentation. We look forward to the presentation to be made later on by Ambassador Menkerios.

My delegation would like to thank the Committee of Experts for having provided the Council with a comprehensive analysis of the subject and for having made concrete and realistic recommendations to strengthen the implementation of resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1333 (2000). We note that the Committee has considered a whole spectrum of options on how to monitor the implementation of the arms embargo, as well as the closure of terrorist training camps in Afghanistan. We are gratified that in making its recommendations, the Committee has given emphasis to the need for the proposed mechanism to be not only effective but also affordable and realizable. We therefore believe that the recommendations of the Committee merit serious consideration.

We look forward to working with other members of the Security Council to consider how we can take the process forward, drawing from the Committee's recommendations. We also agree with the views expressed by others that we should expedite that process. My delegation would like to note, however, that any decision of the Council emanating from the report of the Committee should, insofar as this is possible, be taken by consensus.

We will be commenting on the specific recommendations of the Committee in greater detail in subsequent discussions of the Council. But permit me, at this juncture, to make a few general points.

First, like others, my delegation is of the view that the Council cannot proceed with the implementation of the recommendations of the Committee without adequate consultations with the countries that have specific involvement in the implementation of the Council's resolutions. Singapore has noted with deep appreciation that the six States that share borders with Afghanistan have stated their intention to abide by the resolutions of the Council. The Council will now have to work very closely with them to find the best possible way of helping those countries implement the decisions of the Council. The Committee was right when it asserted that

> "enforcing sanctions must rely on the will and initiative, primarily, of the countries bordering Afghanistan". (*S/2001/511, para. 90*)

As the Committee also noted, in paragraph 21 of its report, those countries

> "stressed the fact that without a stable Afghanistan their own stability and security was threatened".

Secondly, in creating the mechanism to monitor the implementation of the resolutions against the Taliban, the Security Council should not unwittingly institute measures that would impede the ability of humanitarian agencies to bring aid and relief to the Afghan population. I note that the delegations of Ireland, Norway and others have also made that point. This applies in particular to the monitoring of flights in and out of Taliban-controlled territories. The Council should ensure that the frequency and viability of humanitarian flights, which are crucial for dealing with the humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan, are in no way adversely affected.

Thirdly, on the proposal by the Committee that the proposed monitoring mechanism for Afghanistan serve as the nucleus for future sanctions-monitoring requirements, we would counsel some caution. The Council's approach towards the issue of Afghanistan is governed by a set of political and strategic considerations that may not apply in other cases and issues. We should be slow to regard the proposed mechanism, if it is eventually adopted, as a general template for other situations.

Fourthly, with respect to the Committee's recommendation on measures to enforce the arms embargo, we agree with the views expressed by others at the meeting held yesterday between the sanctions Committee and the Committee of Experts that, where relevant, the Council must consider the recommendations within the framework of existing international mechanisms. The Security Council should take into account the international debate on the control of the illegal trade in small arms. The United Nation Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects will be held in New York next month. It should give us an indication of the extent to which there is an international consensus on this issue.

Fifthly, my delegation is pleased that the Committee has expanded the scope of its work to investigate the connection between the illicit drug trade and the financing of arms purchases and terrorist camps in Afghanistan. This is a very important dimension of the problem, and it deserves our attention.

Let me conclude by highlighting paragraph 89 of the Committee's report. I think it is important enough for me to read it out to the Council.

> "The sanctions imposed on the Taliban must be seen and implemented as part of an overall package pursued by the United Nations to ensure peace and stability in Afghanistan. Thus, the sanctions, the search for a political solution, and the humanitarian and economic efforts all need to be taken as a whole and pursued as parts of an integrated strategy leading to a broad based and responsible government in Afghanistan."

My delegation looks forward to future opportunities to exchange views with Council members, and also with Afghanistan's neighbouring States, to see how we

could best find a well-defined, long-term, comprehensive strategy to bring peace to Afghanistan.

Mr. Franco (Colombia) (*spoke in Spanish*): We have given careful consideration to the report of the Committee of Experts, which has made recommendations to the Security Council on how the arms embargo and the closure of terrorist training camps demanded in paragraphs 3 and 5 of resolution 1333 (2000) could be monitored. We also listened carefully to the statement made by Ambassador Valdivieso, in his capacity as Chairman of the sanctions Committee, in which he summarized the content of the report. Colombia concurs with many of the recommendations contained in the report with regard to setting up a monitoring mechanism.

I should like to highlight four preliminary issues that are important to my delegation as starting points for the discussions that will follow this meeting of the Council. The first relates to the neighbouring countries. It is essential for the Security Council to properly involve all the countries neighbouring Afghanistan and to obtain their cooperation in order to ensure that the monitoring mechanism is effective. In this regard, Colombia welcomes the willingness of all of those countries to cooperate with this organ of the United Nations. This is indispensable for ensuring the effective monitoring of illicit activities taking place along the borders. We believe that this is the right approach — the recommendations should be aimed at strengthening national capacities.

My second comment relates to the issue of coordination — horizontal coordination among the neighbouring countries and vertical coordination among those countries, the Security Council and the United Nations as a whole. This Organization could contribute to establishing greater harmony, coordination and compatibility among governmental and security bodies in order to enhance both horizontal and vertical coordination.

My third comment relates to border activities of interest to the Security Council. In this respect, it is important to have effective and comprehensive controls on trafficking in arms and chemical precursors, including acetic anhydride, on the smuggling of goods and on other activities that might fuel or facilitate terrorist activities.

My fourth comment relates to the peace process. In its decisions, the Security Council must be careful to avoid any incompatibility with the efforts of the international community to contribute to peace and stability in Afghanistan. At the appropriate time, when the Security Council carries out a comprehensive review of the situation in that country, we will have an opportunity to highlight and test that necessary compatibility.

In conclusion, Colombia will participate in the scrupulous and detailed analysis of the recommendations presented to the Council by the Committee of Experts so as to ensure that appropriate decisions are taken, including on the modalities of the monitoring mechanism, its location, in either New York or Vienna, and its funding.

This open meeting is the first step towards that analysis and will enable us to hear the opinions of the States concerned.

The President: In interests of better time management, I will forgo making my national statement at this point.

I will move on to the list of countries invited under rule 37. The first speaker on that list is the representative of Afghanistan, on whom I now call.

Mr. Farhâdi (Afghanistan): I should like first of all to congratulate you warmly, Mr. President, on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for June 2001. We are also grateful to the head of the Mission of the United States to the United Nations for presiding over the Council for the month of May. We are also very grateful to you, Sir, for arranging this meeting, which is taking place at such an important time.

As we have consistently and amply explained in earlier statements to this Council and to the General Assembly, foreign intervention in Afghanistan remains the main cause of the present conflict and of all the sufferings of the Afghan people. That is not mere rhetoric or allegation, but a crystal-clear fact, recognized in United Nations documents. In this regard, I would like to draw the attention of the Security Council to the observation made by the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan as early as September 1999. Paragraph 3 of his interim report (A/54/422) states,

> "the people of Afghanistan continued to be victims of gross violations of human rights and

persistent breaches of international humanitarian law. The basic cause of this was that the people of Afghanistan continued to be virtual hostages in their own land, where externally armed forces seek to rule Afghanistan without the effective participation or consent of the people."

These externally armed forces referred to by the Rapporteur, Ambassador Kamal Hossain, in his report consist of an alliance of Pakistani military junta, religious extremists groups from Pakistan, Usama bin Laden's groups, including the notorious Al Quaeda, Central Asian extremist groups and the so-called Islamic Emirate of the Taliban. This alliance is part of a great scheme — let us call it a hallucination — for the domination of Afghanistan and Central Asia by Pakistan, which is seeking to secure "strategic depth". This is a new version of Lebensraum, cherished by groups with an anachronistic ideological agenda. This is not only a threat to Afghanistan but also a serious menace to the peace and security of the region and of the world.

The discrimination against women and girls, the massacre of the civilian population based on ethnic or religious origin, cultural vandalism, the stigmatization of religious minority groups, raids on hospitals run by humanitarian organizations and many other atrocities are part of politico-social agenda of the Pakistan-Taliban-bin Laden alliance. All of these endeavours are focused on establishing an Emirate of terror serving the interests of Pakistan and achieving the dreams of dull-witted people of an "ideal Islamic society". The purpose is to establish in Afghanistan a so-called Islamic regime which does not resemble any other Islamic country of the world.

The pursuit of creating such an idealistic society could be considered one of the main causes of the humanitarian crisis in the country. This man-made disaster has deprived more than one half of the Afghan population of productive activities. There is no infrastructural economic plan for the reconstruction or rehabilitation of Afghanistan, due to the harsh policies issued daily by the Taliban. The skilled workers, intellectuals and knowledgeable people have already left the areas occupied by the Taliban. This is part of Pakistan's scheme regarding Afghanistan, where ignorant people remain in power and become increasingly dependent on Pakistan and on Pakistani military intelligence.

Despite the international community's outcry about Taliban policies and actions — including the safe haven being given to international terrorists in the parts of Afghanistan occupied by the Taliban — in spite of the presence of thousands of Arab and Central Asian fighters and their training camps in Afghanistan, and given the drug trafficking by the Taliban, Pakistan continues to cherish its infamous offspring and puppet, called the Taliban. Pakistan encourages others to recognize this strange entity as a legitimate Government. The interview given by the head of Pakistan's military junta to the Russian daily *Izvestia* on 31 May 2001, demanding the recognition of the Taliban, is clear evidence of the continuing aggressive policy of Pakistan in Afghanistan and in the region. General Musharraf does not cease to repeat his litany that "Pakistan supports the Taliban". He believes that this constitutes "the national interest of Pakistan".

The history of the world in the past century has shown that any policy of appeasement towards an aggressor and turning a blind eye to the facts cannot serve the interests of peace, justice and stability. A firm and strong position against an aggressor can highly serve the interests of peace, justice and stability.

Unfortunately, in the case of Afghanistan, Pakistan's direct involvement in Afghanistan and its aggressive policies in the region, which are a threat to international peace and security, are not addressed properly in the Security Council. Thousands of Pakistani fighters are recruited and openly sent to Afghanistan from different segments of Pakistani society, including its military. The United Nations has confirmed this fact by a mere stereotypical phrase — "deeply concerned" — which appears in United Nations documents without the determination that this action constitutes aggression, requiring appropriate measures against the aggressor.

This indifference by the United Nations encourages Pakistan to pursue its hegemonic adventure in Afghanistan, and — in blatant violation of Security Council resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1333 (2000) — to continue to supply arms and ammunition for the armed conflict there. Pakistan remains engaged in providing the Taliban with support in the areas of planning, mobilization, logistics and recruitment.

In this regard, I would like to quote from the article written by Mr. Anthony Davis, the most famous

scholar and writer on Afghanistan. This article was published on 30 May 2001 in *Jane's Defence Weekly*.

> "Intelligence sources understand Pakistan has continued to provide logistic and advisory support for the build-up of the Taliban despite Islamabad's earlier assurances that it would abide by United Nations Security Council resolution 1333 that since January has prohibited provision of material or advisory support to the Taliban. The United Nations has no mechanism in place that might monitor the implementation of the sanctions regime by Pakistan, which has backed the Taliban since the movement's inception in 1994.
>
> "In one week in early May two convoys of about 15 trucks each were moving daily from the Pakistan border at Torkham through Jalalabad to Kabul, according to reliable sources. The Mercedes-Benz trucks carried Pakistani AF [applied for] plates [issued in advance of normal registration plates], giving them a degree of anonymity, noted the sources. Munitions are understood to have been concealed under sacks of wheat.
>
> "Other munitions are understood to have been moved across the southern borders at Chaman between the Pakistani city of Quetta and Kandahar in Afghanistan."

Once again we would like to put on the record that the Islamic State of Afghanistan is firmly convinced that there is no military solution to the present conflict in Afghanistan. The Pakistani military junta should withdraw its military personnel and so-called volunteers from Afghanistan. All foreign fighters should leave Afghanistan immediately. All foreign fighters should leave Afghanistan immediately. The Afghans should be left to resolve their problems through negotiations.

The Islamic State of Afghanistan has already expressed its readiness to attend the Japanese-proposed peace talks, and also positively responded to the Kazakhstan-proposed peace negotiations, to be held under the auspices of the United Nations. It also positively responded to the appeal by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Ruud Lubbers, for a ceasefire. All these proposals were all systematically rejected by the Taliban.

The Islamic State of Afghanistan strongly believes that it is high time for the Security Council to discharge its duty under the Charter of the United Nations to save the people of Afghanistan, to end the suffering of the Afghan nation and to maintain the peace and security of the region. The Security Council should determine the extent of Pakistani aggression in Afghanistan and decide the measures to be taken to maintain peace and security.

As my Government remains unwaveringly committed to defending the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the country, I would like to reaffirm our strong belief in a peaceful political settlement of the conflict and to reiterate our wholehearted support for the pivotal mediating role of the United Nations, aimed at the establishment of a broad-based, multi-ethnic and fully representative Government in Afghanistan.

In this context, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan already — last Friday — sent identical letters to the Secretary-General and to yourself, Sir. These letters are to be published as an official document of the Security Council and the General Assembly. We expect you will give great attention to the text and its annexes. We thank the Ambassador of Colombia, Alfonso Valdivieso, the Committee of Experts headed by Ambassador Haile Menkerios and all Ambassador Menkerios' companions for their efforts deployed to submit a report on how the arms embargo and the closure of the terrorist training camps could be implemented in accordance with resolution 1333 (2000).

Finally, let me endorse the conclusions of the Committee of Experts, in particular the establishment of a control mechanism and the ideas reflected in paragraph 89 of the Committee's report, which I wish to read out:

> "The sanctions imposed on the Taliban must be seen and implemented as part of an overall package pursued by the United Nations to ensure peace and stability in Afghanistan. Thus, the sanctions, the search for a political solution, and the humanitarian and economic efforts all need to be taken as a whole and pursued as parts of an integrated strategy leading to a broad-based and responsible government in Afghanistan."

Paragraph 90 begins:

"No sanctions monitoring will be effective unless there is total commitment of the Member States involved with its implementation."

We support the immediate funding of the monitoring mechanism from the regular United Nations budget, so that it can be both predictable and secure.

The President: In view of the lateness of the hour, and with the concurrence of the members of the Council, I shall suspend the meeting now until 3 p.m.

The meeting was suspended at 1.15 p.m.

United Nations S/PV.4325 (Resumption 1)

Security Council

Fifty-sixth year

Provisional

4325th meeting

Tuesday, 5 June 2001, 3 p.m.
New York

President:	Mr. Chowdhury	(Bangladesh)
Members:	China	Mr. Wang Yingfan
	Colombia	Mr. Valdivieso
	France	Mr. Teixeira da Silva
	Ireland	Mr. Cooney
	Jamaica	Mr. Ward
	Mali	Mr. Toure
	Mauritius	Mr. Neewoor
	Norway	Mr. Kolby
	Russian Federation	Mr. Lavrov
	Singapore	Mr. Mantaha
	Tunisia	Mr. Mejdoub
	Ukraine	Mr. Kuchinsky
	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Mr. Eldon
	United States of America	Mr. Hume

Agenda

The situation in Afghanistan

Letter dated 21 May 2001 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2001/511).

This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the interpretation of speeches delivered in the other languages. The final text will be printed in the *Official Records of the Security Council*. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room C-178.

01-39884 (E)

The meeting was resumed at 3.15 p.m.

The President: The next speaker on my list is the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran. I invite him to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Hosseinian (Islamic Republic of Iran): I wish to begin by expressing my thanks to you, Sir, for convening this meeting on the important issue of Afghanistan. My delegation is pleased to participate, under your presidency, in a debate of the Council on this issue. I thank Mr. Haile Menkerios, Chairman of the Committee of Experts, and his colleagues for the commendable, accurate and comprehensive report they have presented on how to monitor the arms embargo and the closure of training terrorist camps in the Taliban-held areas of Afghanistan. This report reflects, among other things, the dedicated efforts of the Chairman and the members of the Committee to contribute to a viable and lasting political settlement of the Afghan crisis.

I also thank Ambassador Alfonso Valdivieso for his introduction of the report and for his commendable leadership of the sanctions Committee.

It is very unfortunate that the continual efforts of the international community in recent years have not yet brought about any practical change in the bellicose and intransigent policy pursued by the Taliban on the ground. Based on their war-oriented policy and their total contempt for international opinion and demands, the Taliban leadership, with a view to rendering Security Council resolution 1333 (2000) ineffective by conquering more ground, even broke with the pattern set over the years and continued its military activities during the past winter. Recent reports from Afghanistan are also indicative of a new round of offensives launched by the Taliban.

The decision by the Taliban to interrupt the process of dialogue under the auspices of the United Nations, which they explicitly undertook last November not to abandon, is unacceptable and further testimony to the wide disparity between their words and commitment and their actions and practice.

The current increase in the military activity of the Taliban comes at a time when war and drought are plunging the country into a humanitarian crisis. As the United Nations recently warned, the number of Afghans made homeless by war and drought in 2001-2002 could more than double to over 1.6 million people. On the other hand, according to the officials of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the Taliban leadership has recently embarked on increased harassment and threats against aid workers, making the provision of international assistance to war- and drought-stricken people in Afghanistan more difficult.

In view of all this, the report of the Committee of Experts has been released at a time when the disregard of the Taliban for the demands of the international community — set out, inter alia, in Security Council resolution 1333 (2000) — has become more evident. It is needless to recall that they are trying to flout a resolution that truly expresses the sentiment of the international community and was voted for, among others, by three Islamic States members of the Council. Therefore, it is essential that the international community do its best to prevent a breach of the resolution and thereby deprive the belligerent and intransigent party of the means it needs to further its military objectives at the cost of the continued suffering of the Afghan people and of instability in the region.

We believe that the report prepared by the Committee of Experts is an important and appropriate step in the direction of attaining that objective. The authors of the report are successful, to a great extent, in exposing the ways in which the Taliban procure military means, finance their military machine and organize other unlawful activities, including turning their territory into a safe haven for terrorists. The report refers rightly to the continual supply of arms and ammunition to the Taliban and dismisses the claim that their military machine survives on former stocks. The Committee, among other things, correctly notes the importance of putting an end to illegal flights to and from the areas controlled by the Taliban and the need to deny the Taliban access to turbine fuel and fluids needed for use in armoured vehicles.

As to the closure of terrorist camps in the Taliban-controlled areas, accurate reference is made to the reliance of the Taliban on non-Afghan elements in their efforts to defeat the United Front. In order to help to close these camps and to reverse the multiple harms arising therefrom, the international community should pay attention to the need for the repatriation of these elements, as underlined by the Committee. To this end, the removal of obstacles in the way of their return to

their countries of origin and the encouragement of the officials of those countries to cooperate would be of great help.

In order to bring the military machine of the Taliban to a halt, it is essential to put an end to the trade in narcotics in Afghanistan. Although we welcome the ban on opium poppy cultivation ordered by the Taliban leadership, we doubt that it is driven by religious reasons, as claimed by the Taliban. The order was issued following a few years of abundant crops. Moreover, it does not cover the stockpiling, transit and processing of, and trading in opium and heroin. Had it been driven solely and genuinely by religious considerations, the Taliban leadership should have banned illicit drugs in all their aspects and should have ordered the stockpiles destroyed.

According to our information, the stockpiles of drugs in Afghanistan are huge enough to feed the market at a steady rate for about 10 years. We therefore highlight the conclusion of the report emphasizing the need to monitor the flow of drugs from Afghanistan as an integral component of the arms embargo. Effective control of the financing of the Taliban also requires control of the financial support provided to them by individuals and institutions in the region and beyond.

Most of Afghanistan's neighbouring countries face various difficulties and troubles emanating from civil war and lawlessness in that country, and they need assistance from the international community to cope with the situation. In this context, the need for training and equipment support from the international community to modernize the border services of the countries neighbouring Afghanistan is an appropriate point referred to in the report. In that respect, it is pertinent to refer to the crusade by the Iranian Government against transnational drug mafias. Among other things, that has led to the seizure of 263 metric tons of drugs in the past year alone. Needless to say, these endeavours, which have been undertaken at high human and material costs, help to a great extent to shield the other countries of the region, and far beyond, from the effects of the lawlessness in Afghanistan.

As to the recommendations made by the Committee, they are currently being considered within the Iranian Government on the basis of the assumption that monitoring is an indispensable tool for the enforcement of resolution 1333 (2000). Pending the result of the ongoing consideration, we believe that the eventual stationing of Sanctions Enforcement Support Teams in the region should, and could, be compatible with the sovereign rights of the receiving countries. Moreover, some aspects of the proposed mandate of those teams and of the Office for Sanctions Monitoring and Coordination need further clarifications, and more details should be known to enable the relevant Governments to comment. No doubt consultations between officials of the countries concerned and the members of the Security Council prior to any decision being taken by the Council could pave the way for the smooth implementation of any final decision.

The President: The next speaker inscribed on my list is the representative of Uzbekistan. I invite him to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Vohidov (Uzbekistan) (*spoke in Russian*): First of all, I would like to thank you, Mr. President, for giving me this opportunity to speak at today's meeting. I would also like, at the outset, to extend my thanks to the members of the Committee of Experts on Afghanistan, headed by Mr. Haile Menkerios, for the report they have prepared and for the very painstaking work they have done in implementation of Security Council resolution 1333 (2000). I would also like to take this opportunity to express my appreciation to the Chairman of the sanctions Committee, Ambassador Alfonso Valdivieso, for the useful work that has been done in the Committee.

I would like to say that despite the limited time frame of its mandate, the Committee of Experts on Afghanistan has done an enormous amount of work. Their report proposes a regime for effective monitoring of the implementation of the requirements contained in the Security Council's resolutions to ensure the adoption and implementation of the relevant decisions on sanctions.

We agree with the statement that the effectiveness of monitoring will depend on the direct involvement and commitment of all countries to its implementation. That, of course, also applies fully to us.

We also agree with the statement that the financing of arms and ammunition purchases and of the training of terrorists is integral to the overall problem.

Turning to paragraph 33 of the report, we agree fully with the statement that the flow of arms into, within and from Afghanistan is a major, long-term

cause of insecurity and instability in the central Asian region. In that connection, we would note that Uzbekistan is ready to participate actively in discussions on the draft programme to monitor the illegal arms trade with regard to the situation in Afghanistan, which is to be submitted at the forthcoming United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, to be held in July of this year.

Uzbekistan also agrees with the view set out in paragraph 7 of the Committee's report that there is a direct link between the funds obtained from the production and sale of drugs and support for the military activities and training of terrorists in Afghanistan. In that regard, we support the Committee's conclusion in paragraph 61 of the report, namely, that the flow of drugs from Afghanistan should be monitored as an integral component of the arms embargo. In this connection, it is particularly important to take note of the view expressed in the report that strengthening the capacity of Afghanistan's neighbours to monitor their borders is a key aspect of the measures to be taken.

The Republic of Uzbekistan supports the proposal made by the Committee to establish a United Nations Office for Sanctions Monitoring and Coordination in Afghanistan. Such an office would make it possible to establish a focused mechanism to monitor respect for the arms embargo and would help to close terrorist training camps and coordinate the activities of existing national structures of Afghanistan's neighbours.

We consider constructive the proposal to establish groups in States bordering Afghanistan to provide assistance in the monitoring of sanctions. At the same time, we must note that the organizational aspects of that proposal will certainly require further work.

The Republic of Uzbekistan regards paragraph 45 of the report as one of the key provisions. That paragraph emphasizes the need to establish a central point for collating and analysing information provided by Member States about terrorist camps. We support the Committee's conclusion that this database and the collection of analysis of information from Member States within a clear international structure will be one of the most important elements in ensuring effective monitoring.

In order to do that and to save time and money, we should strengthen the existing international mechanisms and instruments for combating terrorism. We regard it as logical and natural, therefore, that the Committee should have concluded that the Office should cooperate closely with the United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention and the secretariats of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Wassenaar Arrangement in Vienna.

We believe that the Committee's recommendation in paragraph 45, regarding the central authority for collecting information, could be carried out on the basis of the existing counter-terrorism component in the United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention in Vienna. That component could be transformed into an international centre to combat terrorism within this Office.

According to paragraphs 45 and 82 of the report, in addition to the mandate of the existing component, the tasks of the Office would include collecting and analysing information about terrorist training camps, and collating it before its subsequent submission to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. There would also be wide distribution of information about the camps. That would seem to be the most economical and effective way of establishing the mechanism for collecting information. We regard this proposal as a natural and organic way of implementing the recommendations of the Committee's report, in accordance with the provisions of Security Council resolution 1333 (2000). We hope that that proposal will be understood and supported by all members of the Security Council. In conclusion, I would like to say once again that the Republic of Uzbekistan supports the conclusions and recommendations in the report of the Committee of Experts on Afghanistan sanctions.

The President: The next speaker is the representative of Pakistan. I invite him to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Ahmad (Pakistan): I should like to begin by congratulating you, Mr. President, on once again assuming the presidency of the Security Council for the current month. It is, indeed, a pleasure to see you presiding over the Council as the representative of a country with which we value our strong fraternal relations.

Since this meeting is ostensibly devoted to the report of the Committee of Experts on the implementation of sanctions, it is for the members of

the Council to discuss and examine the content of the Committee's report. For our part, we are in the process of examining the recommendations and will formulate our position on the proposed monitoring mechanism, keeping in mind its feasibility, practicality and effectiveness, given the length and porous nature of the Afghan border.

While we categorically reject some baseless allegations contained in the report, let me take this opportunity to reaffirm, on behalf of my Government, that Pakistan, as a responsible and law-abiding Member of the United Nations, has been, and will remain, in full compliance with Security Council resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1333 (2000). We have been extending our fullest cooperation to the Security Council, and, as I said earlier, we will continue to do so. We welcomed the Committee of Experts to Pakistan, under the chairmanship of Ambassador Menkerios, during its fact-finding visit. We extended to it full cooperation in good faith as part of our policy of compliance with all Security Council resolutions, without any discrimination. We are adhering to the resolutions on Afghanistan, even though we are not in favour of sanctions as a matter of principle. We believe that sanctions are an unjust instrument, and that they are never productive. They never produce the desired results; they only hurt the common people. There are no smart sanctions; there are only dumb sanctions. The question is, what have these sanctions achieved?

There is a symbolic link between the sanctions and the tragedy in Afghanistan. The latest sanctions — those provided for in resolution 1333 (2000) — were enacted in the very week last December that marked the twenty-first anniversary of the invasion of Afghanistan by the former Soviet Union. That invasion triggered a tragic conflict which has yet to come to an end. So much has happened since that fateful December: the Berlin Wall has fallen; the cold war has come to an end; the Soviet Union has become history; the map of the world has changed; the dawn of the new millennium has arrived; and, strangely enough, old enemies have become new partners. Yet in Afghanistan, the victims remain the same. The anguish and pain of the people of Afghanistan remain undiminished, while their torment continues unabated.

Afghanistan was the last battle front of the cold war. It served as a catalyst to release energies that eventually brought about an end to that era of confrontation. The world as we know it today might not be the same had it not been for the immense sacrifices that the valiant people of Afghanistan made for the cause of freedom and the free world. With the end of Soviet occupation, the Afghan people rightly expected an environment of peace and reconstruction for their country, with external help and assistance. Unfortunately, the international community did not respond to the legitimate expectations of the Afghan people, who found themselves left by the wayside. After having used them to secure certain strategic objectives, the international community abandoned the Afghan people at the time when they needed the maximum external support and involvement in order to reconstruct their war-ravaged country and rebuild their shattered lives.

The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan was followed by a fratricidal civil war. The warlords — some of whom are still there — who fought against the Soviet occupation forces started fighting one another after the Soviet withdrawal. The misery and suffering of the Afghans continued unabated.

Obviously the plight of the Afghan people cannot be attributed to the Taliban, who emerged on the scene only some six years ago. The Afghans have been suffering for more than two decades.

What has the international community done to alleviate their sufferings during these two decades? The Afghanistan problem is not about the Taliban. It is not about terrorism or drugs alone. It is about 25 million Afghan people who continue to suffer, and they continue to suffer because they have given so much for the cause of freedom. They suffered when they were forced to fight the Soviet forces. They suffered when warlords were pillaging the country. And they suffer today because this esteemed Council, which is charged with maintaining international peace and security, has been enacting punitive measures against them.

These sanctions are said to be a smart and sharp instrument, like a scalpel, to remove a tumour without harming any other part of the body. We wish it were so. Instead, the sanctions have achieved precious little and yet destroyed much. One victim has been the peace process initiated by the Secretary-General through his Personal Representative, Francesc Vendrell. Mr. Vendrell, who had made a spectacular breakthrough in negotiations between the warring sides just before resolution 1333 (2000) was bulldozed through this Council, now finds himself on the sidelines, with the

United Nations being accused of bias, discrimination and partisanship.

Another victim is the humanitarian situation in Afghanistan. Much is being said about how the sanctions have no, or very little, impact on the humanitarian plight of the Afghans. This is blamed on the protracted conflict and the drought. This is at least what the world is being given to understand.

Well, while these two factors have contributed to the humanitarian situation, they do not explain why Afghans did not begin their internal and external exodus until after December 2000, when this resolution — 1333 (2000) — was adopted. After the adoption of that resolution, what had been a trickle became a flood. With almost 1 million internally displaced Afghans — and this is not my figure; this is the figure that has been given by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), a part of this very United Nations system — and with almost 200,000 people becoming refugees after the adoption of sanctions last year, no one can possibility deny the link between the sanctions and the grave humanitarian crisis afflicting the Afghan people. Innocent children have been dying in the freezing cold. You, Sir, must have seen the photographs in newspapers. Innocent children have been dying in the freezing cold of winter and the scorching heat of this summer, while the world looks the other way.

The question is, why has the international community turned its back on a nation of 25 million people? It appears that an inimical and rigid mindset prevails in this Council against a Government which is in control of more than 95 per cent of the country's territory.

With peace becoming even more elusive than before, the misery of the Afghan people increasing by the hour, and the issues that motivated the sanctions remaining unresolved, the sanctions have done every harm, but no good. The scalpel has turned out to be a bludgeon which has destroyed the body, while the tumour festers unmolested.

The wrong done now needs to be corrected. The damage done to the Afghan people needs to be reversed, and the ground lost by the peace process must be recovered. Isolation and ostracism have not helped, and they will not help. The sanctions have to be lifted and replaced with a system that aims at resolving all of Afghanistan's problems by addressing the bigger picture.

The time has come to stop the obsession with one aspect of the Afghan problem and to concentrate on solving the entire problem comprehensively. To start with, efforts need to be made by all concerned to re-engage the Taliban and to bring them back from the position of insulation and intransigence. Engagement is the only solution.

The peace process of Francesc Vendrell, which the Secretary-General launched with great enthusiasm, also needs to be put back on track. In addition, more concerted efforts and generous financial assistance should be forthcoming to alleviate the plight of hundreds of thousands of Afghans, both inside Afghanistan and in refugee camps in Pakistan.

It is important, however, that while providing humanitarian assistance, international relief agencies must respect the religious and cultural sensitivities of the Afghan people. The international community also needs to appreciate the efforts that the Taliban have made to eradicate the cultivation of poppies, even at the cost of added hardship to Afghan farmers. The time has come to move away from the sanctions and towards a comprehensive strategy — one that heals the wounds and revives the body without damaging any part of it.

Pakistan shouldered the main burden of the decade-long war against foreign occupation of Afghanistan. At that time we sheltered more than 4.5 million Afghan refugees, and we are still bearing the burden of the ongoing conflict, with the continued presence of more than 2 million refugees in Pakistan and an additional tens of thousands who have recently arrived.

We have exhausted our patience and capacity to absorb any more refugees. We shelter the largest-ever refugee population anywhere in the world. What we need now are practical steps by the world community to deliver humanitarian relief inside Afghanistan to prevent the Afghans from fleeing their homes for neighbouring countries, and, for those already displaced, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other international organizations should set up camps on the other side of the Afghan border to prevent any further influx into Pakistan.

Due to our proximity to Afghanistan, our difficulties as a neighbouring country need to be viewed from this perspective. Pronouncements from afar may appear convenient, but are flawed in their appreciation of the circumstances that are peculiar to Afghanistan.

A one-sided arms embargo, for instance, is not the solution. It encourages the side exempt from the embargo to continue the conflict. There are credible reports that the northern alliance still continues to receive arms from the outside and is engaged in launching offensives, and arms are coming not only from the neighbouring countries, but also from those outside the neighbourhood.

If the Council is really interested in solving Afghanistan's problems, it must instead impose a comprehensive arms embargo — for which we have been pleading for years — which should be imposed under Chapter VII on all parties in Afghanistan. That would give both sides the same incentive to return to the negotiating table.

The Council, as part of its Charter obligation, should seek to promote peace through engagement with the realities on the ground, and not through isolation and ostracism. The Council must not fuel the continuation of the conflict through a one-sided arms embargo. The Council should let the Secretary-General pursue his peace mission through dialogue and conciliation.

While we are giving the Security Council our full cooperation — and will continue to do so — in the implementation of the sanctions regime in Afghanistan, unfair though it is, we would not like either the report of the Experts Committee which is under consideration by the Council or the creation of a monitoring mechanism to be used to unjustly implicate Pakistan. Baseless allegations, implicit or explicit, have been rejected by us in the past, and we reject them now.

Security Council resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1333 (2000) must not be allowed to serve the narrow ulterior motives of a few. We have said it before, and I will say it again: no country in the world stands to gain more than Pakistan from the return of peace and stability in Afghanistan.

Accordingly, we follow a policy towards Afghanistan that seeks to support and supplement international efforts to promote a peaceful solution to the conflict and, indeed, a comprehensive solution to all of Afghanistan's problems. It is a comprehensive strategy we urge the international community to devise. Pakistan will not lag behind in contributing to this endeavour.

The President: I shall now give the floor to Ambassador Menkerios in his capacity as Chairman of the Committee of Experts on Afghanistan appointed pursuant to Security Council resolution 1333 (2000).

Mr. Menkerios: I should like at the outset, since this is the first time the Committee is formally meeting with the entire Council, to thank the Secretary-General and the Council for the confidence they placed in me and in my colleagues to come up with recommendations on this very important issue. I should like also to thank Ambassador Valdivieso and Mr. Stephanides, as well as their offices, for the valuable support and guidance they have given without interfering with the process of the work of the Committee. I should like also to thank the relevant Missions, particularly the United States and the Russian Federation — which were the sponsors of the resolution — for their contribution, collaboration and advice in the process of our work.

Having said that, I will not repeat once again an introduction of the contents of the report, which has been adequately presented by Ambassador Valdivieso. If you will allow me, Sir, I will only try to elucidate on some of the questions that were raised by the various delegations in their comments.

I should like to say that we feel, of course, rewarded by the comments that we have heard — comments which we believe have done service to the recommendations we have made. A few of the questions that have been raised I believe are pertinent and need to be explained.

There was one question regarding the extent to which the Committee consulted with the countries bordering Afghanistan with regard to their readiness and willingness to cooperate with the placement of people on the ground. I should like to say from the outset that if we had one shortcoming, it was the fact that we were not able to do this — first, because of the shortage of time, and, secondly, because, as was explained by the Chinese Ambassador this morning, the Chinese border is a very short sort of border, and no problems have been reported that would require deeper investigation. But, basically, it was because of

the shortage of time that we were not able to visit China. But that does not mean that we did not hold discussions with representatives here at the Mission and also in the field with Ambassadors.

We tried as much as possible, when we generalized as to what the views of the countries bordering Afghanistan were, to mention the countries we visited and to exclude China, simply because we may not have known, with respect to those particular comments, what the Chinese position would be.

That is what we have done. We have provided a framework — a framework based on our discussions with those countries, all of which welcomed support in these areas. We did not discuss the placement of personnel on the ground, simply because that issue had not been finalized when we were holding discussions with them. But we understood that all of the countries we visited do have support teams, or technical support from the United Nations or other international organizations, as well as bilaterally with friendly countries — technical support with personnel on the ground.

Therefore, we did not feel there was any particular reason that they would in fact reject such a move; and in general terms they welcomed it. So we put it in the form of a general recommendation — to be based, however, on an assessment visit to all those countries to establish need in any or all of those areas and to determine their readiness to accept this. A concrete suggestion would then be made to them on the basis of the assessment mission. So if there is a feeling that there is no need, that would be taken note of at the time of the assessment visit.

Concern was voiced by the representative of Tunisia that some of the general recommendations had not been widely discussed at the international level and had not been the object of final agreement. That is true. These are recommendations which have on the whole been accepted, for instance, by members of the Wassenaar Arrangement. Others have been viewed positively on a general level. But they are still proposals, and as such they will be presented at the forthcoming United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in all its Aspects, to be held from 9 to 20 July.

We, however, see value in our recommendations, given the need to create a more effective monitoring of the illicit movement of small arms. The recommendations we have included in this draft text would prove positive if adopted on a wider scale.

There was a concern voiced both by Ireland and by Norway about fuels that are used for military purposes: that our recommendation is that regard should not harm the humanitarian effort. That is a very valid point. We have come to learn that some of the fuels and, especially, the lubricants that are used for military hardware are not used for flights that are required for humanitarian purposes. These could be identified, especially the lubricants that are needed for heavy military machinery, which are not required for humanitarian efforts. If there are any fuels that could be used by both — since a precedent has already been established by which flights are banned but by which particular consideration is made for humanitarian flights — fuels used for military purposes could be banned, and then, if there is a need for humanitarian flights, the same procedure for allowing flights to take place could be used to allow the use of such fuel for humanitarian purposes. We feel that is easier than completely opening it up and enabling military equipment to use these necessary fuels and lubricants.

Another question raised, again by Norway, was whether it would be advisable to place monitoring support teams in offices with other United Nations agencies that are operating in Afghanistan, rather than locating them outside Afghanistan. These technical teams would be going to the neighbours of Afghanistan to support their efforts. I think this remains to be seen. The efforts of these teams need to be seen within what we have tried to establish as an overall view of this matter: that the sanctions must not be viewed in isolation from all the other efforts that the United Nations is making to resolve the problem in Afghanistan. If they are seen as part and parcel of the effort towards a political solution, of humanitarian relief efforts and of economic support, then there will be a greater need for all the various agencies involved in the area to coordinate in terms of what they are doing, rather than seeing them as one aspect of a United Nations effort completely isolated from other efforts being made.

We heard this when we were in the field also: we tried to learn the views and opinions and to secure information from the various United Nations agencies operating there. Some said, "Look, we do not want to say anything; we are engaged in a humanitarian effort, and we do not want to have anything to do with the

sanctions business, because that is going to jeopardize what we are doing on the humanitarian front". So the concern is understandable, and it has been raised there too. But we feel that this could change; it needs to change. It all needs to be seen as a package, with each component important to the operation of the others.

Moreover, most of these teams would be working with the various ministries and agencies of the countries themselves. If we were to send a team to a particular country, it would be working directly with the customs officers and with the ministry of the interior that polices the borders, or perhaps with the army, in trying to make their capacity to control their borders more effective. Thus, it would not be a committee that would sit in judgement and try to oversee what the country is doing; rather, it would be engaged with the country's activities, so we do not feel it would be seen in a negative way, as some described it in our discussions there. We hope this will minimize any negative view of these bodies.

Those in my view were the questions that needed to be addressed. Our task was to come up with recommendations that would be helpful to members of the Council when they take decisions on this issue. We are very glad that we could be of service.

The President: I thank Ambassador Menkerios for responding to the issues and questions raised by members during their statements, and I thank the other members of the Committee of Experts for their presence in the Council Chamber today.

There are no further speakers on my list. The Council has thus concluded the present stage of its consideration of the item on its agenda. The Council will remain seized of the matter, and will consider the recommendations for action contained in the report of the Committee of Experts.

The meeting rose at 4.10 p.m.

United Nations S/PV.4326

Security Council

Fifty-sixth year

Provisional

4326th meeting

Wednesday, 13 June 2001, 10.30 a.m.

New York

President:	Mr. Chowdhury	(Bangladesh)
Members:	China	Mr. Wang Yingfan
	Colombia	Mr. Franco
	France	Mr. Levitte
	Ireland	Mr. Cooney
	Jamaica	Mr. Ward
	Mali	Mr. Kassé
	Mauritius	Mr. Jingree
	Norway	Mr. Kolby
	Russian Federation	Mr. Gatilov
	Singapore	Mr. Yap
	Tunisia	Mr. Tekaya
	Ukraine	Mr. Kuchinsky
	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Mr. Taylor
	United States of America	Mr. Hume

Agenda

Strengthening cooperation with troop-contributing countries

Letter dated 31 May 2001 from the Chairman of the Security Council Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2001/546).

This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the interpretation of speeches delivered in the other languages. The final text will be printed in the *Official Records of the Security Council*. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room C-178.

01-40905 (E)

The meeting was called to order at 10.50 a.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

Strengthening cooperation with troop-contributing countries

Letter dated 31 May 2001 from the Chairman of the Security Council Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2001/546)

The President: The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. The Council is meeting in accordance with the understanding reached in its prior consultations.

Members of the Council have before them document S/2001/546, letter dated 31 May 2001 from the Chairman of the Security Council Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations addressed to the President of the Security Council, submitting the first report of the Security Council Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations.

I should like to draw the attention of the members of the Council to document S/2001/535, letter dated 30 May 2001 from the representatives of Argentina, Canada, Ghana, India, Jordan, the Netherlands and New Zealand to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council.

Members of the Council also have before them document S/2001/573, which contains the text of a draft resolution prepared in the course of the Council's prior consultations. I would like to take this opportunity to commend again the excellent leadership provided by Ambassador Curtis Ward of Jamaica, as Chairman of the Security Council Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations, which negotiated this text.

It is my understanding that the Council is ready to proceed to the vote on the draft resolution before it. Unless I hear any objection, I shall put the draft resolution to the vote now.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

A vote was taken by a show of hands.

In favour:

Bangladesh, China, Colombia, France, Ireland, Jamaica, Mali, Mauritius, Norway, Russian Federation, Singapore, Tunisia, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

The President: There were 15 votes in favour. The draft resolution has been adopted unanimously as resolution 1353 (2001).

The Security Council has thus concluded the present stage of its consideration of the item on the agenda.

The meeting rose at 10.55 a.m.

United Nations S/PV.4327

Security Council

Fifty-sixth year

Provisional

4327th meeting

Wednesday, 13 June 2001, 10.55 a.m.

New York

President:	Mr. Chowdhury	(Bangladesh)
Members:	China	Mr. Wang Yingfan
	Colombia	Mr. Franco
	France	Mr. Levitte
	Ireland	Mr. Cooney
	Jamaica	Mr. Ward
	Mali	Mr. Kassé
	Mauritius	Mr. Neewoor
	Norway	Mr. Kolby
	Russian Federation	Mr. Gatilov
	Singapore	Mr. Mahbubani
	Tunisia	Mr. Tekaya
	Ukraine	Mr. Kuchinsky
	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Sir Jeremy Greenstock
	United States of America	Mr. Hume

Agenda

The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo

Eighth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (S/2001/572).

This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the interpretation of speeches delivered in the other languages. The final text will be printed in the *Official Records of the Security Council*. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room C-178.

01-40951 (E)

The meeting was called to order at 10.55 a.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

Eighth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (S/2001/572)

The President: I should like to inform the Council that I have received letters from the representatives of Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Japan, Namibia, Rwanda and Sweden, in which they request to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the Council's agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite those representatives to participate in the discussion, without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

On behalf of the Council, I welcome the Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, His Excellency Mr. Léonard She Okitundu.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. She Okitundu (Democratic Republic of the Congo) took a seat at the Council table; Mr. Nteturuye (Burundi), Mr. Aboul Gheit (Egypt), Mr. Akasaka (Japan), Mr. Theron (Namibia), Mr. Gasana (Rwanda) and Mr. Norström (Sweden) took the seats reserved for them at the side of the Council Chamber.

The President: In accordance with the understanding reached in the Council's prior consultations and in the absence of objection, I shall take it that the Security Council agrees to extend an invitation under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure to Mr. Jean-Marie Guéhenno, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

I invite Mr. Guéhenno to take a seat at the Council table.

In accordance with the understanding reached in the Council's prior consultations and in the absence of objection, I shall take it that the Security Council agrees to extend an invitation under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure to Mr. Olara Otunnu, Under-Secretary-General in the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

I invite Mr. Otunnu to take a seat at the Council table.

The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. The Council is meeting in accordance with the understanding reached in its prior consultations.

Members of the Council have before them the eighth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, document S/2001/572. Members of the Council also have before them the report of the Security Council mission to the Great Lakes region, 15-26 May 2001, documents S/2001/521 and S/2001/521/Add.1.

At this meeting the Security Council will hear briefings by Mr. Jean-Marie Guéhenno, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, and by Mr. Olara Otunnu, Under-Secretary-General in the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict.

I now give the floor to Mr. Guéhenno.

Mr. Guéhenno (*spoke in French*): The eighth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) was issued on 8 June 2001 as document S/2001/572. The report describes developments since the issuance of the Secretary-General's previous report (S/2001/373), on 17 April, and contains recommendations for the future activities of MONUC. The mandate of MONUC is scheduled to terminate on 15 June.

In his report, the Secretary-General recommends an extension of the mandate of MONUC for 12 months, until 15 June 2002. The objective of that long extension is to demonstrate the commitment of the Security Council to MONUC and to the resolution of the conflict in the Great Lakes region. It is also

designed to facilitate the recruitment of civilian staff of the necessary high quality by ensuring greater continuity.

The Secretary-General also requests authorization from the Security Council for a transition to the third phase of MONUC deployment. The second phase — deployment to monitor and verify the disengagement of forces from the confrontation line — is now in the process of being accomplished, as Front de libération du Congo (FLC) forces draw back from their forward positions. MONUC is in the process of confirming the withdrawal of FLC units from Befale and Bolomba. However, the Secretary-General is not yet ready to submit detailed plans for MONUC activities in phase III, since the parties have not yet provided the information required to formulate such detailed plans. As Council members will recall, that specific military information was required in accordance with the plans for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of armed groups. MONUC is continuing to work with the parties in compiling and analyzing that information, so that it will be able to prepare the plans.

The Secretary-General is not at this time seeking to exceed the authorized troop strength of 5,537, which was approved by the Security Council in its resolution 1291 (2000). However, it is envisaged to continue to build up the military contingent of MONUC within the figure of 5,537. For example, the vastness of the country and the lack of infrastructure require the establishment of four helicopter refuelling bases — at Manono, Ilebo, Boende and Basankusu — which will need to be protected by armed security units of approximately 200 personnel each. A second riverine unit, also of some 200 personnel, has already been approved. Additional military observers will be needed to verify and monitor some of the more remote positions occupied by the parties pursuant to the disengagement plan, and to staff forward headquarters locations. A military police unit will also be required, and there will be a need to reinforce existing contingents in some areas, including Kisangani.

The demilitarization of Kisangani was demanded by the Security Council in its resolution 1304 (2000), a demand reinforced by the Security Council mission during its recent visit to the region. MONUC will continue to insist that the Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie (RCD) withdraw its forces from Kisangani. To that end, MONUC military planners are prepared to assist the RCD to draw up plans for an orderly withdrawal of its forces from Kisangani.

At the same time, MONUC is very much aware of the political, military and symbolic importance of Kisangani to the RCD, as well as of the potential fragility of the economic and security situation there. A precipitous withdrawal of RCD military forces could contribute to creating trouble in the city and could have adverse implications for the peace process. In keeping with its expectations that the local authorities will retain responsibility for civil administration and the maintenance of law and order, MONUC has no objection to the RCD remaining as the de facto civil authority in Kisangani. Accordingly, it is vital for local stability to ensure, prior to the withdrawal of RCD military forces, that the local police have adequate capacity to maintain law and order after the departure of RCD military forces. Although MONUC is prepared to build up its military strength in order to ensure its own security, it has no intention of assuming law and order functions in Kisangani.

(*spoke in English*)

The Secretary-General envisages an expansion of the civilian components of MONUC. So far, in view of the daunting logistical problems of deployment, the vast majority of the civilian staff of the operation have been administrative and logistical personnel. As we contemplate entry into phase III, it will be necessary to expand the other civilian operations of the mission, including the political, human rights, humanitarian, child protection and public information staff. The Secretary-General also considers that the inclusion in MONUC, for the first time, of the nucleus of a civilian police component is of major importance.

The function of many of these civilian staff will be, in brief, to gather as much information as possible concerning the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, particularly in the east and, most especially, in the Kivus. At the same time, through its public information operations, including radio, MONUC will explain to the Congolese parties and people what it and the broader international community are doing in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The information gathered will supplement the detailed data that the parties are expected to provide in respect of the armed groups to be disarmed and demobilized.

The human rights, humanitarian and child-protection personnel will also have a great deal to do in terms of helping to improve the quality of life of the Congolese people. As access to civilian populations in need increases, and as foreign and rebel armies disengage and begin to withdraw, the possibilities of providing assistance will increase. It should be noted that the risks could also increase, in what has become a widespread climate of impunity and lawlessness in many parts of the country.

With reference to the specific question of the security of the civilian populations in the areas to be evacuated by foreign forces as they withdraw, the Secretary-General has made clear his view that this is primarily the responsibility of the parties. Nevertheless, where it is safe to do so, the deployment of MONUC civilian human rights monitors, civil affairs officers and, eventually, civilian police officers is intended to mitigate the potential threat that these populations might face.

During its recent visit, the Security Council mission became aware of the economic aspects of the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and of the role that MONUC could play in improving the economic situation. While this is not usually a feature of peacekeeping operations, its importance in this case cannot be over-stressed. The reopening of the Congo River system — which was announced by Ambassador Levitte, the leader of the mission, during its visit to Mbandaka — is of central significance, politically, militarily and economically. As a first step towards the reopening of the river, two fast Uruguayan patrol boats with 14 military personnel onboard left Kinshasa for Mbandaka on 8 June, accompanying a barge loaded with vehicles and bulk fuel and water containers. That convoy is due to arrive in Mbandaka on 16 June. Another barge, loaded with fuel for MONUC and accompanied by a boat chartered by MONUC, is today at Lisala, between Mbandaka and Kisangani.

In this connection, we have noted with concern the reported statement of a senior RCD official that the rebel group might block the MONUC fuel convoy before it reaches Kisangani. The official was quoted yesterday as saying that the RCD would not let the boat reach Kisangani before MONUC investigates allegations of ceasefire violations which the RCD claims have been committed by Government forces. The RCD also claimed that the reopening of the river "would only benefit President Kabila and facilitate infiltration".

Needless to say, we do not accept that interpretation, and we continue to favour the reopening of the river system as the most important single step that can be taken to promote an economic recovery of the country, to enable the Congolese people to re-establish contacts, to reinforce the territorial integrity of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and, not least, to enable MONUC to support its own contingents throughout the country in a way that would be cheaper and more easily sustainable. The Force Commander, General Diallo, is taking this matter up today with the RCD as a matter of urgency. The Council may wish to call on the RCD not to link the progress of the MONUC convoy with its demand for an investigation of the ceasefire violation claims. MONUC will investigate those allegations, as it has done in the past, and make its findings known as soon as possible.

In his report, the Secretary-General welcomes the announcement by the neutral facilitator of the inter-Congolese dialogue, Sir Ketumile Masire, of the convening of a preparatory meeting for the dialogue on 16 July. MONUC will continue to support the efforts of the facilitator and looks forward to further developments in the planning and conduct of the dialogue. Sir Ketumile Masire has now dispatched his two senior advisers, Mr. Archibald Mogwe and Mr. Mohamed El Hacen Ould Lebat, to visit all 11 provinces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in preparation for the preparatory meeting to be held on 16 July.

Since the report was completed, there have been a few developments that I would like to bring to the attention of the Council. Among those are allegations from the RCD that the Forces armées congolaises (FAC) have allegedly occupied positions vacated by the RCD. MONUC intends to investigate the allegations, and has taken the matter up with the Government.

As the Council knows, we had hoped that the Special Representative of the Secretary-General Kamel Morjane could be with us this week. Unfortunately, on his way here he suffered a severe bout of malaria and is currently recuperating in Geneva. En route there, he visited Libreville for talks with President Bongo. The Gabonese head of State reiterated his readiness to assist efforts to find a peaceful solution to the conflict in the

Democratic Republic of the Congo, particularly through the inter-Congolese dialogue. President Bongo informed Mr. Morjane that he had maintained contacts with many Congolese political leaders, including in the armed opposition. Speaking of the withdrawal of foreign forces, the President of Gabon insisted on a distinction between "invaders" and invited forces.

Ugandan and Zimbabwean troops continue to withdraw from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. MONUC has reported further movements of the Uganda People's Defence Forces from the northern Democratic Republic of the Congo, though some Ugandan troops have also been deployed to Beni following recent fighting there between FLC troops and former Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie-Mouvement de libération (RCD-ML) elements. Beni is also reported to be the scene of clashes between Mayi-Mayi militiamen and the FLC. Zimbabwe Defence Force troops also appear to be preparing to evacuate their position at Ikela, and the Government of Namibia has announced its intention to withdraw its troops by 31 August.

Assuming the continued commitment of the parties to the Lusaka Agreement and to the plans they themselves have drawn up, MONUC is about to enter a particularly demanding phase of its activities. The continued support of the Security Council, as demonstrated by the Council's endorsement of the report of the Secretary-General and its recommendations, would send a convincing signal to the parties that the United Nations was prepared to do what it could to assist them in their efforts to restore peace, security and the basis of prosperity in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Great Lakes region.

The President: I thank Mr. Guéhenno for his comprehensive briefing and for his presentation of the eighth report of the Secretary-General.

I will now give the floor to Mr. Olara Otunnu.

Mr. Otunnu: It is wonderful to see you, Sir, a devoted advocate of the protection of children, presiding over this meeting. And it is very good to have the Foreign Minister of the Democratic Republic of the Congo with us this morning as well.

I have just concluded a mission to the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The purpose of my visit was to assess firsthand the impact of the wars on children. In the context of my mandate and pursuant to the request of the Security Council in resolution 1341 (2001), I was able to visit different parts of the country, including several of the provinces. Everywhere I went I held discussions with political and military authorities, local and international humanitarian non-governmental organizations and, of course, United Nations agencies and civil society. But above all, throughout the country I was able to meet and hear directly from different groups of war-affected children and their families.

I have to tell the Council that the direct and indirect impact of the wars has taken a very heavy toll on the children. In a country in which somewhere close to 50 per cent of a population of 49 million people are children under 16 years of age, consider the following. The vast majority of some 2 million people displaced within the country by the wars are children and women. Hundreds of thousands of children suffer or have died from severe malnutrition and preventable diseases because of the conditions created by the wars. According to a non-governmental organization, the International Rescue Committee, since the outbreak of hostilities in August 1998 there have been no less than 2.5 million so-called excess deaths — meaning, above the number usually expected — in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo alone. The majority of these victims have been children.

Most families in the Democratic Republic of the Congo today subsist on $1 a day. Forty per cent of the country's children are systematically and seriously malnourished. In the past 10 years, infant mortality has doubled. More than half of the children of school age in the country are not attending school, and the incidence of child labour — especially at mining sites — child prostitution and street children has sharply increased. There is the particular and silent trauma of girls exposed to sexual abuse and HIV/AIDS and forced to become concubines by soldiers of various affiliations. Everywhere I went I received consistent reports of the massive recruitment and use of child soldiers throughout the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

All these categories of war-affected children need our urgent attention and support. In the light of my visit I would like to put forward the following recommendations for the Council's consideration. There is an urgent need for a plan of action to address the grave situation of war-affected children in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Their protection

and rehabilitation must become a national and political priority. This should figure prominently on the agenda of the inter-Congolese dialogue and in the peace process in general.

A word about the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC). The arrival of the military contingent and military observers has had a striking impact on the local populations. Three elements seem to have particular meaning for the local communities. The sheer presence of these personnel is bringing much-needed confidence and reassurance to the local populations, allowing them to pick up pieces of their shattered lives. These personnel are facilitating and engaging in humanitarian activities and are closely associated with the protection of children. I would strongly recommend the expansion and strengthening of these elements of the role of MONUC. This will benefit the local populations and enhance further the considerable credibility of the United Nations.

The peace process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which has gained a new lease on life, needs to be accompanied by parallel efforts to gain access and to provide serious humanitarian assistance to populations in distress — particularly children and women. The priority responsibility for ensuring the well-being of the children — and, therefore, the future of the country — naturally rests with the Congolese leaders. I have urged them to fully assume their responsibility in this regard.

But today I appeal to the international community to do its part to reach out to the Congolese children and offer concrete assistance, focusing in particular on the rehabilitation of schools and health-care centres at the primary and local levels and providing much-needed resources for the demobilization of child soldiers. These measures are necessary to break the present cycle of despair and exploitation. They will also serve as means to protect and rehabilitate children and prevent their being caught back up in that cycle.

The massive recruitment and use of children as child soldiers has become nothing short of a plague that is steadily destroying the fabric and the future of the Congo and of that entire zone of Africa. The place of children is in schools, with their families and with their communities — not in battlefields.

I have therefore proposed the following five-point programme of action, which has been accepted by the political and military leaders of all groups. The programme is a complete stop — a definitive, complete stop to all recruitment of young persons below the age of 18 and the establishment of a mechanism to monitor and report on the application of that commitment; the organization of a major public-awareness campaign to sensitize the military, civil society and local communities; the undertaking of joint visits by MONUC, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and military authorities to military camps and barracks where children are suspected of being housed; and the establishment of the necessary capacity and structures on the ground for the demobilization, rehabilitation and reintegration of child soldiers.

In this connection, may I warmly welcome and congratulate the Government and the people of the Democratic Republic of the Congo on the recent ratification of the Optional Protocol that was announced during my visit to the country.

These important commitments and measures need to be translated into concrete action that can make a difference to the lives of children on the ground. I am counting on the political and military leaders to demonstrate the necessary political will and to deliver on their commitments.

But in the meantime, we of the international community, working closely with local and civil society organizations, need to establish a framework — a network — to monitor the conduct of the parties in conflict relative to their obligations and commitments for the protection of children.

Child soldiering has also become a cross-border and subregional activity. Children are being recruited in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, taken to neighbouring countries for training, and then brought back to fight in the Congo. Similarly, children of neighbouring countries are being recruited and taken to fight in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. We therefore need a neighbour with the initiative to promote protection, control and advocacy with respect to this damaging practice at the subregional level.

I referred earlier to the particular vulnerability of girls exposed to sexual abuse and HIV/AIDS by soldiers of various groups. There is a need for a special programme to address the special needs of this category of victims. This is all the more important because of the social stigma and the reticence that

prevails, which makes it difficult to address these issues within the communities.

We also must be very vigilant in taking measures to ensure that there is no impunity, now or later, for crimes committed against children. I urge and encourage troop-contributing countries — and I know that our colleagues in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations are doing everything in their power — to provide more systematic training for troops who are serving with MONUC.

What I saw in the Congo encouraged me enormously at other levels. I was very encouraged by the vigour and commitment of civil society throughout the Congo. I urge the United Nations and other actors of the international community to link our efforts much more closely with those of local civil society organizations. This is the best way, in the long term, to make our efforts sustainable and to build local capacity for protection and advocacy.

Everywhere I went, children and their parents called for an end to the war — the Congolese children have suffered far too much — and an end to the looting of the natural resources of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. I have to say that the widespread and systematic looting of diamonds, gold, coltan, timber and coffee from the Democratic Republic of the Congo by all concerned is entirely unacceptable. This is robbing the Congolese children of their birthright, of resources that should be used for their education, health care and development. Moreover, it has become the surest way to fuel the continuation of the war. The children of the Congo are looking to the Council to take decisive action to bring this practice to a halt.

In conclusion, I should like to say that I was particularly impressed and encouraged by the commitment of all sectors and of Congolese people of all persuasions to preserve their national unity; by the strength and engagement of civil society throughout the country; and by the resilience and determination of local communities and the youth.

A united, peaceful and vigorous Congo is good for Congolese children. It is good for the development and future of Africa, and it is good for international peace and security. I look forward to working very closely with you in the Council, Mr. President, as well as with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, MONUC, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and other agencies and non-governmental organizations to follow up on these issues and on the recommendations which I have brought to the Council's attention.

The President: I thank Ambassador Otunnu for his excellent briefing. I should also like to thank him, on behalf of the Council, for undertaking the visit to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, as mandated by the Council. We believe that his five-point programme of action, which he says has the acceptance of all political sides, will require the attention of the Council as we engage in the preparation of the draft resolution with regard to the extension of MONUC's mandate. In addition, various other points, particularly the subregional angle that Mr. Otunnu brought in, will require our attention on related agenda items of the Council. I thank him also for his gracious reference to me.

I now call on the Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mr. Leonard Okitundu.

Mr. Okitundu (Democratic Republic of the Congo) (*spoke in French*): Allow me at the outset, Sir, on behalf of my delegation and on my own behalf, warmly to congratulate you on your assumption to the presidency of the Security Council. While recognizing the merits of your predecessor, the representative of the United States of America, I am particularly gratified to see the presidency assumed by the representative of a friendly country, Bangladesh.

I should like also to avail myself of this opportunity to thank the Secretary-General, Mr. Kofi Annan, for his persistent efforts in favour of the maintenance and restoration of peace throughout the world, and in particular for his eighth report on the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

I take this opportunity also to express our gratitude to Mr. Olara Otunnu and to Mr. Guéhenno for the mission they carried out to my country.

Let me also express the deep gratitude of my Government and of the Congolese people to the Security Council mission that visited the Great Lakes region in May to gain a firsthand insight into the realities of the Congolese crisis and to better assess mechanisms for its resolution.

Finally, let me voice my heartfelt gratitude to all of the personnel of the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

(MONUC), in particular Ambassador Kamel Morjane, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Democratic Republic of the Congo, who masterfully led that mission, to the great satisfaction of all parties concerned.

Concerning the peace process that is under way in my country, I should like to comment on a few issues that my Government considers essential. I will discuss the following points: disengagement; the demilitarization of Kisangani; the withdrawal of foreign forces; the disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, reintegration and reinstallation of armed groups; the inter-Congolese dialogue; the humanitarian situation and the economic revival of the Democratic Republic of the Congo; and, finally, the transition to the third phase.

Turning to the disengagement process, we take note of the fact that there have been delays because of the continued refusal of one of the parties to the Lusaka Agreement to abide by the Kampala plan and the Harare sub-plans for disengagement and redeployment, despite oft-repeated promises.

The Security Council had ordered that party to disengage from Equateur province starting on 1 June 2001, to new defensive positions under the Harare sub-plans.

My Government must inform the Security Council that the party has in no way disengaged in keeping with the Kampala plan of 8 April 2000. If the disengagement is to be consistent with the Kampala plan, the party must withdraw by at least 165 kilometres from its current positions. If disengagement does not take place shortly, as determined by this Council, the measures provided for in paragraph 28 of resolution 1341 (2001) of 22 February 2001 must be imposed. That is, moreover, the position of this Council, clearly expressed in paragraph 103 of the mission report contained in document S/2001/521 of 29 May, in which the main organ responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security affirms that its members would react sharply if that party did not disengage to the agreed position as from 1 June.

With respect to the question of the demilitarization of Kisangani, my Government feels that it should be resolved on a priority basis. The Council mission to the Great Lakes region noted that Kisangani has yet to be demilitarized. This deliberate non-demilitarization can be characterized only as a flagrant violation of the relevant provisions of resolution 1304 (2000) of 16 June 2000, unanimously adopted by the Council over a year ago, which provisions were reaffirmed by International Court of Justice Order No. 116 of 1 July 2000 concerning the armed activities on the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

At the risk of wearying its members, I must remind the Council that the city of Kisangani underwent its own war within the war of aggression. Kisangani was the theatre of unusually violent fighting between the regular armed forces of Uganda and Rwanda, in violation not only of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, but also and above all of international public law. All this fighting entailed tremendous loss of human life, as well as the destruction of the economic, social and cultural infrastructures of the city. These serious armed confrontations have left an indelible mark and deeply traumatized the population of Kisangani.

My Government therefore calls on the Security Council to determine, in the draft resolution that it is about to adopt on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, a specific date for the effective and complete demilitarization of Kisangani. It is up to the Security Council to transmit a clear and precise message reminding the forces of occupation not to underestimate its determination to enforce respect for all resolutions on the war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and that they must demilitarize Kisangani as soon as possible.

It is also up to the Security Council to consider innovative measures to ensure respect for resolution 1304 (2000). The United Nations must be in a position to reinforce the Moroccan troops and to increase its civilian and associated staff in order to assist in administering the city. Just as Kisangani has been the symbol of the martyrdom and suffering of the Congolese people, we are convinced that it will become the political and physical symbol of renewal and the return to dignity of an entire people.

As regards the withdrawal of foreign forces and disarmament, demobilization, resettlement, reintegration and repatriation, all the leaders of the region confirmed to the Council mission the joint objective of withdrawing from the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in accordance with the relevant provisions of resolution 1304 (2000).

Furthermore, we clearly stated in Lusaka that this concept of the withdrawal of foreign forces should include a timetable with D-Day set for 22 February 2001.

As is known, General Njuki Mwaniki, Chairman of the Joint Military Commission (JMC) entrusted with the implementation of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, has convened a meeting of the JMC for 22 June in order to finalize precise plans for withdrawal and for disarmament, demobilization, resettlement, reintegration and repatriation. In the ongoing interest of advancing the peace process, my Government affirms that it will spare no effort at that meeting to finalize the plans for withdrawal and for disarmament, demobilization, resettlement, reintegration and repatriation. Specific instructions will be given to the Government representative so that he may assist in resolving all pending issues.

With respect to the disarmament of the armed groups, disarmament, demobilization, resettlement, reintegration and repatriation will be provided to them in conformity with the Lusaka Agreement, which, we would recall, recognizes the need to find solutions to the security concerns of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the neighbouring countries.

In that respect, I would inform the Council that my Government has taken the initiative of opening direct contacts at the highest level with the leaders of the aggressor countries. We seek credibly to formulate our security concerns and to define practical modalities of responding to them. That is the only way for us to find a way of reconciling our countries and to establish peaceful coexistence between our States and respective peoples.

As to my Government, I can assure the Council that the Democratic Republic of the Congo cannot serve as a staging post for the destabilization of neighbouring countries. It is important for us to know, however, that a peace restored through negotiations between States will not last long unless the deep-seated causes of the crisis in the Great Lakes region, including exclusion and intolerance, are addressed. Lasting peace in the Great Lakes region requires the promotion of democracy, human rights, national concord and reconciliation within each of our countries. To ignore this dimension of the issue of peace would be to prolong the unrest for a long time or indefinitely and to strengthen the advocates of ethnic cleansing. The adherents and advocates of these ideologies must be sought and brought before an international tribunal.

With respect to the inter-Congolese dialogue, my Government reaffirms its commitment to that great forum, which it considers to be an irreversible process and the best possible road to national reconciliation. We place all our trust in President Masire's ability to convene the inter-Congolese dialogue as soon as possible. We wish it to be an inclusive process that will bring together all trends and socio-political groupings in the country, with no foreign interference or military pressure whatsoever, so that they may reflect on and devote themselves calmly to the future of the Congolese nation and have their say in the new institutions of the next Republic. That is why we have welcomed the facilitator's proposal to convene a preparatory meeting to the dialogue on 16 July 2001.

As regards the issue of child soldiers, my Government has already issued a decree, as pointed out earlier by Mr. Otunnu, forbidding the recruitment of child soldiers in the Congolese armed forces and launching the process of their demobilization. During his recent visit to Kinshasa, Mr. Otunnu, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, noted that my country has signed and ratified the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict, as well as the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography.

With the support of the United Nations Children's Fund, my Government recently launched a vast awareness campaign to ensure the immediate demobilization of any child soldiers still serving in the Congolese armed forces, to halt the use of child soldiers and to protect children from sexual abuse and other forms of exploitation.

With respect to the humanitarian situation and the economic recovery of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, we must note that the humanitarian situation in my country is a disaster. According to data provided by non-governmental organizations, such as the International Rescue Committee and United Nations agencies, more than 2.5 million Congolese have died in the occupied territories as the direct or indirect victims of aggression. Such bodies as the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and the European Community Humanitarian Office

point to an unbearable humanitarian catastrophe. There are 2.1 million displaced persons. Almost 400,000 Congolese have taken refuge in neighbouring countries. Sixteen million people have been directly affected by the war, and the number of vulnerable persons — street children, widows, orphans — has multiplied. Child soldiers have been recruited by force.

The Council mission noted the precarious situation of the Congolese population in the provinces that are occupied as well as in those that are under Government control. The recent Government devaluation, carried out on the recommendation of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, has had a devastating effect on the daily lives of my people.

Furthermore, the systematic looting of the natural resources and other forms of wealth of the soil and the subsoil of the Democratic Republic of the Congo is being carried out at an unbridled pace with full impunity, thus depriving an entire population of the benefit of the tremendous resources the country is fortunate enough to possess.

The Council is also aware that these activities run counter to international public law and violate the Congolese people's right to freely dispose of its natural wealth and resources, as enshrined in common article 1 of the two United Nations covenants of 1966: the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. This is also a contravention of the principle of respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which has been repeatedly reaffirmed in United Nations resolutions on the situation in my country.

The Council mission identified and announced publicly some 40 small quick-impact projects to be carried out in the zones where the contingents of MONUC are deployed. My Government is grateful to the leader of the Council mission for having called upon the Bretton Woods institutions to contribute to the implementation of these projects.

However, what is important for the Congolese population is the need to include provisions for post-conflict management that is appropriate for this crisis in the plans to restore lasting peace. The Democratic Republic of the Congo requires the full support of the international community. In an act of international solidarity that is commensurate with existing needs, the international community must commit itself to helping the Democratic Republic of the Congo, particularly through the appropriate resumption of multilateral and bilateral structural cooperation, as well as by providing access to various debt-relief mechanisms, including the facilities enjoyed by countries emerging from an armed conflict under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative.

If the reconstruction of the Democratic Republic of the Congo is handled properly from the outset, it can only help the situation throughout Central Africa and the Great Lakes region, which includes Rwanda and Burundi, and where, until not so long ago, there was a regulatory mechanism with an integrating effect that facilitated their peaceful coexistence. This mechanism could be revived in some other form on which we could all agree.

Therefore, the disengagement and withdrawal processes must be accelerated to put an end to the misery of the Congolese people. A large-scale international humanitarian operation, in which many friendly countries have already announced their willingness to participate, would finally permit the Democratic Republic of the Congo to create optimum conditions to curtail traditional structural forms of cooperation.

Regarding the transition to phase III, it is important to note that in his report the Secretary-General, on the basis of the conclusions of the Council mission to the Great Lakes region, calls on the Council to approve the transition to phase III of MONUC.

My Government takes note of the ceiling of 5,537 personnel. However, we vigorously request that the MONUC mandate be redefined to endow it with a clear enforcement capacity. As far as I am concerned, this is a sine qua non for the success of the process.

It also seems vital to me to underline that the imperative of the withdrawal activities of foreign troops call for increased civilian, military and associated MONUC staff, so that it can successfully carry out the support policies aimed at ensuring peace, security and stability in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

To secure the smooth development and regular follow-up of all relevant MONUC activities and the Joint Military Commission, my Government is convinced that the co-location of these two structures

in Kinshasa and in the field will promote significant progress in the peace process. This is why my Government invites the Security Council to exert all its influence to ensure that the decision to co-locate the Joint Military Commission and MONUC, which has been accepted by all the parties, will be realized, particularly bearing in mind that the security concerns raised by certain parties have been proved baseless in the report of the Chairman of the Joint Military Commission submitted to the Security Council delegation in Lusaka on 22 May 2001.

I cannot conclude without restating my Government's concern regarding the snail's pace of the peace process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. My Government is convinced that because of procrastination, only greater involvement of the Security Council and the redefinition of the MONUC mandate, in order to give it a clear enforcement capacity, can bring about the successful implementation of the process now under way.

Finally, to put an end to the allegations of certain parties, the Government invites MONUC to intensify its deployment in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which is currently occupied. All this justifies the urgent need to redefine the mandate and increase the MONUC staff.

The President: I thank the Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of the Democratic Republic of the Congo for his kind words addressed to me and to my country.

I shall now call on the members of the Council. In addition to the 15 Council members, 6 others have requested to take the floor on this subject, so I emphasize the need for brevity and focus with regard to the statements that are going to be made here.

Mr. Levitte (France) (*spoke in French*): It is a pleasure to welcome the presence in this Chamber of Mr. Shé Okitundu, Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

My first words will be to thank Mr. Jean-Marie Guéhenno and Mr. Olara Otunnu for their brilliant presentations on the situation and to extend warm wishes for the recovery of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Kamel Morjane.

The mission that the Security Council carried out recently to the Great Lakes region was exceptionally important. It made it possible to make certain progress, limited yet concrete. The peace process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is showing encouraging developments. The ceasefire is being fully respected. Disengagement proceeds. Several States have begun to withdraw their troops from the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, including Uganda, Zimbabwe and, soon, Namibia.

The inter-Congolese dialogue is also progressing, with visits to all the provinces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo by envoys of Mr. Masire, aimed at appointing representatives for the dialogue; the preparatory meeting will start on 16 July. Finally, the announced reopening of the River Congo, with the arrival of the Uruguayan riverine unit, is a harbinger of hope for millions of Congolese from Kinshasa to Kisangani. None of the parties should threaten this hope in any way. All must participate actively in the Congo River Basin Commission.

The Security Council had an opportunity to address these various points during the consideration of the report of its mission to the Great Lakes region. Today, we have before us the eighth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), document S/2001/572. As we work on a draft resolution to extend the Mission's mandate, we must assess the current situation and consider the message the Council should send to the parties.

The Council shares the cautious optimism to which the Secretary-General refers in his report. But the peace process has not yet reached the point of no return. It remains fragile, and the parties to the conflict must continue their efforts. First of all, the disengagement phase must be completed; the parties to the conflict have prepared and signed disengagement plans, and these must be implemented in full.

The Front de libération du Congo (FLC) announced that it would disengage to agreed positions with effect from 1 June. That announcement is described in the account of the meeting of the Political Committee and the Security Council mission. Mr. Jean-Pierre Bemba reiterated that commitment during his meeting with the Security Council mission on 25 May. That promise must be kept through concrete action. The FLC must redeploy without delay to the positions of the Harare sub-plans.

The demilitarization of Kisangani is another priority. Rwanda and Uganda have withdrawn their troops from the city, and the Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie (RCD) must do the same. It is unacceptable that those troops remain there a year after the adoption of resolution 1304 (2000), which called for the demilitarization of Kisangani.

Finally, both the FLC and the RCD, must fully cooperate with MONUC. The obstacles that those two movements are placing in the way of MONUC's deployment and of its verification and monitoring teams, which are described in the report of the Secretary-General, are unacceptable and are incompatible with the pursuit of the peace process.

While the ceasefire is generally being respected by the signatories of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, we note that foreign armed groups that are not signatories to the Agreement have acted to engage in clashes. These could jeopardize the peace process. The civilian populations of Congo and of neighbouring countries, particularly Burundi, will have to foot the bill for this. All parties to the Lusaka Agreement, and especially the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, must ensure that all support for those foreign armed groups ceases. This issue must be resolved through a negotiated process of the disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, reintegration and resettlement of those groups.

The Council encourages the development of a dialogue among the heads of State concerned to address this important problem in accordance with the Lusaka Agreement. The Council takes note of the assurances just given by Mr. Okitundu; they must be acted upon as soon as possible.

Human rights violations are another cause for great concern within the Council. All parties to the conflict must do much more in this area, especially in the eastern part of the country. We are concerned to note that local human rights organizations are everywhere subjected to serious harassment. As Mr. Otunnu has so eloquently reminded us, children continue to be the most vulnerable victims of the conflict. His recommendations, especially the demobilization of child soldiers, should be a priority for everyone.

The plundering of the natural resources of the Democratic Republic of the Congo must cease. The Council has taken note of the initiatives announced by some States, such as Uganda, to shed light on this matter. But here again, we are awaiting results. This summer, the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which was established by the Council, will submit a further assessment of the situation. We are determined to take whatever measures may be necessary to put an end to this plundering, which has come to fuel the conflict.

Only complete respect by the parties for the commitments they themselves negotiated will enable the dynamic of peace to continue. The primary responsibility for the implementation of the Lusaka process lies with the belligerent parties themselves. For its part, the Security Council is determined to assist the parties in their efforts — if they fully respect their commitments. The Council has demonstrated this by authorizing the deployment of MONUC. MONUC is today in its second phase of deployment, in which it is following the disengagement process.

Like the Secretary-General, we consider that in order to support the dynamic of peace we must prepare for MONUC's next phase. In the third phase, the Mission will assist the parties to implement the withdrawal plans and the process of disarmament, demobilization, resettlement and reintegration. But again, the ball is in the parties' court. Overall plans have been prepared, and they are an excellent point of departure. But they must be finalized as a matter of urgency. For the Secretariat to begin its planning, it requires detailed information on the location and composition of foreign forces and on their withdrawal routes. The Secretariat also needs information about the composition and location of foreign armed groups and about the sites where they will gather for the purpose of demobilization. All the parties must provide this information as soon as possible; without it, MONUC will be unable to provide support.

The Joint Military Commission must be co-located with MONUC headquarters to make it possible for those two bodies to engage in daily cooperation.

The parties to the Lusaka Agreement have established a partnership with the Security Council. Beyond the Council, the entire international community must today marshal its efforts. It must speedily provide substantial economic assistance to the

Democratic Republic of the Congo so that the return of peace can be accompanied by improved living conditions for the Congolese. The international community must also be prepared to assist all the States of the region in implementing solutions developed by those States themselves with a view to ensuring stability in Central Africa. Here, I am thinking, *inter alia*, of the proposed regional conference on peace, security, democracy and development. But here again, it is efforts by the parties to the conflict that will enable that partnership to bear fruit.

Because the Council is to extend the mandate of MONUC, we must continue our close contacts with the signatories of the Lusaka Agreement to enable us to assess our support for the peace process as best we can and as accurately as possible. As Ambassador Greenstock has suggested, we could take advantage of the opening of the fifth-sixth session of the General Assembly, in late September or early October, when ministers members of the Political Committee of the Lusaka Agreement will be in New York, to organize a further meeting with the Security Council. In that way, we could deepen our confidence-building dialogue and our cooperation to the benefit of peace for the people of Congo and for all the other peoples of the Great Lakes region.

Mr. Kuchinsky (Ukraine): First of all, I would like to thank Under-Secretary-General Guéhenno for his presentation of the report of the Secretary-General, which reflects the developments in the Democratic Republic of the Congo during the last two months. I would also like to welcome the Foreign Minister of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mr. Léonard She Okitundu, and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, Mr. Olara Otunnu. I would like to thank Mr. Otunnu for a very convincing briefing on the plight of children in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and especially for his recommendations to the Security Council on a programme of action aimed at remedying the situation.

While taking into account some recent progress made in preserving the ceasefire, the disengagement of forces, enhancing the inter-Congolese dialogue and deploying the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) — which was undoubtedly promoted by the visit of the Security Council mission to the region last month — we are not certain about the irreversibility of the peace process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which is quite closely linked to the political situation in some neighbouring countries.

The precarious situation is still dependent on many political, military and social problems whose solution depends on the willingness of the parties to implement their commitments under the Lusaka peace Agreement. In this regard, it is extremely important for the parties concerned to realize that only a comprehensive solution to the problems, accompanied by their readiness to engage in constructive dialogue and to compromise, can bring about real results leading to a meaningful settlement of the conflict. We again call upon all the parties to leave behind needless ambitions and engage in practical implementation of the Lusaka accord.

In this connection, we would like to express our concern over the fact that some parties still have not provided information on the numbers, disposition and armaments of their forces in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Further progress in transforming the revised concept of operations into a genuine plan is directly dependent on that information.

We still cannot identify as satisfactory the level of cooperation between MONUC and the leaders of the Front de libération du Congo (FLC) and the Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie (RCD-Goma). That lack of cooperation also runs counter to the spirit of arrangements under the Lusaka Agreement. We urge all the parties to ensure an adequate level of cooperation with MONUC, both in the implementation of the disarmament, demobilization, resettlement, reintegration and repatriation programme and in the disengagement of forces and providing United Nations personnel necessary access to all positions.

The problem of the demilitarization of Kisangani remains acute. It must be resolved without delay, in accordance with Security Council resolution 1304 (2000).

As for the commencement of phase III of the operation, we fully share the Secretary-General's view, and we stress the necessity of a balanced approach to its planning, taking into account the numerous and complex tasks MONUC will face during the transitional period. We consider appropriate the decision to expand substantially the civilian components of MONUC, including a new civilian police unit, and to increase its logistical capabilities.

In that regard, we support the recommendation by the Secretary-General to extend the MONUC mandate until 15 June 2002. That would demonstrate the Security Council's commitment to the peace process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and to the stabilization of the situation in the subregion. At the same time, we would like to make the point that MONUC is not the main key to the settlement of the conflict. The desire and willingness of the belligerents themselves to put an end to this conflict should remain the principal factor in this regard.

As for the use of children as combatants, we stress again that this practice is inadmissible, and urgently call upon the recruiters to stop using children for this purpose and to help them reunite with their families.

To normalize the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo it is also expedient not to lose sight of the economic aspect of the problem. In this regard, we think it necessary to expedite the establishment of a Congo River Basin commission that would promote navigation on the river and thus contribute to the revitalization of trade along the country's main artery, the inland waterway system. This is also extremely important for MONUC in terms of shipping supplies to its contingents.

Against the background of the positive developments in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and in the whole region, which were specifically triggered by the Security Council mission to the Great Lakes region, we would like to point out to the importance of regional cooperation, especially meetings between the leaders of the countries involved in the conflict. This is especially urgent in the light of the information about the eastward movement of elements of armed groups crossing into Rwanda, Burundi and Tanzania. We are deeply concerned about these latest developments.

Finally, we would like to express our support for the Security Council draft resolution that is to be adopted later this week. We believe that draft to be a serious signal to the parties in terms of preserving the window of opportunity for the settlement of the conflict and for the stabilization of the situation in the subregion.

Mr. Ward (Jamaica): I thank Under-Secretary-General Jean-Marie Guéhenno for introducing this excellent report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC). I also thank the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, Mr. Olara Otunnu, for his briefing on the state of children in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. I join others in welcoming the presence here today of the Foreign Minister of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and I thank him for his most important statement.

The Secretary-General's report supports the observations we made and the conclusions we derived during our recent mission to the Great Lakes region. The Secretary-General also sets out for us a concept of operations for MONUC that my delegation believes to be appropriate to meet the challenges we face in the Lusaka peace process. It is forward-looking in its scope, and it sets the stage for a transition from MONUC's phase II deployment to its phase III deployment.

It is the view of my delegation that the Secretary-General has told the Security Council what it needs to know in order for us to make appropriate decisions to move forward in facilitating the peace process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in particular, and in the Great Lakes region as a whole. The Security Council is fully apprised of its responsibilities. It is important that the parties to the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement fully understand theirs.

There should be no doubt concerning the commitment of the Security Council and the international community to the peace process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Security Council further demonstrated its commitment to peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in sending its mission to the Great Lakes region, and in the course of the next few days it will extend the mandate of the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) for one year, which will allow for longer-term planning by the Secretary-General.

While on the Security Council mission, the members of the Council, united in their objectives, emphasized to all the parties what is expected of each individually and all collectively. That is, their commitments to Lusaka and subsequent related agreements must be unconditional.

It behoves us to remain focused on the way forward. It is important that the parties understand

clearly their obligations to take appropriate action to carry out the commitments they have made to effectively implement the terms of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. My delegation understands fully that while there are a number of important positive developments, there remain a number of troubling, unresolved issues. It is important that progress by made in resolving these without delay, so that the movement towards peace can be maintained.

I will highlight a few issues that we consider to be of considerable importance in the peace process. The Security Council — in its resolutions, in its discussions with the Political Committee and in its discussions with each party to the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement — has repeatedly emphasized the importance of the national political dialogue for the success of the peace process. The facilitator of the dialogue, Sir Ketumile Masire has announced the start of a preparatory meeting on 16 July. I take this opportunity to once again challenge all parties to rise to the occasion and take full advantage of this opportunity to build a lasting peace in the Congo. At the same time, I also urge President Kabila to engage his counterparts — his neighbours in Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda — in meaningful discussions to resolve the security concerns of all States in the region, and I call on his neighbours to reciprocate. Beyond a doubt a security threat to any one of these countries is a threat to peace for all of them. I commend those leaders in southern Africa who are encouraging and facilitating dialogue between and among the leaders of the region. I reiterate the importance of each party acting in a positive manner and taking appropriate steps to advance the peace process.

This includes, first, ceasing all hostile activities against each other, which means refraining from belligerency in words as well as deeds, including refraining from making false accusations against each other.

Secondly, there must be an end to all support for groups within the Congo by outside forces. Countries in the region that continue to provide such support will have to answer to the international community for obstructing the peace and perpetuating the suffering of the Congolese people.

Thirdly, the disarmament, demobilization, repatriation and reintegration of all armed groups within the Congo must proceed effectively and without delay. There must be an immediate cessation of support for the negative forces, in particular, the former members of the Rwandan Armed Forces (ex-FAR) and the Interahamwe, and the disarmament and demobilization of these forces must be verified by MONUC.

Fourthly, human rights and humanitarian law must be respected, and the protection of civilian populations — both those under the control of armed groups and those in areas evacuated pursuant to the disengagement and withdrawal plans — must be guaranteed. The Secretary-General's report draws attention to the gross violations that are taking place in areas under the control of all armed forces in the Congo, including areas under the control of Government forces. No amount of denial can disguise these facts. In this regard, it should be understood by all perpetrators that the international community will not ignore atrocities carried out against the civilian population. There will be no impunity.

Fifthly, an immediate end must be brought to the recruitment and retention of child soldiers. Child combatants must be demobilized and reintegrated into society without further delay, and such action, to be credible, must be verifiable by MONUC. I urge the international community to provide the necessary resources to carry out an effective disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and resettlement programme for child soldiers and all armed groups in the Congo.

I must direct a few comments to the Mouvement pour la libération du Congo (MLC) and Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie-Goma (RCD-Goma). These groups must act in accord with the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement and with the disengagement plans, and must abide by Security Council resolutions. The MLC must adhere to the disengagement plan and withdraw its forces to the designated lines in Equateur Province without further delay. The RCD must comply with resolution 1304 (2000) and remove its forces from Kisangani. The RCD must understand that cooperation with MONUC and the demilitarization of Kisangani are integral to the peace process, and must understand the implications of failing to comply.

My delegation objects to the position taken by the RCD with respect to the MONUC fuel convoy on its

way to Kisangani. We urge it to reverse its position and cooperate fully with MONUC, unconditionally.

The international community's patience is not inexhaustible. The MLC and RCD, as well as their supporters, would be well advised to realize that such intransigence on their part cannot be tolerated indefinitely by the international community. At the same time, others should not construe these words directed at the MLC, the RCD and their supporters to mean that any party has a lesser obligation to fully cooperate with the peace process and with MONUC.

The Secretary-General has highlighted in his report the dire humanitarian situation of the Congolese people. The problems faced by women and children are of particular severity and require our immediate attention. Jamaica fully supports the strengthening of MONUC to deal with the humanitarian conditions inflicted on the children by the war. We look forward to working with the Special Representative on the plan of action for war-affected children. I urge the international community to look favourably on supporting humanitarian agencies that seek to bring relief to the people of the Congo.

As we move forward on this tenuous path to peace, it is important that we construct a peace that will last. In order to do so, we cannot wait until all the guns are silenced, all the belligerents are disarmed or all foreign forces have completely withdrawn from the Congo. A political solution will not take hold unless the political dialogue, the disarmament and the withdrawal of foreign forces are accompanied and supported by peace-building measures, including economic sustenance and sustainable development. There can be no pause between peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace-building. For peace to be sustained, these processes must overlap, be integrated and be pursued simultaneously.

For this reason, it is imperative that the international community — in particular the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and other international and regional financial and developmental institutions — become fully engaged in the peace process at this critical juncture.

In conclusion, allow me to pay tribute to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Morjane, for his exemplary leadership of MONUC, and to the men and women of MONUC, both civilian and military, for the extraordinary efforts they are making under extremely difficult circumstances in the cause of peace.

I also pay tribute to the countries that have contributed troops and other personnel in the service of MONUC and the United Nations, without which the hope for peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo would be but a fleeting illusion.

Mr. Wang Yingfan (China) (*spoke in Chinese*): The Chinese delegation welcomes and thanks Mr. Okitundu, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, for his statement on the current situation in his country.

We would like also to thank the Secretary-General for his eighth report on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), and to express our gratitude for the very important presentation made by Mr. Guéhenno, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations.

We would like also to thank the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Otunnu, for his briefing, which was very moving. Hearing of the plight of the children in the Democratic Republic of the Congo gives us a sense of urgency to make greater efforts to put an end to the current conflict.

The report of the Secretary-General presents a comprehensive and realistic analysis of the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and contains very sound proposals. We agree with his assessment of the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and we support his ideas regarding the next phase of the deployment of MONUC.

We believe that, following the visit of the Security Council mission to the Great Lakes region, the report of the Secretary-General, the relevant Council resolutions and the activities of MONUC will further promote the development of the peace process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

At present, the armed forces of the parties to the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo have basically completed the disengagement process; the ceasefire has held; the cooperation of the parties with MONUC has improved; and preparations for the inter-Congolese political dialogue are under way. At the same time, there is an increase in bilateral and

multilateral contacts at various levels among countries in the Great Lakes region.

This positive momentum in developments in the Democratic Republic of the Congo has shown the international community that a window of opportunity exists and has increased its confidence in the peace process, but we must also note that there is still a long way to go before a genuine peace is realized.

The situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and in the Great Lakes region as a whole remains fraught with difficulties and risks. The peace efforts made by the parties to the conflict still fall far short of the expectations of the international community. Recently, some armed groups, with the support of certain parties, have continued to engage in acts of violence. The Front de libération du Congo (FLC) has not completed disengagement, and we are still waiting for the Rassemblement Congolais pour la démocratie (RCD-Goma) to take corrective actions to achieve the demilitarization of Kisangani. Furthermore, the parties concerned still have not provided to the Joint Military Commission and MONUC detailed information on their armed forces and armed groups.

The reopening of the Congo river system, as Under-Secretary-General Guéhenno said, is of central importance. However, difficulties and obstacles remain.

We also find the attitude of the RCD, as described by Mr. Guéhenno, very disturbing. We call on the RCD fully to cooperate with MONUC.

The draft resolution to be adopted by the Security Council contains explicit stipulations as to the responsibility of various parties in the next phase of the peace process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The key issue remains whether the parties concerned have the political will to resolve the conflict by peaceful means as soon as possible, and whether they want to translate such will into practical action.

Recently many countries have called on the international community and the United Nations in particular to devote the necessary attention to Africa. Africa should not become a neglected continent. It is encouraging that the United Nations and the Security Council are devoting considerable attention to the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and in the Great Lakes region as a whole.

On the other hand, ultimately the fate of the Democratic Republic of the Congo lies in the hands of the people of that country — the Government, political parties, armed groups and civil society. The fate of the countries in the Great Lakes region, in the same vein, also lies in the hands of the peoples of those countries.

We therefore call on the parties to the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and in the Great Lakes region to preserve the hard-won momentum for peace and to take practical actions to cooperate with the United Nations in a common effort to promote the peace process. This includes implementation of the commitments they undertook during Mr. Otunnu's visit on the question of child soldiers.

Indeed, peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is in the interest of the parties concerned, of the people of that country and of the Great Lakes region as a whole.

Sir Jeremy Greenstock (United Kingdom): I am grateful for your indulgence, Mr. President, and I apologize to you and to members of the Council for being late for the meeting and for darting in and out. But it is in a good cause, because the work of the Security Council is under scrutiny next door in the Trusteeship Council. You started the session off yourself, Mr. President, and I think it would be wise if members of the Council were represented there. Ambassador Valdivieso is bravely holding the fort against a number of predictable comments on the work of the Council.

But it is quite a constructive discussion, and may I say also that it is a very interactive discussion, which is perhaps a lesson also for the Council in its open meetings.

It is very good to see Foreign Minister Okitundu with us today, and I particularly appreciate it that he has taken the trouble to join us as we continue to consider this extremely important topic of trying to find peace in his country.

My delegation, too, is very grateful for the briefings which Under-Secretary-General Guéhenno and Special Representative Otunnu gave us this morning.

Sweden will make a statement on behalf of the European Union which will encompass United Kingdom policy here. I want to make just three or four specific comments about where we are now.

I think that we are all agreed, having been on the mission last month, that the primary responsibility for finding peace in the Great Lakes region rests with the leaders of those countries themselves. The Security Council will play a determined role, but it has to play an ancillary role in this whole process.

We very much welcome the progress that has been made in recent months, but much, much more is needed. I am sure that all interventions during the course of today's meeting will make this point very strongly. The role of the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) can only be developed behind the progress which the parties make.

I echo those particularly who have focused on the Front de libération du Congo and the Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie this morning, as I have heard the two previous speakers do. I think that the news in that direction is poor. MONUC is trying to correct the situation, but they are not following the timetable. More than that, they have not got the message that, if they wish, as factions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, to play a role in the future political life of that troubled country, they will not be able to do so without international support and they will not get international support unless they are wholeheartedly behind the implementation of the Lusaka Agreement. The points which Ambassador Ward and others have made in that respect are extremely important.

The parties now need to produce information and serious plans for the withdrawal of forces and for moving forward in disarmament and demobilization. We very much welcome the whole range of the Secretary-General's report on these issues and particularly his proposal for an integrated civilian-military planning section to coordinate support for the disarmament, demobilization, resettlement and reintegration process. The more we think about it, the more it is vital that this process get going now and that it encompass the forces that are still roaming round and doing damage in the eastern part of the Congo. Otherwise, failure in that respect will unravel the other parts of the reciprocal agreements that have been entered into under the Lusaka Agreement. We have not had a response that is satisfactory from all members of the Political Committee in this respect and it must be chased up.

We need also to be conscious of the links with the conflict in Burundi, including, again, in planning for disarmament, demobilization, resettlement, reintegration and repatriation, and I am sure we will all be making that point this morning.

We are very pleased that Sir Ketumile Masire is making progress now on the inter-Congolese dialogue. We have to recognize that the interplay between the dialogue and the peace implementation process is going to be a vital one. We have to recognize also the interplay between the political process and the opportunities for economic regeneration. It is vital for the Congo that both these *volets* be taken forward as quickly as possible.

The humanitarian situation is still dire and we have to recognize that progress in military withdrawal and in disengagement opens up a wider set of challenges in terms of both political and civilian administration in the Congo and in terms of humanitarian relief. It is right to look for a wider role for MONUC in that respect. We look forward to receiving more detailed plans from the Secretariat across this whole range, but we will look very carefully at precisely what is being proposed. We would like to see details and costings. The potential for further action in the range of activity described in the Secretary-General's report is very wide and the Council will have to make some very careful judgements between what is needed and what is affordable in that respect. Again, this is very much related to progress being made by the parties.

We warmly thank Special Representative Otunnu for his report to us this morning. We welcome the measures he has proposed to put an end to the use of child soldiers and we welcome the fact that the parties have accepted these proposals. That is good progress and we are very pleased that he has been able to make this visit. We would like the Council to be involved in monitoring the implementation of what he is proposing, but we give him our warm support. As he said, there is also a wider need to ensure that children in the Democratic Republic of the Congo have a real alternative — the alternative of a normal life. It is right that this should be addressed within the inter-Congolese dialogue, as well as by the action of the United Nations.

I, too, pay a warm tribute to what Special Representative Morjane has achieved in his tenure in

the Democratic Republic of the Congo and to what all the members of MONUC and the forces involved in the Congo are achieving at this moment.

Mr. Gatilov (Russian Federation) (*spoke in Russian*): We consider the presence at today's Security Council meeting of the Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mr. She Okitundu, and of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, Mr. Olara Otunnu, to be very important and useful.

The Russian delegation is grateful to the Secretary-General for his thorough report on the Democratic Republic of the Congo and for its introduction by Mr. Guéhenno. We share the cautious optimism with which the report assesses developments in that country. It is important that there be a general observance of the ceasefire. There has been incontrovertible progress in the disengagement of forces in the conflict. Part of the Ugandan and Zimbabwean contingents are leaving the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Preparations are well under way for the establishment of the inter-Congolese dialogue.

At the same time, we would feel it to be premature to speak of the irreversibility of the peace process. A great deal remains to be done to that end, in particular by the parties to the conflict, which bear the main responsibility for its settlement. On that basis, we support the recommendation in the Secretary-General's report to extend the present mandate of the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo for 12 months, until 15 June 2002, while maintaining the current level of the maximum agreed strength of the Mission's military component. This would allow adequate preparation for the onset of phase III of the peacekeeping operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

In our view, important steps in that direction should include the completion of the process of the disengagement of the parties to the conflict and the demilitarization of Kisangani, in accordance with the provisions of resolution 1304 (2000). It is also essential to accelerate the work of the Political Committee of participants in the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement and of the Joint Military Commission on the preparation of detailed plans for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of the members of armed groups and for the withdrawal of foreign troops from the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

In our view, the logic behind the development of the peace process requires the intensification of the dialogue between the States involved in the conflict, first and foremost through bilateral contacts between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and its neighbours. This is precisely where we see a window of opportunity to resolve many key issues of the settlement, notably those related to the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of the so-called negative forces.

It is essential to prevent the infiltration of armed groups from the Democratic Republic of the Congo into the territories of neighbouring States, which would only broaden the conflict. In that context, I must note our great concern over the involvement of the Front de libération du Congo in the recent fighting in the Central African Republic. We feel that this emerging trend calls for the closest attention and we would be grateful to the Secretary-General for specific recommendations on how to counter it.

The efforts of the parties to the conflict towards reconciliation will be met with support from the United Nations and its Mission to the Democratic Republic of the Congo. We welcome the Secretary-General's intention at this early stage to step up the Mission's activity in the civilian, political, human rights humanitarian and socio-economic spheres. Efforts aimed at the economic recovery of the Democratic Republic of the Congo should be a basic component of the general strategy for the settlement of the conflict.

In that context, I should like especially to note the importance of the project to reopen river navigation between regions of the Democratic Republic of the Congo that are under the control of the conflicting parties, the significance of which for the overall settlement cannot be overemphasized. A useful role in planning future tasks will have to be played by the civilian police contingent, which has now appeared for the first time in MONUC. However, it is important that all Secretariat measures to develop the mission in accordance with the defined concept should clearly correspond to the mandate agreed by the Council and should be thoroughly planned and based on the necessary logistical resources.

Mr. Neewoor (Mauritius): Thank you very much, Mr. President, for holding this important public meeting on the Democratic Republic of the Congo. We thank also Under-Secretary-General Guéhenno for introducing the eighth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC). Likewise, we express our appreciation to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, Mr. Olara Otunnu, for his briefing on the situation of children in the Democratic Republic of the Congo conflict.

We extend a very warm welcome to Mr. She Okitundu, Foreign Minister of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and we thank him for his comprehensive statement.

As we all know, the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo has undergone very significant changes for the better over the last few months. Not only has the ceasefire continued to hold, but the disengagement of forces on the ground has proceeded rather smoothly, except in Equateur Province, where there have been some difficulties. We are confident, however, that the commitment in this regard given by the Front de libération du Congo at the meeting of the Joint Military Commission (JMC) and the Political Committee in Lusaka last month, and reiterated personally by Mr. Bemba at the Security Council mission meeting with him in Kampala, will be fully honoured without any further delay.

We also call upon the Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie (RCD) to comply fully with Security Council resolution 1304 (2000), which calls for the demilitarization of Kisangani. The RCD cannot continue to flout the Security Council resolution in this regard.

We now look forward to the total withdrawal of all foreign forces from the soil of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and we welcome the plans worked out to this end by the parties at the Lusaka meeting of the Political Committee and the JMC recently. The withdrawal plans require the parties to the conflict to communicate important information on movements of their troops and other relevant information by fixed dates. The information is also vital for MONUC to plan and prepare for phase III deployment.

While we welcome the proposal of the Secretary-General that MONUC deployment in the Democratic Republic of the Congo be maintained in a state of transition to phase III until the conditions on the ground permit deployment under phase III, we believe that full phase III deployment must not be unduly delayed. In particular, we believe that the delay should not be the result of failures on the part of the parties to live up to their commitments under both the Lusaka accord and subsequent agreements for their disengagement and total withdrawal from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. We also hold the view that during the transition to phase III, MONUC deployment should attain the ceiling of 5,537 set under phase II.

Now that the process of the inter-Congolese dialogue, under the leadership of Sir Ketumile Masire, is about to get under way, the Congolese armed groups must decisively give up their military options and gear up to join the political dialogue, and together with the political parties in the country and civil society help prepare the constitutional framework for democratic rule in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. They must not miss out on the new opportunities to serve their country through the democratic process in the new political liberalization President Kabila has triggered in the country.

The armed groups must also cooperate fully with MONUC in the important task of bringing peace and normalcy to the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Above all, the armed groups must understand that any obstructionist action on their part will not be acceptable to the Security Council and the international community generally.

During the visit of the Security Council mission to the Great Lakes region, the leaders we met reminded us repeatedly that lasting peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and indeed in the region, cannot be secured without disarming, demobilizing, repatriating and rehabilitating the negative forces, including the former Rwandan Armed Forces and the Interahamwe, that are responsible for much of the trouble the region has seen in recent years. This should indeed be a high priority, as also recognized under the Lusaka Agreement.

The process of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration must be undertaken by the parties concerned as a concerted action through dialogue

among leaders of the region. MONUC will have an important responsibility in this regard, and it must get ready as soon as possible to assume its role. We urge the international financial institutions and the donor community to contribute generously towards the DDR process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Great Lakes region.

As the conflict abates and normalcy gradually returns, the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo will have to engage in massive all-round reconstruction to put the economy back on the rails and to consolidate peace and democracy. This can be achieved only with large-scale support, again from the international financial institutions and the donor community. We hope that the parties that are engaged in the illegal exploitation of the natural resources of the Democratic Republic of the Congo have taken serious note of the resolve of the Security Council, following the report of the Panel on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, that it will act appropriately if the plundering is not swiftly brought to an end.

The humanitarian situation resulting from the conflict remains grim in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. We acknowledge with gratitude the efforts of the humanitarian organizations that are involved in alleviating the sufferings of the Congolese people. We have heard Mr. Olara Otunnu, and we feel deeply distressed by the picture he has presented on the plight of children in the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. My delegation fully subscribes to the five-point plan that he is recommending in favour of the children of the Congo.

I wish to warmly commend MONUC, which is doing tremendous work in difficult circumstances in the Democratic Republic of the Congo under the dynamic leadership of Ambassador Morjane. We witnessed this abundantly in the Democratic Republic of the Congo during the visit of the Security Council mission.

Finally, my delegation supports the Secretary-General's recommendation that the mandate of MONUC be extended by one year.

Mr. Mahbubani (Singapore): Let me begin with a brief word of apology and a brief word of thanks. I would like to apologize to my colleagues for not having been here earlier this morning. But like you, Mr. President, I was called to another room by a meeting of the Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters Related to the Security Council. And I would like to thank my Irish colleague for allowing me to speak this morning, as I have a flight to catch this afternoon.

I commend you, Sir, for convening today's meeting. We welcome Mr. Léonard She Okitundu, and I take this opportunity to thank him for his warm and generous hospitality when we were in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. I also want to thank the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Mr. Guéhenno, and my good friend Ambassador Olara Otunnu for their presentations.

Previous speakers have already mentioned many of the key points, and we also had an opportunity to discuss them two weeks ago in a public meeting, when we discussed the Security Council mission to the Great Lakes region. Therefore, we wish merely to add three observations which we hope will be helpful for today's discussion.

The first observation we want to make is that we cannot take for granted that the window of opportunity that has been referred to several times will remain open forever; this must be stressed. Certainly, as we agreed at that earlier meeting, the Security Council mission has given further impetus to the Lusaka Agreement. A fragile peace is beginning to take root in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. But the positive momentum generated by the disengagement of forces and the withdrawal of foreign forces must be maintained. The problem we have is that there are many obstacles and dangers. And — perhaps this is not surprising — we are witnessing signs of backsliding by some of the parties, particularly by the Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC), and the Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie (RCD (Goma)).

As several speakers have noted, one key challenge we face in this process is the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration or resettlement of the armed groups in the region. This is obviously a complex issue, and we probably cannot address it in great detail here, but I wanted to draw the attention of members of the Council to a report that has just been put out by the International Crisis Group, entitled "Disarmament in the Congo: Investing in Conflict Prevention". The report tries to discuss this issue at

great length. Of course, we do not agree with all the conclusions and recommendations of the report. But I recall that during the Security Council mission, many of us were sitting in the plane reading reports published by that organization to get the background on the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and in Burundi. I hope that members of the Council will refer to the report I have mentioned as well; it points out that this is a serious problem that the Council has to address. I hope we will address it.

Another key challenge we face at this stage concerns responsibility for the protection of civilians. I realize that this too is a very delicate issue. We have taken note of the concern expressed in paragraph 93 of the Secretary-General's report on the problem of assuring effective civilian administration, including the safety and security of the civilian population, in areas to be evacuated by foreign forces. Paragraphs 67 to 69 of the Secretary-General's report highlight the pressing challenge of ensuring the security of the Congolese population. But paragraphs 93 to 95 of the report make it equally clear that the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) cannot be expected to assume that responsibility. That function and general law and order duties remain the primary responsibility of the parties to the Lusaka Agreement.

At the same time, the tragic experiences of Rwanda and Srebrenica remind us that it is morally unacceptable for the United Nations to remain inactive in the face of massive human rights violations. By its very presence — and even though we would not wish this to be the case — MONUC will be expected to provide protection for civilian populations. Although it has neither the mandate nor the resources to protect civilians, at the very minimum MONUC can nevertheless carry out a valuable monitoring function by alerting the Council to any serious threat to the security of civilians. When that happens, the Council will be obliged to consider and devise an appropriate response. In that regard, we would like to recall the recommendations contained in the 15 December 1999 report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations during the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, the Carlsson inquiry, which stated that

> "The United Nations — and in particular the Security Council and troop-contributing countries — must be prepared to act to prevent acts of genocide or gross violations of human rights wherever they may take place. The political will to act should not be subject to different standards." (*S/1999/1257, annex, recommendation 3*)

Our second observation is on the humanitarian aspects. Here, like all our colleagues, we were struck by the sobering figures presented in the Secretary-General's latest report and, I think, in Ambassador Otunnu's presentation this morning: more than 2 million people have been displaced, 16 million have critical food needs, 2 million are affected by AIDS, and, in some areas such as Moba and Kalemie, an estimated 75 per cent of children born during the conflict have perished or are expected to die before they reach the age of two. That random sampling of grim statistics amounts to what the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, Mr. Kenzo Oshima, has called the country's "massive humanitarian deficit" (*S/2001/572, para. 62*). Clearly, further resources are required to tackle the problem.

In our view — and this is perhaps an obvious but nonetheless useful point to make here — one sure way to create a substantial "humanitarian credit" is for the parties to the Lusaka Agreement to end the fighting immediately and to fulfil all their commitments. The mortality study released by the International Rescue Committee on 8 May makes it clear that "excess" civilian deaths will continue to mount as long as all sides insist on pursuing the military option. In the meantime, we would urge the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the rebel groups to agree to the establishment of humanitarian corridors between Kinshasa and the eastern and northern provinces. We also look forward to working with Ambassador Otunnu on his five-point plan of action to address the grave situation of war-affected children in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Our final observation is on Burundi. The situation in Burundi presents a conundrum for this Council. We all agree that we cannot afford to ignore this dimension of the conflict in the Great Lakes. We all also agree that failure to contain the crisis in Burundi will have repercussions for peace in the entire subregion. It will perpetuate the vicious cycle of ethnic conflagration that has plagued the region. Indeed, as the Secretary-General notes in his report,

> "there can be no lasting peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo without a comprehensive settlement of the situation in Burundi". (*S/2001/572, para. 106*)

We therefore strongly endorse and echo the Secretary-General's call to regional heads of State to urge the armed groups to refrain from violence and to enter into negotiations immediately. We did the same when we were part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo mission. The sheer complexity and intractability of the crisis in Burundi defies any easy solution. But the formidable challenge it poses requires us to continue to pay close attention to the unfolding situation. In that regard, it may be useful at some point for us to reflect on what role MONUC could usefully play in the border region with Burundi.

Let me join my colleagues in paying tribute to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Kamel Morjane, who is soldiering on despite, I gather, having fallen ill. We wish him a speedy recovery.

Mr. Hume (United States of America): First, I would like to join colleagues in welcoming the Foreign Minister of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mr. Okidundu, to this meeting of the Council. We would like to thank the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Affairs, Mr. Guéhenno, for his report to the Council.

We are also pleased to welcome the Under-Secretary-General in the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, Mr. Otunnu, back to the Security Council; he is a friend and an asset to every Member of the United Nations. More important, he is a friend and an asset to children in armed conflicts throughout the world. We are grateful that he undertook his mission to Central Africa, and we are grateful for his briefing this morning. I would like to echo his comments, and those of my colleagues, on the depravity of using children as soldiers in the Great Lakes conflict. We cannot separate that issue from the wider pursuit of peace in the region, and we must recognize that, even in a climate in which human rights are routinely violated, the cynical use of children to fight the wars of adults merits special opprobrium.

The overall strategy adopted by the Security Council has been to support the commitments made by the parties as expressed in the Lusaka Agreement and in subsequent statements. The United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) is the embodiment of the Council's support. The success of our actions depends directly on the commitments made by the parties and on the performance by the parties of those commitments. They have all made promises that must be kept for peace and progress to be restored.

That overall strategy includes three inter-locking parts. First, peace in the Congo needs the democratic legitimacy that can come from the proposed national dialogue aiming at national elections. Cooperation and compromise by all concerned parties will be required in order to achieve this essential goal. We must redouble our efforts in support of the inter-Congolese dialogue, for this is the exercise that will lead to the rebuilding of the Congolese State. In our view, there can be no State without a working justice system, and there will be no justice in the Democratic Republic of the Congo without legitimate State authority.

The second inter-locking part is that peace depends on the end of the threats posed by the so-called negative forces. The United States shares the concern of the Security Council at recent reports that elements of the former Rwandan Armed Forces (ex-FAR)/Interahamwe, the Front pour la défense de la démocratie (FDD) and the Forces nationales de libération (FNL) are moving eastward towards Rwanda, Burundi and Tanzania. Nothing could be more destabilizing than renewed incursions by these groups into their countries of origin. It is, in our view, morally indefensible to aid or to abet the movement of these forces back to Rwanda or Burundi. Beyond that, it is dangerous to the entire peace process. The only answer lies in cooperation between regional States on cessation of arming, followed by the disarming and disbanding of these groups, with individual members demobilized and repatriated or resettled.

There are United Nations Security Council prohibitions on the provision of arms to the ex-FAR/Interahamwe, resolutions that, in our view, should be strengthened. The draft resolution currently under negotiation among Council members calls on all Governments to halt the provision of arms to the FDD and the FNL. It may be that those measures alone will not bring peace to the region, but history suggests that absent those measures, the peace we desire will be even harder to attain.

Thirdly, peace requires the withdrawal of all foreign forces. We welcome the recent progress in this direction, but, frankly, it is not enough. Those parties that have not made detailed commitments to withdraw their forces need to do so now. There must be no backsliding. While this process cannot be completed without security cooperation among the State parties, each individually has a duty to make that cooperation effective.

I want to raise a point emphasized by the recent Security Council mission: the need to end impunity for violations of human rights and international humanitarian law. We all agree that impunity should no longer be acceptable in this crisis, but now we need to enter into a discussion of how we go about ending it. As in the case of our wider involvement in resolving the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, our first response should be to turn to our partners in the peace process. We must remind all of their obligations under the Fourth Geneva Convention, and we must work to ensure that those obligations are met.

As already raised by Under-Secretary-General Guéhenno and Special Representative Otunnu in the most eloquent terms, the parties have obligations under the decisions of the Council and under international humanitarian law to respect civilian rights. Kisangani must be demilitarized, and the Congo River must be reopened for commerce. Most profoundly, these duties owed by the parties are owed to the Congolese people. We require that these actions be taken now.

Finally, we all recognize the extraordinary performance of the United Nations Mission in the Congo. With limited resources to cover a vast and undeveloped country, MONUC has done a superb job. We believe the Secretary-General has given us an excellent report that balances the need for United Nations action with the need for action on the part of the Lusaka signatories. The Secretary-General's recommendations keep MONUC within achievable tasks and set realistic benchmarks for future commitments. We are pleased to support the report and the current draft resolution.

Mr. Cooney (Ireland): I would like to thank Under-Secretary-General Guéhenno for introducing the Secretary-General's latest report, which outlines proposals for the transition to phase III of the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC). I would also like to thank the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, Mr. Otunnu, who is of course no stranger to this table, for his report. Ireland shares his many concerns and welcomes reported progress on the demobilization of child soldiers — although, of course, much, more needs to be done. I would also like to recognize the constructive and forward-looking intervention of Foreign Minister She Okitundu, and to thank him for the warm welcome that was extended to the Security Council delegation during our recent visit to the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Of course, like others, I would also like to pay tribute to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Kamel Morjane, and to the men and women of MONUC for their untiring work on behalf of the international community.

Sweden will later speak on behalf of the European Union. Ireland fully associates itself with that intervention.

The Security Council mission returned from the Great Lakes region reasonably optimistic about the prospects for a resolution of the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Since then there have been some positive developments, but there have also been disappointments. The onus is now on the signatories to the Lusaka Agreement to honour their commitments under the Agreement and to resist the temptation to use the ceasefire and the redeployment of forces to seek advantage over their fellow signatories. All sides must accept that the conflict is over and that the future lies in cooperation and the mutual and progressive implementation of the Lusaka accord.

In its various resolutions and statements, and in its various meetings with the parties, the Security Council has always striven to demonstrate a sense of balance and proportion in its demands. Ireland believes that this has been acknowledged and welcomed by the parties and that it has allowed the Council to make a real contribution to the modest progress that has been achieved to date.

It is in that spirit that we express our concern at the reported incidents of non-cooperation by the Mouvement pour la libération du congo (MLC) and the Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie (RCD). We call on the MLC to complete the programme of redeployment of its forces in sector one, and on the RCD-Goma to comply with the Council's demand that it withdraw its troops from Kisangani. We urge all

foreign Governments to implement their commitments under the Lusaka Agreement to withdraw their forces from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. And we call for all parties, in particular the Governments of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Zimbabwe, to refuse all support to the so-called negative forces, as well as to Mayi-Mayi groups violating the ceasefire.

The exploitation of the resources of the Democratic Republic of the Congo by foreign Governments, which is a result of the conflict, must end with immediate effect.

Turning to the proposal of the Secretary-General, we regret that only Angola and Uganda have so far provided MONUC with information on the numbers, dispositions and armaments of forces in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in respect to the withdrawal of foreign forces and disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, reintegration and resettlement. We reluctantly concur with the Secretary-General that as a result there is not presently sufficient basis for further action by the United Nations in sustaining and supporting the initiatives taken by the parties in these areas.

However, we also agree with the Secretary-General that preparations for phase III of MONUC's operations, as envisaged in the Secretary-General's seventh report, should proceed. We feel that particular effort should be made to address the situation in the Kivus, as resolution of the conflict or conflicts there is central to ending violence in the wider region. We particularly welcome the proposal to deploy a civilian component to advise and assist the local authorities in discharging their duty to ensure the security of the population. We welcome too the intention to attach to MONUC specialists in human rights, humanitarian assistance, child protection and gender-awareness, and we hope that they will be able to provide support to the local authorities in developing their own capacity.

We support, too, the emphasis placed on the gender perspective and stress that the particular impact of the conflict on women and girls should be factored into all aspects of MONUC's work. We particularly support the appointment of a Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General who is to be charged with coordination within MONUC and between MONUC and other United Nations agencies and donors.

As regards the dire humanitarian situation of the Congolese people, which is highlighted by the Secretary-General, we support the call for the establishment of humanitarian corridors to allow resumption of trade in food and other goods between Kinshasa and eastern and northern provinces. We call on the Government and the rebel groups to work together to this end.

We note that it is envisaged that the role of MONUC in the transitional phase will be limited to monitoring developments and reporting on them to the Council. We fully agree that the parties to the conflict bear the primary responsibility for the safety of the civilian population. We also recognize the practical limitations placed on the United Nations, not least because of the geographical and logistical difficulties of the operation. Nevertheless, like my Singaporean colleague, I would point out that the mere presence of the United Nations on the ground will create a sense of expectation to which we must be ready to respond as developments unfold.

I would like to conclude on a positive note by urging that all Congolese parties work closely with the facilitator of the inter-Congolese dialogue, Sir Ketumile Masire, and his team to bring about early progress in the establishment of viable democratic government in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The success of the inter-Congolese dialogue is essential to the long-term peace and stability of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the wider region.

During the Council's visit to Kinshasa, a friend of the Congo described the country — blessed as it is by its great natural and human resources — as a safe to which the key had been lost. The inter-Congolese dialogue gives the Congolese people the opportunity to refashion that key and thereby unblock their enormous potential and put it to use to the benefit of the entire Congolese people.

Mr. Tekaya (Tunisia) (*spoke in French*): Allow me to thank Mr. Jean-Marie Guéhenno for introducing the eighth report of the Secretary-General. I would also like to thank Mr. Olara Otunnu for his presentation on his recent visit to the Congo. My delegation hopes that the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Kamel Morjane, will soon be well.

My delegation would also like to welcome the presence here of the Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. His participation in this meeting bears further witness to the interest his Government attaches to the role of the Security Council in seeking peace and security in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Great Lakes region. Once again, I would like to thank him for all the cooperation he personally and his Government provided the Security Council mission.

The momentum for peace persists in the region, but it is fragile. It is worth doing all we can to make it irreversible. Here the main responsibility lies with the parties. They must work in conformity with the resolutions of the Security Council, abide by the commitments they have entered into and avoid any backsliding — which would be damaging to the entire region.

We are gratified by the many diplomatic activities under way in the region, as well as by the summit meetings that have been held or are planned. We encourage all bilateral and multilateral initiatives for dialogue among the States of the subregion. Such dialogue will allow for the implementation of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement to be accelerated.

Whereas the cooperation of the Congolese authorities with MONUC is satisfactory, MONUC continues — as the Secretary-General's report states — to be frustrated by a lack of cooperation on the part of the Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie and the Front de libération du Congo. During its visit the mission of the Security Council conveyed a clear message, reminding these parties of the commitments that they had undertaken. The Council should reiterate this message.

The humanitarian situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo remains worrisome, and there are pressing needs. Significant efforts are being made by humanitarian organizations in cooperation with MONUC. These efforts deserve our full support.

Mr. Olara Otunnu has just described the challenges inherent in this situation in which children are being recruited to fight in the Democratic Republic of the Congo conflict. We are grateful for the efforts he made during his visit and for his recommendations for assisting war-affected children. We also appreciate all the initiatives being taken by humanitarian actors in order to protect children.

The economic revival of the Congo is one of the important elements that must accompany the return to peace. The Council mission gave particular attention to this. We note with satisfaction the will of donor countries and of the Bretton Woods institutions to support the efforts and sacrifices of the Congolese Government at this crucial stage. The re-opening of the road and river networks with the assistance of MONUC and the carrying out of the small local projects that have been identified will make the dividends of peace tangible to the people.

The recommendations formulated by the Secretary-General in his report are realistic, and we support them. The transition stage during phase III, as recommended by the Secretary-General, seems appropriate to us. In this regard it is worth reminding the delinquent parties that they need to provide all the required detailed information regarding the withdrawal of foreign troops and disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and resettlement. This information is essential if the United Nations is to play its role.

The need to enlarge MONUC's civilian component, including deploying a civilian police unit, has become obvious with the evolution of the peace process. In addition, the demilitarization of Kisangani, demanded by the Security Council in resolution 1304 (2000), and the increasing presence of MONUC in this city, as described by the Secretary-General, reflect the importance of the role that Kisangani could play in the economic and political life of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. As Mr. Guéhenno has told us, Kisangani has a symbolic value.

We agree that while extending the mandate of MONUC, the Security Council must remain vigilant, regularly reassessing the evolution of the situation and the parties' compliance with their commitments. Preparations for the next phase must be accompanied by renewed political will on the part of the parties. The Security Council has worked since last year in partnership with the Political Committee of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. This partnership should be enhanced during the next phase which will, undoubtedly, be decisive.

I would like in conclusion to pay tribute to the Secretary-General, to his Special Representative Mr. Kamel Morjane, to the Force Commander of MONUC and to all the staff of the Mission for the considerable

efforts that they continue to make to in support of peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

The President: In view of the lateness of the hour, and with the concurrence of the Council, I believe it will be appropriate for us to suspend here. We have a number of speakers, including the Council members Norway, Mali, Colombia, and Bangladesh, in my national capacity, and also Sweden, Namibia, Egypt, Japan, Burundi and Rwanda. We will suspend the meeting now and reconvene at 3 p.m.

The meeting was suspended at 1.25 p.m.

United Nations S/PV.4327 (Resumption 1)

Security Council

Fifty-sixth year

Provisional

4327th meeting

Wednesday, 13 June 2001, 3 p.m.
New York

President:	Mr. Chowdhury	(Bangladesh)
Members:	China	Mr. Wang Yingfan
	Colombia	Mr. Valdivieso
	France	Mr. Levitte
	Ireland	Mr. Cooney
	Jamaica	Mr. Ward
	Mali	Mr. Kassé
	Mauritius	Mr. Neewoor
	Norway	Mr. Kolby
	Russian Federation	Mr. Gatilov
	Singapore	Mr. Mahbubani
	Tunisia	Mr. Jerandi
	Ukraine	Mr. Kuchinsky
	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Sir Jeremy Greenstock
	United States of America	Mr. Hume

Agenda

The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo

Eighth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (S/2001/572).

This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the interpretation of speeches delivered in the other languages. The final text will be printed in the *Official Records of the Security Council*. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room C-178.

01-40971 (E)

The meeting was resumed at 3.10 p.m.

The President: I should like to inform the Council that I have received a letter from the representative of Uganda in which he requests to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the Council's agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite that representative to participate in the discussion without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Beyendeza (Uganda) took the seat reserved for him at the side of the Council Chamber.

Mr. Kolby (Norway): My delegation, too, is grateful for the briefings that we heard this morning.

We note the consistency of the assessments made by the Secretary-General in his report and by the recent Security Council mission in its report. The Council members' increasingly common analysis of and approach to the Great Lakes region is indeed a good basis for our deliberations this week on extending the mandate of the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC).

The progress made in the peace process during the past few months is encouraging. At the same time, the challenges at hand as we prepare for the third phase of MONUC are enormous, as illustrated in the Secretary-General s report. The risk requires a carefully balanced approach which would allow us to play our part in maintaining the momentum of the peace process while minimizing, to the extent possible, the scope for mission creep. It is important that the new MONUC mandate be given, to the greatest extent possible, in conformity with the relevant recommendations in the Brahimi report.

Norway is supportive of the recommendation in the Secretary-General's report to extend the mandate of the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo for 12 months, until 15 June 2002. We share his assessment that MONUC and the United Nations will be engaged in the Democratic Republic of the Congo for a considerable time. We believe that, by extending the mandate for one year, the international community is showing its commitment to supporting peace and security and to helping alleviate the sufferings of the people of the region.

We are supportive of the Secretary-General's request for additional personnel for MONUC. We are especially happy to see the proposed strengthening of the civilian component and we see the necessity of strengthening the operation's logistical capacity. However, we would have preferred to see a more detailed plan for the use of additional personnel.

Norway also shares the Secretary-General's concern about reports of eastward movements of armed groups and their incursion into Rwanda, Burundi and Tanzania. This concern underlines the necessity of establishing a viable programme of disarmament, demobilization, resettlement, reintegration and repatriation for armed groups, as identified in the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. I note, however, the Secretary-General's assessment that the plans provided to date by the parties are not a sufficient basis for further United Nations action in this regard. Pressure on the parties must thus be maintained in order to have a proper plan for disarmament, demobilization, resettlement, reintegration and repatriation devised. Likewise, pressure must be applied vis-à-vis the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and its allies to end any support for the negative forces operating in the region. We also share the view expressed by the Secretary-General that there can be no lasting peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo without a comprehensive settlement of the situation in Burundi.

The problem of assuring effective civilian administration, including the security and safety of the civilian population, remains a serious challenge to peace and stability in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. We agree with the notion that this is the responsibility of the parties with de facto control and we urge those in control to address this problem in a serious manner. We share the view that human rights, child protection and civil affairs officers will help to protect the safety of the civilian population.

We remain deeply concerned about the humanitarian situation and the use of child soldiers throughout the region. Special Representative Olara Otunnu's statement today on the exploitation of children provided an extremely grim picture. Concerted and urgent efforts are called for by the government

forces, as well as the rebel groups. We look forward to working with Olara Otunnu on his five-point plan. The international community must relentlessly address the aspects relating to the humanitarian situation.

Norway would like to reiterate its support for regional initiatives to bring peace to the Great Lakes region.

Mr. Kassé (Mali) (*spoke in French*): I should like to thank you, Sir, for having convened this public meeting pursuant to the issuance of the eighth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), which we commend.

My delegation welcomes the presence here today of the Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mr. Léonard She Okitundu. We thank him for his statement and commend the initiative of his Government to initiate direct, high-level negotiations with its neighbours and its decision to prohibit the recruitment of child soldiers and to order the demobilization of those already recruited.

Our thanks also go to the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Mr. Jean-Marie Guéhenno, for his introduction of the report and to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, Mr. Olara Otunnu, for his oral briefing this morning. We entirely subscribe to the recommendations and programme of action on child soldiers that have been put forward.

The report before us today follows that which we considered here only a few days ago in the wake of the Security Council mission to the Great Lakes region. It allows us, as did the other, to continue to entertain optimism — cautious optimism, of course — with regard to the Lusaka peace process. My delegation agrees with the observations and conclusions of the report and would like to make the following comments.

First, despite important progress made on various aspects of the Lusaka process, we share the Secretary-General's view that there can be no lasting peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo without a comprehensive settlement of the situation, particularly that which prevails in Burundi. In that connection, we strongly urge the continuation of bilateral summit meetings to achieve agreements based, inter alia, on common interests and mutual respect for the territorial integrity, national sovereignty and security of the States of the region.

Secondly, we are also of the view that the future of the Lusaka process depends on the commitment and cooperation of the parties. In that connection, we take due note of the significant progress achieved in the disengagement of forces and of the withdrawal and announced withdrawal of certain foreign forces from the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. We are still greatly concerned, however, over the reluctance and manifest lack of zeal shown by the Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie and the Front de libération du Congo towards, respectively, the demilitarization of Kisangani and disengagement in Equateur Province. This situation, which is dangerously hampering the process, should no longer be tolerated by the Security Council. The Council's resolutions and the instruments of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement must be implemented.

Thirdly, we subscribe to the idea of a transition to phase III deployment of MONUC. Such a transition should be brief and allow for the completion of planning for all the components of phase III. In that connection, we support the idea of a meeting in the context of the partnership between the Political Committee of the Lusaka Agreement and the Security Council next September.

Fourthly, with respect to the economic and humanitarian situation, we reiterate the appeal made to the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

We have already welcomed the opening of the Congo River to navigation. We support the process of establishing a Congo River Basin commission and are prepared to endorse the concept of opening a humanitarian corridor to ease a situation that needs no description, since the figures speak for themselves.

Lastly, we support the extension of the mandate of MONUC for another 12 months and will vote in favour of the draft resolution authorizing that extension.

I cannot conclude without paying a vibrant to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ambassador Kamel Morjane, and, through him, to his entire team and to all the agencies on the ground for their efforts to restore peace to the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Mr. Valdivieso (Colombia) (*spoke in Spanish*): My delegation wishes to welcome Mr. Léonard She Okitundu, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and to express appreciation for the informative presentations of Under-Secretary-General Guéhenno and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Otunnu, as well as for the presence of Mr. Annabi.

The broad consensus in the Security Council on the goals and purposes that the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) must achieve in implementing the Lusaka Agreement makes it unnecessary for me to speak at length at this meeting.

The Council members who have preceded me have highlighted various aspects of the important commitment to peace that we have with regard to the Democratic Republic of the Congo and its neighbouring countries. I had the opportunity to express that commitment personally to various interlocutors during our recent visit to the Great Lakes region. Therefore, allow me to make just a few comments on three points.

First, my delegation shares the view put forward by the Secretariat in its report that the insufficient information from the parties to the Lusaka Agreement prevents, at this time, the formulation of a broad strategy for the next phase of MONUC operations. In this regard, non-compliance with the deadlines for the presentation of timetables for the withdrawal of foreign troops and the total demobilization of armed groups, as well as certain delays in separating forces, is naturally somewhat disconcerting to us. However, this does not mean a loss of confidence in the process, because we also see positive signs. We urge the members of the Political Committee to deliver the information necessary to move to the next phase of MONUC operations.

Peace is an asset for which we must continue to strive, even in the face of strong resistance. Therefore, through this Council we will persist in peace activities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, but our commitment will inevitably depend on the degree of fulfilment of obligations shown by our partners.

We attach great importance to bilateral meetings between the authorities of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi, with a view to ending the support provided to the armed groups that operate on Congolese territory. We are concerned about recent reports on cross-border moves of contingents of the so-called negative forces; these movements constitute a kind of repatriation without disarmament and with serious consequences. In this regard, we underscore the upcoming meeting to be held between President Joseph Kabila and President Paul Kagame in the capital of Tanzania.

The second point is that my delegation wishes to express its deep concern about the humanitarian situation that the Democratic Republic of the Congo is experiencing, particularly caused by the massive displacement of people who are fleeing violence, the interruption of traditional sources of food supplies, the systematic plundering of the country's natural resources and the impact of the war on children's lives, as was eloquently presented by Mr. Olara Otunnu.

We find totally unacceptable the figure of 16 million people who have acute food needs and difficulty in gaining access to humanitarian organizations. We must promote an agreement between authorities and rebel groups to establish a human corridor for food delivery, as proposed by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.

The question of the protection of the civilian population in areas that have been or will be evacuated by rebel groups causes us concern. If protection is the fundamental responsibility of the de facto occupiers of each region, the reports that are reaching us on respect for human rights and international humanitarian law are cause for anxiety. We support the prompt deployment of human rights monitors in sufficient numbers to accomplish this monitoring task.

We also note that the situation of the population has worsened as a result of the illegal exploitation of the natural resources of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the widespread sale of arms to violent countries and groups involved in the conflict, particularly small arms, which cause the majority of deaths and injuries among the population. We urge arms suppliers to exercise greater control over arms sales to this region of Africa.

With regard to the situation of children in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, we support the five-point plan presented by the Special Representative, Mr. Otunnu, and we will contribute so that its recommendations will be reflected in the draft resolution to be adopted at the end of this week.

Thirdly and lastly, my delegation wishes to pay an admiring tribute and to express its appreciation to the personnel of MONUC and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in the Democratic Republic of the Congo for the excellent work they are doing. We are prepared to authorize the extension of the Mission mandate, as proposed by the Secretary-General, with a view to a subsequent third phase. Therefore, we will support the text of the draft resolution, to be submitted by the French delegation, which is now in the negotiating phase and which will seek the progressive strengthening of the Mission through the expansion of its civilian staff component.

The President: Bangladesh was supposed to take the floor and I was supposed to make a statement in my national capacity, but as a gesture to the non-Council members, I will take the floor after they have spoken.

I invite the representative of Sweden to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Norström (Sweden): I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union. The Central and Eastern European Countries associated with the European Union — Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia — and the associated countries Cyprus, Malta and Turkey, as well as the European Free Trade Association countries members of the European Economic Area, Iceland and Liechtenstein, align themselves with this statement.

First of all, I would like to express our appreciation here for the presence of the Foreign Minister of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mr. She Okitundu. We are also very grateful for the briefings by Mr. Guéhenno and Mr. Otunnu that we heard this morning. I would also like to welcome and recognize the presence of Mr. Hédi Annabi.

For several months developments in the Democratic Republic of the Congo have inspired increasing hope. In his report of 8 June, the Secretary-General describes a situation not merely of obstacles and difficulties, but also of opportunities and positive trends. The European Union notes with satisfaction the Secretary-General's conclusion that progress has been made in key areas since April and his cautious optimism regarding the immediate future of the Lusaka peace process.

The European Union remains fully supportive of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, the consensual basis for peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Sustained advances should be ensured on all aspects of the agreement, in particular the orderly withdrawal of foreign troops, the national dialogue in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, repatriation or resettlement of the armed groups. Continued progress depends, first and foremost, on the parties to the conflict. The role of the United Nations and the international community, including the European Union, and the contribution they can make to peace and development in the region is clearly defined by the actions of the parties themselves.

We therefore urge all parties to honour their commitments fully and in earnest, and to comply unconditionally with their obligations, thus enabling further progress to take place in the Lusaka peace process.

As for the role of the United Nations, important decisions are to be taken by the Council within the next couple of days on the future of the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC). Taking into account the current situation and both its positive and its troubling characteristics, the European Union agrees with the Secretary-General that the momentum generated by the disengagement of forces and the withdrawals of foreign forces should not be lost. The European Union thus welcomes the proposal of the Secretary-General to extend the mandate of MONUC and to deploy, within the force level of 5,537, additional personnel for the functions envisaged for a transitional period leading up to the third phase.

The European Union welcomes the cooperation extended to MONUC by the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and its allies, and the cooperation between MONUC and the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) and the Ugandan People's Defence Forces (UPDF). However, the difficulties and delays caused by the Front de libération du Congo (FLC) and the Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie (RCD) are unacceptable. The European Union considers particularly serious the detainment of MONUC observers by the FLC and the targeting of MONUC in disinformation campaigns. While welcoming the fact that disengagement and verification are near completion in three of the four sectors, we also

note with concern that obstructions have occurred, in particular by the FLC. All parties should finalize their disengagement and respect the new defensive positions. International humanitarian law must be respected, including in areas from which troops have been disengaged.

The recent Security Council mission to the region emphasized that the Council expected to see steady, consistent progress and strict adherence by the parties to all agreements and timetables regarding the withdrawal of foreign forces and the disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and repatriation or resettlement of armed groups. The European Union fully endorses that position. As regards that process, it should be based primarily on voluntary reintegration and repatriation in order to be effective. The international community may support such a voluntary process, but the primary responsibility for implementation lies with the parties themselves. In particular, the Governments of Zimbabwe and of the Democratic Republic of the Congo should cease all support to such armed groups, and Rwanda should honour its commitment with a view to repatriation and reintegration. The European Union recognizes the need to differentiate among various categories of members of the armed groups, and to tackle urgently the question of groups of Rwandan origin. Furthermore, the demobilization of child soldiers should be a top priority.

The humanitarian situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and throughout the region remains an area of most serious concern, as reflected in all recent reports of the Secretary-General. In order for genuine improvement to be possible, all parties must guarantee secure, rapid and unimpeded access for humanitarian assistance. While welcoming the fact that access to vulnerable populations is improving, we note that faltering security remains a constant threat to crucial humanitarian and rehabilitation efforts, as illustrated by the deplorable attack on six workers of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in April.

The difficult humanitarian conditions, which particularly affect women and children, must be given increased international attention and financial assistance. The European Commission has decided to provide 35 million euros in humanitarian assistance and 120 million euros to finance poverty alleviation and the promotion of human rights. The European Union remains willing to contribute further to the improvement of the humanitarian situation and to the economic regeneration of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

The President: The next speaker is the representative of Namibia. I invite him to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Theron (Namibia): Let me start, Sir, by saying how happy my delegation is to see you presiding over the work of the Security Council. We also want to thank you for arranging this important meeting today. I would also like to take this opportunity to commend Ambassador Cunningham for the excellent manner in which he conducted the work of the Council in May. I would further like to thank Mr. Guéhenno for introducing the report of the Secretary-General and Mr. Otunnu for his important briefing this morning. My delegation welcomes His Excellency Mr. Léonard She Okitundu, the Foreign Minister of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, to today's meeting.

The report of the Secretary-General before the Council in document S/2001/572 takes cognizance of and plans for progress in the peace process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, although cautiously and while recognizing that the progress is still limited. However, my delegation welcomes the proposed steps and confirms the positive developments since the last Council meeting.

In that regard, while noting the present limit of 5,537 for the personnel of the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), my delegation trusts that that number will soon be appropriately increased, taking into consideration the many functions to be performed by MONUC.

My delegation furthermore welcomes the progress reported with regard to the inter-Congolese dialogue. We commend the work done by the neutral facilitator, Sir Ketumile Masire, and in particular his announcement that a preparatory meeting to the dialogue will take place on 16 July. We note that his associates will visit all 11 provinces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in preparing for the dialogue process. It is furthermore our view that the preparatory meeting and the dialogue can take place on Congolese territory, and that they should be without outside interference.

We note that the humanitarian situation remains precarious and that serious human rights violations are continuing, in particular in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. We support immediate measures aimed at stopping that tragedy. We also hope that, along with their associates, the murderers of the six personnel of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) will soon be apprehended and brought to justice. We commend Mr. Olara Otunnu for his efforts to highlight and improve the plight of children in armed conflict, and we welcome the positive results achieved thus far.

We continue to insist that the Council should ensure that Kisangani be completely demilitarized in accordance with resolution 1304 (2000). The reasons advanced for its continued occupation by military forces of the Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie (RCD) are unfounded, since MONUC troops are perfectly capable of providing security for the city. Moreover, the expansion of MONUC's presence, as proposed in the report of the Secretary-General, will adequately take care of any security concerns. We agree with the Secretary-General's assessment of the role that Kisangani could play in the economic and political regeneration of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

The economic revival of the Democratic Republic of the Congo is of extreme importance to alleviate the suffering of the Congolese people and to improve the disastrous economic situation in their country. We welcome initiatives already undertaken to achieve that goal, and in particular we note the announcement just made by the representative of Sweden. But we also want to stress that massive bilateral and multilateral efforts will be required, considering the size and the population of the country. The international community should therefore continue to assist Congo's economic revival efforts.

In that regard, we recognize that the opening of the riverine network is an important step, and we share the view that it will have benefits not only for trade and freedom of movement but also for confidence-building and for the strengthening of national unity. We therefore deplore the recent threat by the RCD that the Uruguayan riverine unit will not be allowed to reach Kisangani. My delegation wishes also to reiterate the importance of the co-location of the Joint Military Commission (JMC) with MONUC in Kinshasa to allow the two bodies to coordinate military planning for the next stages of their operations.

As we have stated consistently, Namibia remains committed to the Lusaka peace process and to the full implementation of the Kampala and Harare disengagement plans and sub-plans. Hence, my delegation recognizes the importance of a detailed plan and modalities for assistance to be provided by the United Nations. In that regard, I wish to confirm here that on 3 May Namibia submitted to the JMC the required information on its forces, and that our withdrawal plans are on course, as required by relevant Security Council resolutions. My delegation can also confirm that, as mentioned this morning by Mr. Guéhenno, it is the intention of the Namibian Government to have all Namibian forces withdrawn from the Democratic Republic of the Congo by the end of August.

In conclusion, my delegation welcomes all efforts towards furthering the peace process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. We therefore support the extension of the mandate of MONUC for 12 months, until 15 June 2002. Furthermore, we join the Secretary-General in expressing appreciation to Mr. Kamel Morjane, to the MONUC Force Commander and to the men and women of MONUC for their efforts to help restore peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. We wish Mr. Morjane a speedy recovery.

The President: The next speaker inscribed on my list is the representative of Egypt. I invite him to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Aboul Gheit (Egypt) (*spoke in Arabic*): I would like at the outset to extend our thanks to you, Mr. President, for organizing this open debate and for affording us the opportunity to participate in this meeting on the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and on the role we expect the United Nations to play in this important phase of the peace process in that country. I would also like to take this opportunity to welcome the Foreign Minister of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Our two countries have excellent relations that serve to unite us.

The delegation of Egypt has considered with interest the report of the Secretary-General on the Democratic Republic of the Congo. We have also followed the activities of the Security Council mission that visited the Great Lakes region in the second half of May this year, as well as the valuable results that were

achieved during that mission. In this regard, my delegation would like to make a number of specific points that we believe need to be stressed.

First, the peace process in the Congo has lately witnessed a number of consecutive steps that have served to maintain the current momentum aimed at implementing the Lusaka Agreement in both its military and political components and at reaching a final and comprehensive settlement of the conflict, which has been tearing the Congo apart and draining the energies of its neighbours for almost three years. These steps have been reflected, inter alia, in the continued respect by the parties of the ceasefire; in the implementation of the disengagement plans between their forces in the field; and in their agreement on the principal framework that will govern the processes of withdrawing all foreign forces from the country and of disarming, demobilizing and reintegrating the armed groups taking refuge on Congolese soil.

Secondly, and in the same vein, we now look to the United Nations to intensify its efforts to support the parties in implementing their commitments in accordance with the Lusaka Agreement and the relevant Security Council resolutions; to create an environment conducive to the withdrawal of foreign forces from the Congo and to ending the problems posed by armed groups; and to establish the necessary arrangements to restore the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Congo and address the security concerns of its neighbours.

While we welcome the recommendation in the Secretary-General's report on the revised concept of operations for the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) and on the deployment of additional troops, observers and civilian personnel in the operation, we also hope that the United Nations will proceed to prepare the necessary plans to establish and deploy the third, expanded phase of the Mission so that the period we are about to enter — which we assume will be a transitional one — will not be prolonged, and so that the situation in the field will not become entrenched where it currently stands, that is, lacking the implementation of the specific steps needed to bring the Lusaka Agreement to its desired conclusion.

Thirdly, while we are aware of the essential prerequisites that must be met prior to the deployment of phase III of the operation — at the forefront of which is the provision by the parties of relevant information on the numbers, locations and armaments of their forces and those of the armed groups — we would also like to stress that the United Nations must be ready to address the challenges and risks it may face in such an expanded operation, as it did in Sierra Leone and, before that, in East Timor.

The Congo operation, like all other peacekeeping operations, will by its nature and the nature of the mission area be subject to a number of risks that cannot be avoided. This, however, should not serve as a cause for hesitation in the establishment of phase III, so long as the two primary conditions that the Secretary-General previously set for the deployment of United Nations personnel in the Congo are met. Those conditions are the provision of the necessary security guarantees for MONUC personnel, and the reaffirmation by the parties of their commitment to respect and implement the Lusaka Agreement.

Fourthly, of course we cannot ask the United Nations to undertake the primary role in the efforts to resolve the conflict in the Congo without reaffirming the responsibility that the parties themselves bear in moving forward with the implementation of the Lusaka Agreement and their responsibility to demonstrate the necessary political will — not only to prepare detailed plans for the withdrawal of foreign forces and the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of the armed groups, but also to implement what is agreed upon in good faith and to resolve any differences that may emerge between them within the Joint Military Commission, the Political Committee and the inter-Congolese dialogue under the facilitation of former President Masire.

We would also like to take this opportunity to encourage the parties to intensify their diplomatic contacts at the highest level in a manner that strongly drives the peace process forward and contributes to the building of trust among them at this critical time. In this regard, we welcome the steps being taken to organize a meeting between Presidents Kabila and Museveni, and we express the hope that those efforts will extend to arranging similar direct contacts between the leaderships in Kinshasa and Kigali.

Fifthly, we have also witnessed the increasing importance given by the Security Council and the Secretariat to the need to enhance the international support that must accompany the implementation of the

Lusaka Agreement in resuscitating the Congolese economy, rebuilding the infrastructure that was destroyed by the conflict and rehabilitating the social, educational and health institutions of the country. While we welcome the ideas and initiatives that the international community has begun to put forward in that regard, we also express the hope that the international community will prove its resolve to build a genuine peace in the Congo and to eradicate the basic causes that may prevent permanent peace and stability from taking root in the country. It should do so by generously contributing to the various programmes that may be put in place so that they do not remain a dead letter, as well as to end the suffering of the Congolese people, who have been deprived for many decades of enjoying the life of dignity and prosperity that they deserve.

Sixthly, Egypt will continue its active role in contributing to the restoration of permanent peace in the Congo and in the Great Lakes region — whether through its bilateral contacts with the parties concerned or within the Organization of African Unity. We will also maintain our support for the courageous efforts of the United Nations — represented by the Security Council and the Secretary-General and his Special Representative, Kamel Morjane — as well as our contribution to MONUC, in which Egypt is proud to be the largest provider of military observers among the 43 countries participating in the operation.

Before concluding, I would like to express our deep concern at the ongoing events in the Central African Republic following the failed coup attempt that erupted in Bangui over two weeks ago. Perhaps those events will strengthen the conviction of the United Nations that the security and political situation in the Great Lakes region continues to be extremely fragile and that any undue haste in terminating or reducing the presence of the United Nations in the region — or a failure to confront the inter-twined problems that continue to threaten international peace and security — will only result in multiple consequences of a much more serious nature than those already afflicting this important and strategic region in the heart of the African continent.

The President: The next speaker is the representative of Japan. I invite him to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Akasaka (Japan): I would like to thank you, Mr. President, for convening this meeting as a follow-up to the Security Council's recent mission to the Democratic Republic of the Congo. First of all, let me welcome the presence of Mr. She Okitundu, Foreign Minister of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. I would also like to thank Mr. Otunnu for his excellent report this morning.

My Government commends the Security Council for its work and for its timely report. We read with great interest the Secretary-General's eighth report on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), which is based on the mission's report. We appreciate its focus on reconstruction and development issues in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and note its recommendation that MONUC's mandate be extended for one year.

Japan has been closely following the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, recognizing that world stability and prosperity cannot prevail in the twenty-first century unless the problems of Africa are resolved. For this reason, my Government places great emphasis on the need to support the African countries' own efforts for their development, as well as conflict-prevention measures and refugee-assistance programmes. Today I would like to emphasize the following points with respect to the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

First, my Government has long emphasized that peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo needs to be considered in the wider context of consolidating peace throughout the region, and must therefore be pursued with a comprehensive and integrated approach. Peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction and development, democratization and a halt to the illicit exploitation of natural resources must likewise be pursued from a regional perspective. Thus, my Government has argued that, as part of its efforts to achieve a peaceful settlement of the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Security Council should also address the economic and security problems in neighbouring Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda. For this reason the recent deterioration of the situation in Burundi is all the more worrisome to my Government. Japan shares the view of the Secretary-General that there can be no lasting peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo without a comprehensive settlement of the situation in Burundi.

Secondly, my Government welcomes the Secretary-General's recommendation that, while MONUC continues to complete phase II of its operations, the Security Council authorize the transition to phase III of MONUC deployment, which entails the disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and resettlement of armed groups. We believe this overlapping of the activities for the completion of phase II with the preparatory activities of phase III will reduce the risk of losing momentum in the peace process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Thirdly, an expansion of the civilian components of MONUC is necessary if the Security Council is to have a longer-term commitment to the peace process in the region.

Fourthly, Japan is greatly encouraged by Sir Ketumile Masire's announcement that a preparatory meeting for the inter-Congolese dialogue is to begin on 16 July. We sincerely hope that this will advance the democratization process, and we call upon the international community to support the facilitation efforts of Sir Ketumile Masire.

Finally, my Government welcomed the announcement of the reopening of the Congo River as well as the proposed establishment of a Congo River Basin Commission. The revitalization of trade by reopening the country's main inland waterway system would be a significant milestone on the path towards economic reconstruction and development.

Japan has provided emergency and humanitarian assistance as well as financial contributions to support the activities of the Joint Military Commission and the inter-Congolese dialogue. As the situation becomes more stable, we look forward to considering extending assistance to the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo for its nation-building efforts.

The President: The next speaker is the representative of Burundi. I invite him to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Nteturuye (Burundi) (*spoke in French*): Allow me to congratulate you sincerely, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for the month of June. The delegation of Burundi does not have the slightest doubt that you will lead the work of the Council with your usual flair. I also wish to welcome to the Council the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

This public meeting of the Security Council on the Democratic Republic of the Congo gives me an opportunity to pay tribute to the Council for its persistent efforts to restore peace to the Great Lakes region of Africa, as reflected, inter alia, in the Council's most recent visit to the region.

In regard to the eighth report of the Secretary-General on the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the report of the Security Council mission to the Great Lakes region, Burundi would like to recall the current threats to the security of our country and to the inter-Burundian peace process.

First of all, the good prospects for peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo are, paradoxically but intentionally, at the root of the unfortunate evolution of the security situation in Burundi. The Secretary-General and the Security Council have understood this, and we are grateful to them for affirming that there will be no lasting peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo if it must come at the expense of peace in Burundi.

Secondly, the countries of the region that sponsored the peace agreements signed at Arusha on 28 August 2000 must work as a united front to bring about an end to the war in Burundi. This is the most fervent wish of the Government and the people of Burundi. Peace will be regional or there will be no peace, as those who know the socio-political realities of this part of Africa are aware.

Every passing day points to a certain duplicity on the part of some countries of the region — an agenda that is no longer concealed, since some have said to the Security Council mission that the negative forces are negative here but not negative there, and that, in fact, they are not negative at all. This is troubling, given the fact that the Lusaka and Arusha agreements were signed under the moral umbrella of the representatives of all of the countries concerned from that same region.

The delegation of Burundi wishes to recall here that as long as the Forces pour la défense de la démocratie (FDD) and the Forces nationales de libération (FNL) — Burundi armed groups — do not put an end to the hostilities, as long as they are not disarmed in accordance with the Lusaka Agreement and repatriated to Burundi to be reintegrated socially — in the case of those who are not found guilty of crimes under the Arusha Agreement — those groups will be considered negative forces, to be

combated and brought to justice in Burundi, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and in any other country. Indeed, they constitute a regional danger, just like their allies, the Interahamwe and the former Rwandan armed forces (ex-FAR), who became mercenaries of genocide in Africa.

What must be done? First of all, the Government of Burundi asks the Security Council not to allow the Lusaka and Arusha processes to destroy each other. The Council must find a formula that can ensure a deterrent presence at the borders of Burundi with the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Tanzania, and avert the failure of current efforts to restore peace to the region. It is a fact that the transfer of war from the Democratic Republic of the Congo towards Burundi or Rwanda will perpetuate the regional conflict and make it even crueler.

Secondly, strong pressure must be brought to bear by those countries that have a real influence on the Burundian armed groups — in this case Tanzania more than any other country — to induce those groups to put an end to the violence and rejoin the peace process. We are convinced that if the FDD and the FNL had no rear bases or multifaceted external support, they would long ago have agreed to the conclusions of the Arusha Peace Agreement, as they had pledged to do.

We are gratified that today many members of the Security Council appealed to all those who have influence on those groups to induce them to take a more positive stance. But those groups want to continue the war, even though a political agreement was signed nine months ago. Unfortunately, the signals that they are sending out are not encouraging.

We read in the report of the Security Council mission, we read that the leader of the FDD had put forward a series of conditions before agreeing to sign or to negotiate a ceasefire agreement. In fact, it was political questions that were at issue, questions that are already answered in the Arusha Agreement.

Today I can inform the Security Council that I have seen a statement by the FDD in which it says that it will never sign a ceasefire agreement until political negotiations with it come to an end. It also states that it is shocked by the double language of the Security Council, because, according to the groups, when the Council met with Mr. Jean Bosco there was some degree of mutual understanding, and now they do not understand why the Council is still asking them to put an end to the hostilities.

The international community must also exert some pressure. We are pleased to note that the Security Council is doing so, in particular since its meeting with the two armed groups, in Kinshasa and in Dar es-Salaam. We urge the Council to provide for enforcement measures, as have been used elsewhere in similar cases, if the rebellion definitively turns its back on a negotiated solution.

The violence in Burundi is standing in the way of the implementation of the Peace Agreement. The various supporters of the armed groups do not give the impression of being interested in the implementation of the peace agreement; they too seem to follow the logic of military victory. Peace in Burundi must be saved, and the Arusha Agreement must be saved, before it is too late.

In conclusion, I should like to reiterate the will of the Government of Burundi to continue bilateral consultations, in particular with the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Tanzania, in the hope that this will yield positive results before it is too late.

I should also like once again to commend the Security Council's commitment to peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and in Burundi and to express the hope that the United Nations will join the efforts of Nelson Mandela, Ketumile Masire and the heads of State of the region to give renewed hope to those peoples of the Great Lakes region of Africa, in particular women, children, the elderly and even humanitarian workers, who are dying day by day or are wandering within and outside the borders.

The Government of Burundi would like to draw the attention of the Security Council to the fact that delays are dangerous and action is therefore urgent.

The President: I thank the representative of Burundi for the very kind words he addressed to me.

The next speaker inscribed on my list is the representative of Rwanda. I invite him to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Gasana (Rwanda) (*spoke in French*): My country, Rwanda, would like to congratulate you, Mr. President, on your leadership and that of your country as you guide the work of the Security Council during this month of June. Rwanda would like to assure you

and all of the members of the Council of its full cooperation.

Rwanda welcomes the fact that you have convened a public meeting today to explain, analyse and extend the mandate of the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC).

The very worst thing that the late President Mobutu did vis-à-vis our neighbours in the Congo was to ally himself strongly with those who planned and committed the genocide in Rwanda. Need we recall here that Mobutu's Congolese army fought side by side with the former Rwandan armed forces (ex-FAR) in Rwanda in 1990 against Rwandan citizens who were fighting for their right to a homeland after a forced exile of more than 30 years?

The reunion of those two friendly armies on the territory of the Congo has, since July 1994, led to serious problems for the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Frankly, it can only be deplored, especially since it has caused us tremendous border security problems with the Congo, our neighbour.

Today, intensive fighting is taking place in two provinces of Rwanda that border the Congo, namely the province of Gisenyi and the province of Ruhengeri. This fighting is taking place between, on the one hand, those who planned and implemented the genocide in Rwanda and who found a welcome refuge in the Congo since 1994, and the Rwandan Patriotic Army on the other.

It is no secret to anyone that, from Mobutu's day to the post-Mobutu period, the Interahamwe militias and the former Rwandan Army Forces (ex-FAR), which perpetrated the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, have been the spearhead of Mobutu's army. If the strategy of the signatories of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement today is to wage war in the rear by sending us the Interahamwe militias and ex-Far armed to the teeth, rather than to send them disarmed and disengaged pursuant to the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, that in itself is, in a way, a violation of the Agreement. Rwanda vigorously denounces that approach, which jeopardizes the entire Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement on which we found all our hopes.

It is said that history is perpetually repeating itself. In 1996 and 1997, the United Nations Development Programme, other United Nations agencies and Western embassies in Kigali drew maps of Rwanda, with the provinces bordering on the Democratic Republic of the Congo coloured red to indicate the threat of insecurity, ambushes and murder perpetrated by the ex-FAR and Interahamwe militias that had infiltrated the country from Congolese territory. That was the situation in 1996 that prompted the Rwandese Government to decide to fight them and to chase them into the territory of the Congo, where they received shelter and assistance. The same or a similar scenario is being played out again today. Two Rwandese border provinces have been designated in red as dangerous regions where no United Nations agency, no embassy and no non-governmental organization can venture, just as it was in 1996-1997.

We believe that the Security Council is duty-bound to assist Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the entire region, so that the Interahamwe militias and ex-Far responsible for the genocide in Rwanda can be disarmed and disengaged in accordance with the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement.

Various reports and even some statements have highlighted what has commonly been called the illegal exploitation of the natural resources of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Rwanda once again reaffirms loud and clear that it went into the Congo for security reasons, threatened by the genocidal forces of the Interahamwe militias and ex-FAR operating from Congolese territory, and not in search of any natural resources of that neighbouring country. Proof of this can be found in the fighting taking place today, as we speak, along the Rwanda-Congo border, which attests to the fact that we went into the Congo for no other reason than the security of our country.

Rwanda therefore believes that we cannot come to the conclusion, on the basis of information howsoever troubling, that there has been any illegal exploitation, as yet unproved, of the natural resources of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Panel of Experts has been asked to continue its investigation and to seek tangible proof of the allegations it made in its first report. Why not await the issuance of the next report before we reaffirm anything and proclaim our intentions?

I cannot conclude my statement without briefly addressing the eighth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. As members of the

Council are aware, we received the Security Council mission to the region. The mission met with members of the Political Committee in Lusaka under the chairmanship of Rwanda. The outcome of the meeting was set out in a joint communiqué annexed to the report before us today. It is also known that, in an effort fully to implement the provisions of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, Rwanda has taken the initiative to withdraw 200 kilometres from Pweto and to meet all the deadlines for withdrawal, in conjunction with the other components of the Agreement, taking into due account the requirements of our country's security. Our head of State had occasion to refer to this in his meeting at Kigali with the Security Council mission and on his recent travels in the region, including to Zimbabwe, where he met with his counterpart, President Mugabe, and elsewhere on the continent.

We are very pleased that the Secretary-General has spared no effort in support of the activities of the Security Council in the region with a view to assisting our people to re-establish peace, which everyone needs, especially those children to whom Mr. Otunnu referred this morning with such emotion and compassion.

We spoke earlier of the chagrin of Congolese and Rwandese alike at having to live to this day with the unfortunate legacies of Mobutu in the Congo and Habyarimana in Rwanda. Following their massacres of hundreds of thousands in Rwanda in 1994, Habyarimana's Interahamwe militias and the ex-FAR crossed the Rwanda-Congo border with their war machines and their spirit and philosophy of genocide, which, unfortunately for us all, they have exported to the peaceful people of the Congo. It is not my neighbours to my left at this table who created the Interahamwe and the ex-FAR, nor is it I myself who am responsible; they are the legacy of poor leaders on both sides.

The philosophy of genocide — the exclusion and extermination of others — that has been entrenched in the region was invoked by Rwandese civil society in Kigali during the Security Council's recent mission to the Great Lakes region. This spirit and philosophy of genocide have been propagated throughout the region by their advocates, the Interahamwe militias and the ex-FAR, who move freely throughout the region. The Security Council was unable to make an appropriate, adequate or precise response in Kigali, but it promised to continue to reflect on the genocidal spirit that continues to reign in the Great Lakes region. Why not undertake a joint action, all of us together — Rwanda, the Security Council, the Democratic Republic of the Congo — to neutralize those elements which are sowing the seeds of the genocidal philosophy in the Great Lakes region?

In conclusion, I reaffirm the willingness of the Government of Rwanda to pursue its close cooperation with the Security Council, with MONUC on the ground in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and with any other agency that is working for the implementation of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement in its entirety.

The President: I thank the representative of Rwanda for his kind words addressed to me and my country.

The next speaker inscribed on my list is the representative of Uganda. I invite him to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Beyendeza (Uganda): My delegation congratulates you, Mr. President, on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council and looks forward to an open and transparent handling of important issues — as you promised and now have demonstrated — such as the Democratic Republic of the Council and others that the Council will discuss during this month of your presidency.

The Ugandan delegation also welcomes the participation of the Foreign Minister of the Democratic Republic of the Congo today. We particularly want to emphasize the positive and constructive attitudes in his presentation, not only with regard to the security concerns of his country but also those of the neighbours, including my country, Uganda. Furthermore, my delegation thanks the Secretary-General for his report and the able manner in which it was presented by the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Mr. Guéhenno. We also take note of the five-point programme of action proposed by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children in Armed Conflict, following his recent visit to the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

For us in Uganda, the challenges raised by Ambassador Olara Otunnu have been our painful concerns for some time, following the continuing abduction of children in the northern part of Uganda by the Lord's Resistance Army. We would therefore like to renew our long-standing invitation to the Special Representative to make time in his busy schedule to

visit Uganda on the same subject. Maybe it could make a difference.

This is the second time in a relatively short period that the Security Council is devoting yet another open meeting to the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Although this meeting focuses primarily on the report of the Secretary-General and the draft resolution for the renewal of the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), my delegation believes that some of the most important issues that have been covered today have also been covered in past Council meetings. My delegation will therefore be brief and will mention a few of the issues that we feel should be addressed.

First, Uganda has continued to implement the withdrawal policy within the framework of the Lusaka Peace Accord, as the Security Council has noted and has been recognized in the Secretary-General's report, S/2001/572, now before the Council. We want to assure the Council that this will continue.

Secondly, our country continues to cooperate with MONUC under the planned withdrawal programme and the programme for demobilization, disarming, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration. Again, the report of the Secretary-General has confirmed that Uganda is the only country, apart from Angola, that continues to provide information on numbers, disposition and armaments of our forces in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. We shall continue to cooperate in this regard.

Thirdly, my delegation notes that the Secretary-General's report wishes to maintain the same level of operation, at 5,537 officers and men. In our view, this is too small a force and too large an area which is expected to be covered. We therefore propose that this process should be left open and be reviewed, even at midterm, to address the concerns as troops are withdrawn and MONUC is called upon to take more and more areas under its observation and control.

Fourthly, Uganda wishes once again to share some views expressed by some members of the Security Council concerning the issue of the violation of human rights. Our delegation believes that any violation of human rights is wrong in any circumstances, and therefore this matter should be addressed in the entirety of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Finally, my delegation would like to reaffirm its support for the implementation of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, for Uganda believes firmly that that Agreement addressed two fundamental areas in the root of the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and indeed the region. The first area is the internal dimension of the conflict, which is going to be settled through a dialogue. The second is the external dimension, which addresses the security concerns of the Democratic Republic of the Congo itself and of its neighbours. My delegation would like to call upon all the signatories to Lusaka Agreement to implement it fully.

The President: I shall now make a statement in my capacity as the representative of Bangladesh. After my statement I will give the floor to Ambassador Otunnu and to Mr. Annabi — if he wishes to take the floor on behalf of Mr. Guéhenno — if they have any point to raise.

I first thank Under-Secretary-General Jean-Marie Guéhenno and Special Representative Olara Otunnu for their presentations, which have set the background for today's deliberations. We are engaged here in a critically important phase of the Lusaka peace process. The presence of Foreign Minister Leonard Okitundu with us today testifies to his Government's abiding commitment to the peace process and to cooperation with the United Nations. We have noted his Government's position on different aspects of the peace process, particularly on the matter of child soldiers. I am sure that his views will provide extremely important inputs to the Council's decision-making process.

I shall limit my observations to three specific points of special interest to Bangladesh.

First, child soldiers. I was struck by Ambassador Otunnu's observation that Congo is being robbed of its future. Ambassador Otunnu, whose mission to the Democratic Republic of the Congo my delegation had pursued for the past few months, has brought us a grim, alarming report. The children of that country represent, as he reports, many faces of suffering: uprooted children, street children, war orphans, those separated from parents, child soldiers who are traumatized, abandoned, malnourished, sexually abused. Ambassador Otunnu's findings tell us most unequivocally that the question of the children of the Democratic Republic of the Congo needs to be

addressed as a matter of particular concern and high priority.

He has made some practical recommendations, particularly the five-point programme of action, which has the support of all political sides. We should give serious consideration to his proposals. The subregional dimension of which he spoke with regard to the issue of child soldiers also needs our attention. A report published yesterday by the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers says that more than 120,000 children are currently fighting in Africa. Children are often seen as cheap and expendable fighters. In that context, I once again draw the attention of the Council to the proposal made by the Prime Minister of Bangladesh at the Security Council summit in September 2000 that of child-soldier-free zones be declared in various parts of the world.

The second point of interest to Bangladesh is the inter-Congolese dialogue. The Security Council mission considered the inter-Congolese dialogue to be the centrepiece of the entire peace process. It would address in a sustainable way the main source of the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. We welcome the decision of President Masire to convene a preparatory meeting on 16 July. It should not be further delayed. The parties should show pragmatism and a constructive spirit in their negotiations on procedural and substantive issues. Bangladesh concurs with the view of the Council mission that the dialogue should proceed, in all parts of the country, as speedily as possible. It would also be symbolically important to hold the dialogue within the territory of the Congo.

My third and final point relates to civilian components and humanitarian need. The most important matter before us at this stage is certainly the preparedness of the United Nations. The Secretary-General has been keeping us informed about the requirements for the third phase, starting more elaborately with his seventh report (S/2001/373). In his present report too he draws attention to the need for considerable expansion of the civilian components of the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC). The deployment of those components, including civilian police, is extremely important in the context of the need for the protection of civilians and related matters. We believe that the Council should take the lead in mobilizing necessary support in that regard.

The Council mission, in its report, underlined the economic needs of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and identified areas for attention, including the opening of riverine traffic, the renovation of rail and road networks and quick impact projects. It was stressed that broader economic assistance should accompany the peace process. It is time that the relevant organs and agencies of the United Nations system mobilized economic assistance to sustain peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Bangladesh drew attention to that humanitarian imperative in April, when the Council considered the seventh report of the Secretary-General. We hope that the United Nations funds and programmes, the Bretton Woods institutions and the international community are seriously engaged in the planning that was urged about two months ago. The people of the Democratic Republic of the Congo have suffered the scourge of a protracted war. We must not fail them as they stake everything to secure peace.

I now resume my functions as President of the Security Council.

I call on Mr. Otunnu.

Mr. Otunnu: I thank you, Mr. President, for inviting me to brief the Security Council, and I thank you very much for your deep interest and for your commitment to helping the children of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. I have taken note of all the important comments made by Council members and other delegations. I will act on them and will continue the dialogue with the Council. My Office is at the Council's disposal to work with its members.

I very much hope that the Council will consider incorporating into the draft resolution it is preparing for subsequent adoption some of the practical recommendations I have placed before it.

Again, I thank you, Sir; I thank the members of the Council; and I thank all the other delegations that participated in this discussion. The children of the Democratic Republic of the Congo need us; we must not let them down.

The President: Mr. Guéhenno has been unable to remain in the Council Chamber, so in the absence of objection, I shall take it that the Security Council agrees to extend an invitation under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure to Mr. Hédi Annabi,

Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

I call on Mr. Annabi.

Mr. Annabi: I do not think there were any specific questions addressed to Mr. Guéhenno, and I know that members are eager to move on to their meeting with troop-contributing countries. I would like just to express our thanks to members of the Council for their kind words of appreciation regarding the work done by the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) and by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in support of the peace process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. I will gladly convey those expressions of appreciation to Mr. Morjane. I will also convey to him the good wishes expressed by members of the Council for his prompt recovery. As members know, he was unable to be here today because he is recovering from malaria.

The President: I would indeed ask Mr. Annabi to convey to Ambassador Morjane our very best wishes for a speedy recovery. The Council has already sent him a get-well message, and we are looking forward to his quick recovery and to his being able to join us so that we can interact with him.

There are no further speakers on my list. The Security Council has thus concluded the present stage of its consideration of the item on its agenda. The Security Council will remain seized of the matter.

The meeting rose at 4.40 p.m.